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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 September 2013
We know so much more about Cicero than we do about anyone else from antiquity, and because of the nature of our knowledge, especially the ‘personal’ viewpoint which his letters offer, it is easy to think we know more about him than we actually do, or to consider him unique, attributing to him alone as personality characteristics things which may in fact be features common to others of his class and time. So, for instance, he is regularly accused of inconsistency in public life by both ancients and moderns, but I believe here we are led astray by the evidence, and that he was only marginally more changeable than his contemporaries. This is a position impossible to argue, because it would require information that we do not have about the vagaries of political alliances in the 60s, 50s, and 40s bc, and about how many times various people changed their minds about different things. Even the limited material we do have, however, suggests that the successful late Republican politician held very few alliances to be unbreakable. This article explores the possibility that Cicero was particularly susceptible to the charge of inconsistency precisely because he was not one of the nobiles, and so could not lay claim to this aristocratic virtue without being challenged. It also suggests that he may in reality have had to change his mind more regularly than his contemporaries, again owing to the vulnerabilities inherent in his status. Finally, it raises the possibility that inconstantia and levitas in Latin may mean something different from what inconsistency usually means in English, at least to some speakers of the language. After brief discussion of the nuances of constantia and its opposite, I explore the charge of levitas as wielded by Cicero's enemies against him in the trials of 54 bc, his own defences against the charge, and then his use of it against others in the 50s and 40s. I should perhaps make clear that this is not an attempt to rehabilitate Cicero, except insofar as the ancient evidence misleads us into misjudging him; I hope merely to suggest that inconstantia is in the eye of the beholder, and that most of the leading figures of the Senate were more prone to see it in men like Cicero than in men like themselves.
I am extremely grateful to Trevor Luke, Laura Samponaro, and W. Jeffrey Tatum for reading earlier versions of this article, and for saving me from a number of errors of fact and interpretation. Their amicitia, in different ways, has been exemplary. All translations in the article are mine.
1 This seems to be a feature of older scholarship, although where it lies unexamined, it is still dangerous. Hutchinson, G. O., Cicero's Correspondence. A Literary Study (Oxford, 1998)Google Scholar, Hall, J., Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters (Oxford, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and White, P., Cicero in Letters. Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic (Oxford, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, the three most recent books to focus on the letters, each offer an interpretation of the letters as literary artefacts, rather than as ‘sincere’ outpourings, and Tempest, K., Cicero. Politics and Persuasion in Ancient Rome (London, 2011)Google Scholar, articulates the difficulties caused by the letters. See too Dugan, J., Making a New Man. Ciceronian Self-fashioning in the Rhetorical Works (Oxford 2005), 334CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who notes that even where Cicero draws attention to his insincerity in other places we need not believe that he is revealing his authentic self. For the case that the coherent self is an anachronistic concept to apply to antiquity, see Gill, C., Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy. The Self in Dialogue (Oxford, 1996)Google Scholar and Gill, C., The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Numerous modern biographies partake in the pathologizing of Cicero, referring to his unique sensitivity to slights, bouts of depression, and painful indecision (see Habicht, C., Cicero the Politician [Baltimore, MD, 1990], 4–5Google Scholar for a brief history of Cicero reception). Such a psychological approach is currently out of favour, but it has cast a long shadow. For two studies conducted along similar lines to those I take here – that Cicero was not uniquely vain or prone to self-praise, and that his reflections on his exile offer different philosophical perspectives – see Allen, W., ‘Cicero's Conceit’, TAPhA 85 (1954), 121–44Google Scholar, and Narducci, E., ‘Perceptions of Exile in Cicero: The Philosophical Interpretation of a Real Experience’, AJPh 118 (1997), 55–73Google Scholar.
3 For the claim that Cicero was ‘over his long career reasonably faithful to certain basic tenets’, see Tatum, W. J., The Patrician Tribune. Publius Clodius Pulcher (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 8Google Scholar.
4 We might phrase this differently, saying that speakers of Latin recognize both occurrent and constative states: one can be inconsistent right now, in this discussion, by changing one's mind or adducing mutually incompatible positions; or one can normally be inconsistent, such that it is a character trait (and others might therefore expect it right now, in this discussion).
5 Riggsby, A. M., ‘Did the Romans Believe in Their Verdicts?’, Rhetorica 15 (1997), 235–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Riggsby, A. M., Crime and Community in Ciceronian Rome (Austin, TX, 1999)Google Scholar; Craig, C., ‘Audience Expectations, Invective, and Proof’, in Powell, J. G. F., and Paterson, J. (eds.), Cicero the Advocate (Oxford, 2004), 195–6Google Scholar; and Powell, J. G. F., ‘Invective and the Orator: Ciceronian Theory and Practice’, in Booth, J. (ed.), Cicero on the Attack. Invective and Subversion in the Orations and Beyond (Swansea, 2007), 17–18Google Scholar.
6 There are many other figures not regularly called inconsistent by contemporaries (at least, as far as our limited evidence suggests), but some of them certainly could be: see, for instance, Cicero's blanket accusation of the nobiles for their inconstancy in the Philippics (Phil. 2.89, 5.3, 7.4, 7.9, 7.14, 8.1, 11.17, 14.17; cf. too Cic. Fam. 1.7.10, among other examples).
7 For a recent discussion of the differing nuances of constantia in Seneca, see Starr, C., ‘Commanding Constantia in Senecan Tragedy’, TAPhA 136 (2006), 207–44Google Scholar.
8 Cic. Fin. 3.1; Tusc. 1.2, 4.57, 4. 60, 5.12–13; Off. 1.23, 1.72, 1.112; Sen. 33; Par. St. 16; Acad. 2.53; Nat. D. 1.1; Sest. 88; Sull. 82–3; Flac. 36; Clu. 196; Top. 78 (a more or less random sample of Ciceronian uses, omitting letters and Philippics). See Hellegouarc'h, s.v. constans/constantia, whose main treatment of the quality is under the elements of nobilitas (283–5, with further citations).
9 On the use made of ethos in trials, see Corbeill, A., Controlling Laughter. Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic (Princeton, NJ, 1996)Google Scholar; May, J. M., Trials of Character. The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos (Chapel Hill, NC, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Riggsby 1999 (n. 5).
10 From hundreds of Ciceronian examples where levis/levitas is clearly pejorative, see e.g. Q Rosc. 49; Verr. 2.2.30, 2.2.94, 2.3.84; Arch. 9; Pis. fr. 11a; Flac. 6 and 46; Sest. 22; Clu. 71; In Vat. 3 (all applied to individuals and all taken from speeches, but the letters show a similar pattern). See Hellegouarc'h, 518, 538, and 558 on levitas (inconstantia is not treated); it is above all the characteristic of the people, and so, by extension, of those demagogues who seek their approval (see Yavetz, Z., ‘Levitas Popularis’, A&R 10 [1965], 97–110)Google Scholar. Kroll, W., Die Kultur der Ciceronischen Zeit. I. Politik und Wirtschaft (Leipzig, 1933), 27–8Google Scholar, notes that levitas is also characteristic, at least in Roman eyes, of the Greeks. By contrast, Sallust also uses the word, but usually without the negative implications: Iug. 54.1, 80.6, 87.1, 91.2, 94.1; Hist. 1.99 3.37, 4.72, etc. So too Caesar, e.g. B Civ. 2.34.3, 3.26.4; but see B Gall. 2.1.3 on the levitas of the Gauls, 7.43.4 on the levitas of the multitude, and 5.28.3 on the fickleness of allowing enemies to determine one's plans. On the seriousness of the charge of inconstantia, see Hall (n. 1), 121, along with Cic. Phil. 2.7–9, in which Cicero deplores Antony's decision to make public an ostensibly private letter in an attempt to show Cicero as inconstans.
11 The phenomenon of the novus homo has been well studied, despite disagreements about exactly what it connotes. See Wiseman, T. P., New Men in the Roman Senate 139B.C.–14A.D. (Oxford, 1971), esp. 100–7Google Scholar on electoral disadvantages and difficulties; Habicht (n. 2), 6, for those facing Cicero in particular; and Epstein, D. F., Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218–43 BC (London, 1987)Google Scholar, 55, for the claim that new men easily made enemies because they were outsiders (so less was at stake in hating them). Van der Blom, H., Cicero's Role Models. The Political Strategy of a Newcomer (Oxford, 2010), esp. 35–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar, sees Cicero's need to overcome his novitas as a basis for much of his political strategy.
12 Syme, R., The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939)Google Scholar, 12 and 16. The precise definition of nobilis is problematic (see Burckhardt, L. A., ‘The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Comments on Recent Discussion of the Concepts Nobilitas and Homo Novus’, Historia 39 [1990], 77–99Google Scholar, on the history of the question); for my purposes, the details are less significant than noting that there are very clear differences between Cicero and the traditional senatorial class – see now Van der Blom (n. 11), 35–59 for a thorough discussion. On the relative ease for nobles in securing office see (among other sources) Cic. Pis. 2. The terms optimate and especially popularis are also problematic: see Robb, M. A., Beyond Populares and Optimates. Political Language in the Late Republic (Stuttgart, 2010), 15–33Google Scholar, for discussion of the shortcomings of various modern attempts at definition. As Robb notes (32) the optimates are (somewhat) easier to identify, but the words are still not nearly precise enough. So too, he shows (111) that Ciceronian usage differs from that of his contemporaries, which suggests, at the very least, that the words did not have a stable definition but instead changed meanings as useful. With some hesitation (for it, too, is imprecise), I mostly use the word ‘aristocrat’ to signify the Senate's traditional power base.
13 Mitchell, T. N., Cicero. The Senior Statesman (New Haven, CT, 1991), 1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Habicht (n. 2) 6.
14 The ostensible reason for Cicero's exile was his putting to death of Roman citizens without a trial during his consulship in 63, but the accusation was brought about primarily because he had unwittingly made an enemy of Clodius, and because the issue provided Clodius with the opportunity to attack the Senate's authority. On Clodius and many of the related issues, see Tatum (n. 3) 114–93, especially his discussion of Pompey's abandonment of Cicero (which enabled the exile to occur) at 152–3.
15 He was apparently even invited to join in the alliance between Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus at its inception, but refused (Cic. Att. 2.3.3–4, Prov. cons. 41; see also Brunt, P. A., ‘Cicero's Officium in the Civil War’, JRS 76 [1986], 16Google Scholar, and Lintott, A. W., Cicero as Evidence. A Historian's Companion [Oxford, 2008], 165)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (It is anachronistic but convenient to refer to this alliance as the ‘first triumvirate’.) On Cicero's relations with Pompey and Caesar after 63, see Mitchell (n. 13), 92–3, and Lintott (this note), 152–66. As Tatum (n. 3), 187, notes, Pompey's role in Cicero's return from exile meant that he was, both in his own mind and in that of others, linked with Pompey (see Plut. Vit. Cic. 33.2 with J. Moles, L., Plutarch. Lives. Cicero [Warminster, 1988]Google Scholarad loc., and Vit. Pomp. 43.4 and 49.1, for a later view), so in some ways his decision to throw in his lot with the triumvirate was an obvious one. See Mitchell (n. 13), 97, 162, on Cicero's isolation from the boni and move toward the triumvirs. Lintott (this note), 182–5, 201–11, offers a useful discussion of Cicero's post-exilic policy alterations; among other things, he discusses (208) Cic. Att. 4.5 and Fam. 1.2 to Lentulus Spinther, which offer Cicero's explanations.
16 See especially Steel, C. E. W., Cicero, Rhetoric, and Empire (Oxford, 2001)Google Scholar, 20 and 277, who discusses the ways in which Cicero's reliance on (only) oratory and not, say, military success (or the wealth and connections that were unavailable to him) limited him in various ways.
17 May discusses the Roman belief ‘that in most cases character remains constant from generation to generation of the same family’ (n. 9), 6. Although his model has sometimes been criticized (in part, for failing to take into account the context of Cicero's speeches, i.e., the fact that it would have been much easier, and more useful, to ‘sell’ this simplistic view of character in an agonistic setting (Powell, J. G. F., ‘Character Presentation in Cicero's Oratory’, CR 39 [1989], 225Google Scholar; Berry, D. H., ‘Review of Trials of Character’, JRS 80 [1990], 204Google Scholar), I believe it does genuinely reflect an important strand of ancient thought. See too Cicero's claim that it would be silly to think of him as a relative of the Tullius who was consul in 500; presumably this is because they are in fact not related (Brut. 62, and see Brunt, P. A., ‘Nobilitas and Novitas’, JRS 72 [1982], 3–4Google Scholar, on unconnected families with the same nomen). And, as an attempt to counteract this presumption, see Verr. 2.4.81, where Cicero claims that he too, like all patriotic Romans, has access to the glory of the Scipiones, with extended discussion in Van der Blom (n. 11), 152–8, of the notion that great Romans are available as role models for all of their successors, even (perhaps especially) those who do not have famed ancestors of their own.
18 See too Leg. agr. 2.3, where Cicero notes that he cannot draw upon his ancestors to persuade the audience, because the audience has never heard of them, with Van der Blom (n. 11) on the historical exempla that Cicero does draw upon.
19 The most notable is at the end of his life, when he claims that a lifetime of advocating peace entitles him to decide when war is necessary, and argues that this is a position of constantia (see esp. Cic. Phil. 1.38, 5.30, 7.7–9, 7.14, 8.30, 12.5, 12. 17, 13.1–4, 13.9–10, 14.10, all with Ramsey, J., Cicero. Philippics. I–II [Cambridge, 2003]Google Scholar and Manuwald, G., Cicero. Philippics 3–9. Text and Commentary, 2 vols. [Berlin, 2007]Google Scholar, ad loc., and, for an excellent overview of the speeches as a whole, Frisch, H., Cicero's Fight for the Republic. The Historical Background of Cicero's Philippics [Copenhagen, 1946]Google Scholar). I discuss Cicero's position very briefly below, on pp. 260–1. Cicero is also regularly criticized by modern writers for indecision in the civil war – but this is rather a different issue. In the generations following his death, Cicero was often found guilty of this charge: to take but one early example, Sen. Controv. 2.4.4 explicitly says that he was lacking in constantia.
20 I follow the traditional dating for the trials of Gabinius; see Lintott, A. W., ‘Cicero and Milo’, JRS 64 (1974), 67–8Google Scholar, for arguments that place them later.
21 For his later comments on this speech, see Cic. Att. 4.5, 4.6; Fam. 1.7.10 1.9.8–10; and Q Fr. 2.5.1, 2.6.2. For discussion of some of the effects of the speech, see Stockton, D., ‘Cicero and the Ager Campanus’, TAPhA 93 (1962), 471–89Google Scholar.
22 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 51.4, Vit. Caes. 21.5; Suet. Iul. 24.1; App. B Civ. 2.17.62. The cause for their meeting at Luca is uncertain; it may have been in direct reaction to Cicero's speech, as he claims (see too Habicht [n. 2], 50–1), but it may have come at the instigation of Caesar and Crassus (so Stockton [n. 21], 480–1) or Pompey (so Gruen, E. S., The Last Generation of the Roman Republic [Berkeley, CA, 1974], 311Google Scholar) or for some other reason.
23 This speech draws a sharp distinction between Cicero's personal feelings and the good of the state, and also claims that reconciliations between enemies are sometimes necessary for the greater good (18–24). But shifting alliances are, of course, a standard feature of Republican politics (which is why Cicero is able to adduce so many examples). This speech is often seen as Cicero's attempt to negotiate his relationship with the consuls (there is a good discussion in Steel [n. 16], 181–9).
24 Gruen (n. 22), passim, makes it clear that the politics of this period were not as clear-cut as might seem in retrospect. For a mostly favourable opinion of Cicero's behaviour, see Mittelstadt, M. C., ‘Cicero's Political Velificatio Mutata: 54 b.c.–51 b.c. Compromise or Capitulation?’, PP 40 (1985), 17Google Scholar. Cicero delivered numerous defence speeches in this period (Q Fr. 2.16.1; Fam. 7.1.4), but I focus on two, those of Vatinius and Gabinius, because in some cases (e.g. Plancus and possibly Balbus) Cicero may have done so primarily out of gratitude, and in others we do not have sufficient information to posit a previously existing enmity (e.g. Caninius Gallus, Fam. 7.1.4). Lintott (n. 20), 65–8, suggests that the defences of Gabinius and Rabirius Postumus were actually undertaken by Cicero's own choice, and in the hope of securing Pompey's help in the consular election for Milo for 53 (which they failed to do).
25 Its internal date falls between August 54 and June 53 (Pasoli, E., Caius Sallustius Crispus. Invectiva in M. Tullium Ciceronem [Bologna, 1965], 6–8Google Scholar and n. 1; Vretska, K., ed. and trans., C. Sallustius Crispus. Invektive und Episteln [Heidelberg, 1961], i.15–20Google Scholar); whoever wrote it knew enough about contemporary politics to avoid some but not all anachronisms. The fact that it does not mention Gabinius may offer some support for the thesis of Lintott (n. 20), or it may serve to date the speech to before December 54. On the relationship of the text to Asinius Pollio, see Gabba, E., ‘Note sulla polemica anticiceroniana di Asinio Pollione’, RSI 69 (1957), 317–39Google Scholar.
26 See Vretska (n. 25), i.9–12, and Zielinski, T., Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte, (Leipzig, 1897), 347–57Google Scholar; for invective topics more generally, see Corbeill (n. 9).
27 Text from Vretska (n. 25).
28 For an overview of the trials of this period and discussion of the sources, see Gruen (n. 22), 311–50, with Vatinius treated at 317 and Gabinius at 322–8. Rawson, E., Cicero. A Portrait (London, 1975), 136Google Scholar, discusses them briefly, and Tempest (n. 1), 134–7 gives a good summary, including mention of the In Ciceronem.
29 See too Cic. Att. 2.9.2; Q Fr. 2.4.1, 3.9.5; Fam. 5.9.1, 1.9.7 (the last discussed below). On the In Vatinium, see Albini, U., ‘L'Orazione Contro Vatinio’, PP 66 (1959), 172–84Google Scholar; Mitchell (n. 13), 175–6; Corbeill (n. 9), 49–55; Powell (n. 5), 11–12; and, for line-by-line discussion, Pocock, L. G., A Commentary on Cicero ‘In Vatinium’ (London, 1926; reprinted Amsterdam, 1967Google Scholar). For what we know about Vatinius and the trials against him, see Gruen, E. S., ‘Cicero and Licinius Calvus’, HSPh 71 (1967), 217–22Google Scholar.
30 There is some suggestion (Val. Max. 4.2.4) that Cicero defended Vatinius twice, but this is probably an error; see Gruen (n. 29), 229, n. 33.
31 Cic. Att. 4.18.1–2; Q Fr. 3.1.24, 3.2.1–2, 3.3.3, 3.4.1–3, 3.5.5, 3.7.1; Red. sen. 16; Dom. 60; Sest. 18, 20, 26, 28–9, 93; Prov. cons. 2, 9–12, 14–16; Pis. 48–50; Planc. 86–7, the last delivered very shortly before the defence of Gabinius.
32 Cic. Q Fr. 3.1.15 (notably with the caveat that Pompey will not be able to reconcile the two men si ullam partem libertatis tenebo, ‘if I retain any part of my freedom’), 3.2.2, 3.4.2–3, 3.6.5. See Fantham, E., ‘The Trials of Gabinius in 54 B.C.’, Historia 24 (1975)Google Scholar, 426, n. 1, on Cicero's hesitation. On Gabinius' career in general, see Steel (n. 16), 231.
33 See Bailey, D. R. Shackleton, Cicero. Letters to Quintus and Brutus (Cambridge, MA, 2002)Google Scholar, for the text.
34 Gruen (n. 22), 328. General outrage at Cicero for this is attested later too, in Cass. Dio 39.63.5, who calls him automolos (‘a turncoat’). But, as many have noted, Dio is extremely hostile to Cicero (Lintott, A. W., ‘Cassius Dio and the History of the Late Roman Republic’, ANRW 2.34.3 [Berlin, 1997], 2514–7Google Scholar; Millar, F., A Study of Cassius Dio [Oxford, 1964], 46–55Google Scholar).
35 See Crawford, J. W., ‘The Lost and Fragmentary Orations’, in May, J. M. (ed.) Brill's Companion to Cicero. Oratory and Rhetoric (Leiden, 2002), 306–7Google Scholar, on Cicero's publication – and non-publication – strategies; given the negative attention they aroused, he is not likely to have made these two speeches public.
36 Fantham (n. 32), 441.
37 For discussion, see Lintott (n. 15), 242–9 and notes.
38 There is much to be said about amicitia. For an influential view which holds it to be not really, or not solely, political, see Brunt, P. A., ‘Amicitia in the Late Roman Republic’, PCPhS 11 (1965), 1–20Google Scholar, and, for more recent work, Konstan, D., Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge, 1997), 122–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Amicitia is both more and less than what we mean by friendship: more, because it can imply a close political partnership, and less, because it cannot always allow for differences of opinion. It is noteworthy that many of the major conflicts of this period are framed in terms of violations of amicitia, but also of its requirements; so, for instance, Cicero would have had less difficulty in the impending civil war if he had not had ties of amicitia with both Caesar and Pompey (I owe this point, and its phrasing, to Jeff Tatum). On Cicero's friendship with Caesar, see Mitchell (n. 13), 189, 244. For an exemplary study of the amicitia between Cicero and Milo, see Lintott (n. 20).
39 On the pragmatism involved in most reconciliations, see Epstein (n. 11), 5. He also notes (5–6) that a third party is usually involved, so that neither enemy need lose face by making the first move. Compare the statement made by Plutarch that Cicero defended Crassus one day and attacked him the next (Vit. Cic. 25.2), and the patent insincerity of Cicero's ‘reconciliation’ with Crassus (e.g. Mittelstadt [n. 24], 17–18).
40 White (n. 1), 69, notes that, in later correspondence, Vatinius used familiar forms with Cicero, which suggests that he, at least, felt that the relationship was intimate. Rawson (n. 28), 203–4, offers brief discussion.
41 See e.g. Cic. Att. 10.8.3 and, for a final, scornful mention of Gabinius, see Phil. 14.24.
42 This statement was, of course, capable of being criticized, but presumably Cicero would not have made it unless he thought that it would seem plausible to some. See Epstein (n. 11), 8, on the ‘considerable price in lost prestige’ paid by Cicero because he sometimes backed down; contra, Brunt (n. 38), 16, on the temporary nature of enmities, with citation of Livy 40.46.12.
43 Lentulus is in Cilicia, and almost certainly receiving a wide variety of correspondence. So Cicero is making sure his side of the story is heard: presumably if Lentulus finds it persuasive, he will share it with others. This letter, like many others in the corpus, is ostensibly private but clearly designed to be comprehensible and persuasive to a wider audience than its addressee. For useful discussion of the letter, see L. Canfora, ‘Inimicus amicorum suorum (Cic. Fam. 1,9,2)’, Ciceroniana 3–6 (1961–4), 163–6; Mitchell (n. 13), 172–3; White (n. 1), 108–9.
44 See too Cic. Planc. 91–4, where he speaks of his political freedom as uncurtailed despite having been reconciled with former enemies.
45 See Gruen (n. 29), 219.
46 See too Cic. Fam. 1.8.2, also written to Lentulus to explain his decision to cast his lot in with Pompey.
47 Shackleton Bailey, D. R., Cicero (London, 1971)Google Scholar, dates the letter to June or July 56.
48 <iam> dudum enim circumrodo quod devorandum est) subturpicula mihi videbatur esse παλινῳδία. sed valeant recta, vera, honesta consilia (‘Well, I have been nibbling at what must be swallowed: my “palinode” has seemed to me just the tiniest bit shameful. But farewell proper, genuine honourable plans’; Att. 4.5.1). This palinode is plausibly taken to refer to the speech De provinciis consularibus, but it may be some other document (Bailey, D. R. Shackleton, Cicero. Letters to Atticus [Cambridge, MA, 1999]Google Scholar, i.25; see too Balsdon, J. P. V. D., ‘Roman History, 65–60 b.c.: Five Problems’, JRS 51 [1962], 137–9Google Scholar). Gotoff, H. C., Cicero's Caesarian Speeches. A Stylistic Commentary (Chapel Hill, NC, 1993), xxi–xxiiGoogle Scholar, thinks the palinode more likely to be a letter, probably written to Pompey, and some posit an official retraction of his Campanian land proposal.
49 Stes. Fr. 192, from Pl. Phdr. 243a (with some, but not much, context). On Stesichorus' palinode, see Bassi, K., ‘Helen and the Discourse of Denial in Stesichorus' Palinode’, Arethusa 26 (1993), 51–75Google Scholar. Kakagoria, the word Stesichorus uses, is clearly meant to convey the impression that Stesichorus was in error, but is not as precise as it might be; all it really says is that he said something accusatory.
50 The reader for this journal suggested to me that, in fact, Cicero may be presenting himself as more savvy than Stesichorus: whereas the poet was ‘blinded’, Cicero has always known what his colleagues were capable of.
51 Cic. Att. 4.6.2 and 4.19 convey a different mood, but also make clear that Cicero is not fooled by his own public pronouncements.
52 Brunt (n. 15) is the classic study of these letters. Mitchell (n. 13), 252–60, provides a sympathetic and persuasive account of the complexities of Cicero's decision. See too Everitt, A., Cicero. A Turbulent Life (London, 2001)Google Scholar, 200, on Cicero's increasing realization that one side was much the same as the other. It is also worth noting in this context that Roman education focused on the rhetorical exploration of alternate scenarios (Lanham, R., The Motives of Eloquence. Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance [New Haven, CT, 1976], 4Google Scholar), which is just what Cicero's ‘vacillating’ letters do, and that, unlike modern education, its ancient counterpart did not attempt to inculcate a specific set of values (Lanham, 5).
53 See Cic. Att. 7.26.2, 9.11, 9.11a; Att. 9.7a, from Balbus and Oppius, confirms this. See too Syme (n. 12), 137: ‘Cicero came close to being a neutral in the Civil War. Returning from his province of Cilicia, he made what efforts he could to avert hostilities. He showed both judgement and impartiality. It was too late’.
54 See Cic. Att. 9.7b from Balbus; Att. 9.18.1 on Cicero's meeting with Caesar; Att. 10.8a from Antony; Att. 10.8b from Caesar; and Att. 10.9a from Caelius urging Cicero to stay, with Caesar's threat that he will consider it amicitiae graviorem iniuriam (‘a rather serious insult to friendship’) if Cicero joins the Pompeian cause now. Att. 10.10 contains word from Antony that he is under orders from Caesar to prevent Cicero from leaving, which determines Cicero to plan an escape, and Att. 10.12.1 has Antony's assertion that Cicero is not permitted to leave. See too the consideration, advanced at Att. 7.26.2 and 10.8.5, that Cicero's neutrality could only help with a peace. In the latter passage, Cicero suggests that he was naïve to envision such an outcome. He had been burned before by choosing one man over the other, so his hesitation makes sense on the political level as well as the moral.
