¹ The Greek text is quoted from the OCT edition by Solmsen, F. (ed.), Hesiodi opera, third edition (Oxford, 1990)Google Scholar; the English translation follows the Loeb edition of Most, G. W. (ed.), Hesiod II. The Shield. Catalogue of Women. Other Fragments (Cambridge, MA, 2007)Google Scholar.

² The root appears here in o-grade, the corresponding simple verb being δέμω, whose basic meaning is ‘(to) build’, ‘(to) join together’. See Rix, H., LIV. Lexikon der indogermanischen Verben. Die Wurzeln und ihre Primärstammbildungen (Wiesbaden, 2001), 114–15Google Scholar, s.v. *demh₂-.

³ See Beekes, R. S. P., Etymological Dictionary of Greek (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2010), 247 Google Scholar, s.v. βυθός: ‘βυσσοδομεύω “build in the deep > brood over (in the deep of one's soul), ponder deeply”’. This etymology is rejected by Stanford, W. B., The Odyssey of Homer. Vol. 1. Books I–XII, second edition (London, 1959), 358 Google Scholar, ad Od. 9.316: ‘βυσσοδομεύων = “brooding deeply”. The first part may be from βυσσός = “depth [of the sea]”, but the second is hardly conn. w. δομέω “build’” as L.-S.-J. take it.’ However, he does not offer an alternative explanation and no other etymologies have ever been suggested.

By way of explanation, the commentary of Russo, C. F., Hesiodi Scutum, second edition (Florence, 1968), 80 Google Scholar, ad loc., merely offers a Latin translation, ‘profunda mente struens’, which employs the same metaphorical conceptualizations.

⁴ See also LfgrE ii.105, s.v. βυσσοδομεύω.

⁵ On the general problem of literal lexicography of ancient languages and metaphor, see Silk, M. S., Interaction in Poetic Imagery. With Special Reference to Early Greek Poetry (Cambridge, 1974), 33–56 and 82–3Google Scholar; Silk, M. S., ‘LSJ and the Problem of Poetic Archaism: From Meaning to Iconyms’, CQ 33 (1983), 303–30, esp. 309–13Google Scholar.

⁶ See also LSJ, s.v. βυσσοδομεύω, which offers this literal sense but fails to mark the contextual sense as metaphorical: ‘build in the deep: hence, brood over a thing in the depth of one's soul, ponder deeply’.

⁷ For a procedure and criteria to determine metaphor through the difference between basic and contextual meaning, see PragglejazGroup, ‘MIP: A Method for Identifying Metaphorically Used Words in Discourse’, Metaphor and Symbol 22 (2007), 1–39 Google Scholar, further developed in Steen, J. G., Dorst, A. G., Herrmann, B. J., Kaal, A. A., Krennmayr, T., and Pasma, T., A Method for Linguistic Metaphor Identification. From MIP to MIPVU (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA, 2010), esp. 1–42Google Scholar.

⁸ The direct object in Sc. 30 is δόλον (‘deception’); in the passages from the Odyssey it is usually κακά (‘evil [deeds]’).

⁹ The term ‘conventional’ metaphor is employed in this context to denote a common, and probably even idiomatic, instance of figurative language which nevertheless still retains its metaphoric character and is not fully lexicalized. For the use of the categories conventional/novel and deliberate/non-deliberate, see Steen, J. G., ‘The Paradox of Metaphor: Why We Need a Three-dimensional Model of Metaphor’, Metaphor and Symbol 23 (2008), 213–41Google Scholar; Steen, J. G., ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: Now New and Improved!’, Review of Cognitive Linguistics 9 (2011), 38–43 Google Scholar. Contrary to earlier theories of metaphor, cognitive metaphor theory holds that deliberate usage is not a requirement for the identification of metaphor.

However, the general value of deliberateness as a category for metaphor classification has been questioned (e.g. by R. Gibbs, W. Jr., ‘Are “Deliberate” Metaphors Really Deliberate? A question of Human Consciousness and Action’, Metaphor and the Social World 1 [2011], 26–52 Google Scholar) and it needs to be stressed that repeated occurrence and formulaic character of a phrase in epic poetry do not necessarily make all its appearances non-deliberate or poetically ineffective. See, for example, Vivante, P., The Epithets in Homer. A Study in Poetic Values (New Haven, CT, 1982), vii–x, 151–91Google Scholar; or Silk, M. S., Homer, The Iliad, second edition (Cambridge, 2004), 14–23 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ For a theoretical approach to the notion of distinguishing varying degrees of metaphoricity (as opposed to applying the obsolete ‘dead’/‘alive’ distinction), see Hanks, P., ‘Metaphoricity is Gradable’, in Stefanowitsch, A. and Gries, S. T. (eds.), Corpus-based Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy (Berlin, 2006), 17–35 Google Scholar; or Müller, C., Metaphors. Dead and Alive, Sleeping and Waking. A Cognitive Approach to Metaphors in Language Use (Chicago, IL, 2008), esp. 178–209Google Scholar. Müller defines metaphoricity as a continuum, starting with expressions whose original metaphorical character is entirely obscured by semantic opacity and poetic novel metaphors, with high metaphoricity forming the other end of the spectrum.

¹¹ See already Snell, B., Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen, 9th edition (Göttingen, 2009), 183 Google Scholar: ‘für alles Geistige [sind] die verbalen Metaphern ursprünglich und notwendig. Im Griechischen bildet sich die “abstrakte” Auffassung alles Geistigen und Seelischen vor unsern Augen, so daß wir die Entwicklung dieser metaphorischen Bezeichnungen genau verfolgen können.’ (‘For everything regarding the mind, verbal metaphors are natural and necessary. In Greek, the “abstract” view of everything regarding the mind and soul forms in front of our eyes so that we can minutely follow the development of these metaphorical designations.’) The seminal work which established metaphor as a common and indispensable process of language and thought and gave rise to conceptual metaphor theory in cognitive linguistics was G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA, 1980).

Note, however, the dismissive view of metaphors for mental and psychological activity in Homeric poetry expressed by Clarke, M., Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer. A Study of Words and Myths (Oxford, 1999), 109 Google Scholar: ‘there is no metaphor, no transference or extension, no extraneous imagery which we can separate off from what thought and emotion are literally conceived to be’. In this, he is implicitly followed by Long, A. A., Greek Models of Mind and Self (Cambridge, MA, 2015), esp. 15–50Google Scholar, even though Long later recognizes the use of metaphors as models of mind in Plato (see esp. 136–7).

¹² Lakoff and Johnson (n. 11), 3. See also e.g. Gibbs, R. W. Jr., The Poetics of Mind (Cambridge, 1994)Google Scholar, esp. 120–264: Gibbs, W. R. Jr., ‘Why Many Concepts are Metaphorical’, Cognition 61 (1996), 309–19Google Scholar. The importance of metaphor for the intellectual engagement with new, unfamiliar, or ‘difficult’ ideas through terms drawn from familiar and well-defined conceptual frameworks has also been stressed by metaphor theorists coming from disciplines other than cognitive linguistics. See, for example, Blumenberg, H., ‘Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 6 (1960), 7–142 Google Scholar; Jones, R. S., Physics as Metaphor (Minneapolis, MN, 1982)Google Scholar; Stambovsky, P., ‘Metaphor and Historical Understanding’, History and Theory 27 (1988), 125–34Google Scholar; Haverkamp, A. and Mende, D. (eds.), Metaphorologie. Zur Praxis von Theorie (Frankfurt, 2009)Google Scholar. The status of metaphor as a universal, pervasive, and necessary cultural mechanism is also established in Geary, J., I Is an Other. The Secret Life of Metaphor and How It Shapes the Way We See the World (New York, 2011)Google Scholar.

¹³ For the general cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphors and its terminology, see Lakoff and Johnson (n. 11); Lakoff, G. and Turner, M., More Than Cool Reason. A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago/London, 1989)Google Scholar; Lakoff, G., ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor’, in Ortony, A. (ed.), Metaphor and Thought, second edition (Cambridge, 1993), 202–51Google Scholar; Grady, J. E., ‘Metaphor’, in Geeraerts, D. and Cuyckens, H. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics (Oxford, 2007), 188–213 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See esp. Johnson, M., The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago, IL, and London, 1987)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Currently, the most extensive theoretical discussion of the interdependence of metaphor and culture is Kövecses, Z., Metaphor in Culture. Universality and Variation (Cambridge, 2005)Google Scholar; however, the scope of this study is predominantly synchronic, and the diachronic aspects of metaphor universality and variation are only touched upon. For metaphors for thinking in different modern languages see the issue of Cognitive Linguistics 14, nos. 2–3 (2003) devoted to this topic, particularly Goddard, C., ‘Thinking Across Languages and Cultures: Six Dimensions of Variation’, Cognitive Linguistics 14 (2003), 109–40Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Several identifications for the ϕρήν/ϕρένες have been proposed, among them the diaphragm, the spleen, the lungs, or parts of the heart; see also LfgrE iv.1015–18, s.v. ϕρένες, ϕρήν.

¹⁷ On θυμός-speeches see Pelliccia, H., Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar (Göttingen, 1995), 120–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ See Stanford (n. 3), 358, ad Od. 9.316; Clarke (n. 11), 88, n. 67. The word is not particularly common, but the meaning is undisputed; see also Il. 24.80 and Hdt. 2.28, 96, where βυσσός occurs with the meaning ‘depth/bottom of a body of water’. On the ‘trustworthiness’ of Homeric and Herodotean occurrences to establish meaning, see Silk (n. 5 [1974]), esp. 43–5.

¹⁹ For the literal reading of ϕρένες and their identification with the lungs, see esp. Onians, R. B., The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate, second edition (Cambridge, 1953), 23–8 (accepted by Clarke [n. 11], 75)Google Scholar.

²⁰ See the explanation offered by Russo, J., Fernándet-Galiano, M., and Heubeck, A., A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey. Vol. III. Books XVII–XXIV (Oxford, 1992)Google Scholar, 24 ad Od. 17.66: ‘βυσσοδόμευον: a most interesting word, used seven times in the Odyssey…, never in the Iliad, and in Hesiod only at Scut. 30. The meaning, “to meditate secretly”, is derived by combining the etymological sense, “to build in the deep”, with the idea of mental space, here specified by ϕρεσί but normally not verbally expressed.’

There is considerable fluidity in the epic vocabulary regarding mental activity, and words such as ϕρήν/ϕρένες or θυμός may metonymically refer to the location of thought processes in the body as well as to the agent of thought: see e.g. Clarke (n. 11), 61–126.

²¹ From the usage of seemingly bodily terms in Homeric diction arise so many difficulties and inconsistencies that one is forced to conclude that in many cases they are used figuratively and have lost their original bodily reference (or it has become secondary to the metonymical/metaphorical meaning – on the relation between metonymy and metaphor see also Kövecses, Z., ‘The Metaphor–Metonymy Relationship: Correlation Metaphors are Based on Metonymy’, Metaphor and Symbol 28 [2013], 75–88 Google Scholar). On the general lack of specificity and semantic difference of words denoting psychological or physiological functions (such as θυμός, ϕρένες, κῆρ [‘heart’], ἦτορ [‘heart’]) in Homer, see also Jahn, T., Zum Wortfeld ‘Seele-Geist’ in der Sprache Homers (Munich, 1987), esp. 182–211Google Scholar.

²² Note the convention of cognitive linguistics to distinguish between linguistic or textual and conceptual metaphors and to print conceptual metaphors (the abstract conceptualizations underlying individual linguistic metaphors) – as opposed to textual metaphors – in small capitals. This particular conceptual metaphor is very common and in Ancient Greek appears lexicalized in the verb οἶδα, lit. ‘(to) have seen’, i.e. ‘(to) know’ (see Sweetser, E., From Etymology to Pragmatics. Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure [Cambridge, 1990], 23–48 Google Scholar). See also Snell (n. 11), 183–4, for more examples and Sansone, D., Aeschylean Metaphors for Intellectual Activity (Stuttgart, 1975), 22–5Google Scholar, for examples from Aeschylus. On the basis of this conceptualization, something which is hidden from sight is also unknown and secret.

²³ The idea of ‘depth/superficiality of thought’ is also generally associated with the verticality schema; on the verticality schema (also called the up–down schema) see Johnson (n. 14), esp. xiv: already in epic diction, a mind prone to unimportant and inconsequential thoughts is described metaphorically as ‘light’ (Il. 10.226; 23.590: λεπτὴ μῆτις, ‘not sinking to great depths of mind’). Note, however, that the Hellenistic βαρύ-ϕρων (‘heavy-minded’) does not only refer to important, ‘weighty’ thoughts (Theoc. 25.110), but usually to a mindset which is ‘aggravating’ to others (Lyc. 464; Ap. Rhod. Argon. 4.731; Mel. Anth. Pal. 12.141.6; also later Opp. Hal. 4.174; Nonnus Dion. 5.327, 27.266). The metaphor of ‘quick’ or ‘slow’ thought which appears in connection with the ‘light mind’ (Il. 10.226, 23.590) draws on other another complex of metaphorical conceptualizations.

²⁴ See also the parallels cited in Steiner, D., Homer Odyssey Books XVII and XVIII (Cambridge, 2010)Google Scholar, 86, ad Od. 17.66. The question of ‘depth’ of organs of cognition and thought is also discussed by Sansone (n. 22), 22–5, with reference to the Aeschylean examples of this conceptualization.

²⁵ For metaphor identification, see the literature cited in n. 7 above.

²⁶ The verbs ϕρονέω and ϕροντίζω are both derived from ϕρήν (lit. probably ‘midriff’), which was imagined to be the seat of mental activity: see Frisk, H., Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 1960–1970)Google Scholar, ii.1041–3, s.v. ϕρήν; or Beekes (n. 3), 1590–1, s.v. ϕρήν. However, even though ϕρήν retains traces of a reference to a bodily organ, its derivations, such as ϕροντίς, ϕρόνημα, ϕρονέω, and ϕροντίζω seem to have lost this primary bodily frame of reference and refer exclusively to the domain of the ‘mind’.

²⁷ It seems as if the primary reference of μερμηρίζω is to the process of thought: see Frisk (n. 26), ii.210, s.v. μέρμερος. For locations of the thought process, see also the formulae στήθεσσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν (‘in his shaggy breast he pondered two ways’; Il. 1.189) and μερμήριξε κατὰ ϕρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (‘he pondered in his mind and spirit’; Il. 5.671, 8.169; Od. 24.235).

²⁸ The verb ὁρμαίνω is usually explained as a denominative of ὁρμή (‘rush’, ‘forceful motion’): see Frisk (n. 26), ii.419–20, s.v. ὁρμή; Beekes (n. 3), 1104–5, s.v. ὁρμή. Latin shows the same metaphorical conceptualization in the conventional usage of cogitare (< co-agitare) as a compound of agitare, ‘(to) set in motion’ (also used as simplex in Plaut. Truc. 451; Ter. Phorm. 615; Prop. 1.7.5; Liv. 6.2.1, 7.35.3, 21.41.16, 21.22.7; Ov. Ep. 17.54; Sen. Ep. 94.26; Tac. Ann. 2.12, 6.9) for mental processes. Other verbs which originally denoted physical movement but are also applied to thinking and contemplation include versare, ‘(to) turn about’ (e.g. Plaut. Trin. 224; Prop. 2.4.16; Hor. Ars P. 39; Verg. Aen. 4.563, 10.285, 11.551; Liv. 3.34.4; Sen. Dial. 3.17.5, Ep. 94.26; Tac. Hist. 2.78); volvere, ‘(to) turn over’ (e.g. Catull. 64.250; Sall. Cat. 32.1, Iug. 6.2; Liv. 26.7.3, 42.5.1; Verg. Aen. 3.102; Tac. Ann. 1.64, 14.53; Stat. Silv. 2.2.113); and volutare, frq. of volvere (e.g. Plaut. Capt. 781, Mil. 196; Cic. Rep. 1.28; Verg. Ecl. 9.37, Aen. 6.157; Liv. 34.36.4; Ov. Met. 1.389; Sen. Ep. 24.15; Tac. Ann. 1.36, 4.12).

²⁹ Compare the metaphorical use of Latin iactare in the sense of ‘(to) consider’, ‘(to) discuss publicly’ (e.g. Cic. Cael. 35, Mil. 7; Caes. B Gall. 1.18.3; Liv. 2.13.3, 44.34.2; Verg. Aen. 1.227; Ov. Am. 3.1.21; Sen. Ep. 87.38; Tac. Ann. 15.24; Quint. Inst. 1.2.2, 6.3.4).

³⁰ See also Frisk (n. 26), ii.232–4, s.v. μῆτις; Beekes (n. 3), 948–9, s.v. μῆτις. Latin metiri, while being used metaphorically for ‘measurement’ (i.e. estimation or appraisal of immaterial entities), never acquired the same universal application to all kind of mental processes.

³¹ The verbs are commonly treated as mere synonyms and their metaphorical content is usually not discussed: see, for example, the study of Pelliccia (n. 17).

³² On the containment schema, see Johnson (n. 14), esp. 21–23, 30–40. On reification and personification as ontological metaphors, see Lakoff and Johnson (n. 13), 26–35. See also Jäkel, O., ‘The Metaphorical Concept of Mind: “Mental Activity is Manipulation”’, in Taylor, J. R. and MacLaury, R. (eds.), Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World (Berlin and New York, 1995), 198–9Google Scholar, who notes initially that ‘this domain [i.e. of mental activity] is conceptualized metaphorically in terms of the physical manipulation of solid objects’ (197).

³³ On the basic meaning of δαΐζω, ‘(to) rip apart’, see LfgrE ii.196–7, s.v. δαΐζω; Frisk (n. 26), 340, s.v. δαΐζω; Beekes (n. 3), 297, s.v. δαΐζω. Note, however, that the medio-passive participle δαϊζόμενος does not necessarily take the plan or the decision which could be swayed both ways as its direct object, but that the phrase could also be interpreted as a passive form and correspond literally to our modern notion of ‘being torn between two options’.

³⁴ For the notion of ‘mental craftsmanship’, see also Jäkel (n. 32), 210–11.

³⁵ For the basic meaning, see the etymologies given in Frisk (n. 26), ii.976–7, s.v. ὑϕαίνω, and Beekes (n. 3), 1540, s.v. ὑϕαίνω. Direct objects of ὑϕαίνω, ‘(to) weave’, include μύθους καὶ μήδεα (‘words and plans’; Il. 3.212), δόλον (‘deception’; Il. 6.187; Od. 5.356), μῆτιν (‘a plan’; Il. 7.324, 9.93; Od. 4.739, 13.303, 13.386; Sc. 27), and δόλους καὶ μῆτιν (‘deceptions and a plan’; Od. 9.422). The metaphor also occurs in later Greek poetry: see Ar. Lys. 630; Callim. Aet. fr. 26.5.

³⁶ For the basic meaning, see the etymologies given in Frisk (n. 26), ii.643, s.v. ῥάπτω, and Beekes (n. 3), 1275–6, s.v. ῥάπτω. As direct objects of ῥάπτω, ‘(to) stitch’, appear κακά (‘evils’; Il. 18.367; Od. 3.118 16.423), ϕόνον αἰπύν (‘sudden murder’; Od. 16.379), and θάνατόν τε μόρον τε (‘death and doom’; Od. 16.421–2). Judging from these contexts, it seems as if both verbs predominantly carried connotations of insidiousness and deceit when applied to mental processes. See also LfgrE iv.6, s.v. ῥάπτω: ‘pej. (Übles) planen, anzetteln’; iv.774, s.v. ὑϕαίνω: ‘übertr. ersinnen, erfinden, spez. List.’

³⁷ Not only ῥάπτω but also ὑϕαίνω are used to refer to the (mental) process of composing songs and poetry: see e.g. Pind. Nem. 4.44; fr. 179; Bacchyl. 5.9–10, 19.8.

³⁸ Note that ὑϕαίνω is not confined to textile manufacture, but is also occasionally used as a metaphor for building: see Aesch. PV 450–1; Pl. Cri. 116b3–4; Callim. Hymn 2.57; Tryph. 536; Nonnus, Par. 2.98.

³⁹ See also the use of πλέκω (‘[to] plait’), its compounds and derivations for mental processes (usually for devising evil means and stratagems) in later Greek literature: e.g. Thgn. 1.215, 1.226, 1.1386; Aesch. Cho. 220; Eur. Ion, 826, 1280; Eur. Andr. 995; Ar. Vesp. 644.

⁴⁰ See e.g. Lakoff and Johnson (n. 11), passim; Kövecses, Z., Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, second edition (Oxford, 2010)Google Scholar, passim. More specifically and extensively, see Grady, J., ‘Theories are Buildings Revisited’, Cognitive Linguistics 8 (1997), 267–90Google Scholar.

⁴¹ The observation that even metaphors which are felt to be highly poetic are only novel elaborations grounded in common and everyday conceptual metaphorical metaphors is also the main point of the argument presented in Lakoff and Turner (n. 13), esp. 57–139.

⁴² Note that even Clarke (n. 11), 87–8, grudgingly admits that βυσσοδομεύω must be a metaphor, even though his whole argument rests on the assumption that Homeric Greek did not employ metaphors for mental and emotional activity (see esp. the quote in n. 11 above).

⁴³ On the notion of a metaphorical concept of mind and its prevalence, at least in Modern English, see Jäkel (n. 32), esp. 225–6. Metaphor in Greek epic poetry has not received much attention, and the very idea of metaphor in early Greek literature has been questioned: before Clarke's (n. 11) claim that Homeric Greek did not use metaphors for thought and emotion, Stanford, W. B., Greek Metaphor. Studies in Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1936), 122–7Google Scholar, disregarded Homeric metaphor on the basis of his hypothesis that Homeric diction was not developed enough to allow imaginative figurative language for the sake of clarity. See also Snell (n. 11), who claimed that Homeric poetry shows evidence of only a primitive state of consciousness and a development of metaphorical language. However, many aspects of Snell's position have been disproved in the last decades: see Burkert, W., ‘Mikroskopie der Geistesgeschichte. Bruno Snells “Entdeckung des Geistes” im kritischen Rückblick’, Philologus 148 (2004), 168–82Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ See, for example, the recent, very insightful study of Long (n. 11), who proposes ‘linguistic and conceptual attempts to identify and understand the threads of our emotional, reflective, and purposive life, in order for us to make sense of living in the world’ (4), but never avails himself of the notion that phrases referring to the body, the mind, and self in (Homeric) Greek might be metaphorical, despite many conclusions which point to metaphorical usage (see esp. 26–7, 32–7, 47–8).