^{page 208 note 1} See, for example, Barker, E., Greek Political Theory (London, 1957), 112Google Scholar; Sinclair, T. A., A History of Greek Political Thought ² (London, 1967), 92Google Scholar; Gulley, N., The Philosophy of Socrates (London, 1968), 175–7.Google Scholar

^{page 209 note 1} It is not clear precisely what ‘persuading the laws’ involves. It is usually taken to imply making actual changes in the laws; in which case Socrates' theory of obligation applies only to those who may participate in the process of legislation. On the other hand, it may simply mean being able to plead one's case in court. Both rights, of course, were possessed by Athenian citizens, but the ambiguity is important because, as in certain states citizens could possess the latter without the former, it affects the scope of Socrates' theory.

^{page 210 note 1} Cf. Greenberg, N. A., ‘Socrates' Choice in the Crito’, HSCP lxx (1965), 46.Google Scholar Greenberg interprets the threat as an attempt by Socrates to ‘raise the stakes’ like a gambler. This is to overlook the peculiar importance that the practice of questioning and philosophizing had for Socrates (see below, p. 211).

^{page 210 note 2} The fact that Socrates in the Apology is unwilling to contradict the Crito openly and explicitly provides further justification for taking the two works together.

^{page 210 note 3} As Gulley seems to suggest, loc. cit.

^{page 211 note 1} Cf. Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy, iii (Cambridge, 1969), 405–8.Google Scholar

^{page 211 note 2} Cf. Greenberg, art. cit. 66.

^{page 211 note 3} Bentham, J., A Fragment on Government, Preface, § 16.Google Scholar