It Was An Honour To Be Invited To contribute to this special issue, yet I hesitated to take up the invitation. A learned journal is no place for expressions of wifely tribute, had such ever been my style, and I am not a political scientist. In the end, however, it was precisely the lack of specialist qualification which persuaded me. Sam's influence and appeal, as both scholar and teacher, were after all never confined to the realms of political science per se – any more than were his sources of reference and inspiration.

During Recent Years, The Notion of The Democratic deficit has become, together with subsidiarity, or transparency, one of the most popdar subjects for conferences on European Union. While almost everyone seems to agree that a democratic deficit exists, it is far from certain that there is a general understanding of what is meant by it.

The most radical meaning would be that the European Union (EU) as such is undemocratic and that its decision-making does not correspond to democratic norms. Quite often when national governments have to explain unpopular decisions of the EU, responsibility for these uncomfortable situations is attributed to a faceless monster, the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’. The assumption is that a very strong central authority exists which embodies the power of decision-making and that democratic accountability of this central authority either does not exist or at least is not sufficiently guaranteed. In other words, the EU institutional system does not comply with democratic norms. This is by far the most extreme definition of a democratic deficit.

When The Berlin Wall Came Down, on 10 November 1989, and communist regimes crumbled first in Central Europe, then in the Balkans, finally in the Soviet Union, we all hoped that a new era of peace and prosperity would begin. We knew it would be hard and painful for working democracies and effective market economies to be established in the former Warsaw Pact countries. But we believed that this could be achieved: and that we in the West could provide not only material help, but also the valuable example of the successful economic system practised by the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This system had finally triumphed over the rival, centrally-planned approach. Moreover, it was not just in Central and Eastern Europe that the open market economic system was prevailing, but all over the world. China was transforming its economy, with conspicuous success. The little dragons of East Asia were reaching economic standards close to those of OECD and their neighbours in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were following in their wake. In Latin America new, open economic and trade policies were being brought in, notably in Mexico. The world-wide prospects had never looked better.

The European Parliament is The First Directly Elected international parliament in history. June 1994 marks the beginning of its fourth term of five years. The Treaty on European Union, which came into force on 1 November 1993, strengthens the powers of the Parliament in a number of significant ways. Now is a good time, therefore, to reflect on the development of the European Parliament, and to speculate on its potential.

For South Africa 1994 was an Annus Mirabilis. Despite pre-election predictions of violent disruption, the country's first democratic general election took place in an atmosphere of reconciliation and hope for a future in which past injustice would be rectified and the ‘new South Africa’ welcomed back into the international community. For a brief moment — and, of course, it might not last as the inevitable constraints imposed by scarce resources, rising expectations and external pressures complicate decision making — South Africa appeared to have taken a major step towards Nelson Mandela's goal of a ‘nation united in diversity’. Certainly, one striking feature of the four-year transition was the willingness of the elites engaged in the negotiating process to accommodate each other as they sought to reach agreement on a new constitution in a spirit of ‘consensus and compromise’. And the same spirit is meant to inspire the day-to-day working of the Government of National Unity and Reconstruction (GNU) which, in effect, is a grand coalition of all the major talents.

By Any Standards Sammy Finer's Career Was one of the utmost distinction. It was also an outstanding (and outstandingly merited) case of social mobility. He was but seven years-old when he first declared his ambition to be a university teacher, inspired by the example of his brother Herman at the LSE. He was indeed to make his way in a world that was entirely novel and, despite Herman's example, was bound to be in some respects am alien one. Seldom can a childhood ambition have been so fully attained – least of all in a milieu like that of Oxford, whose pathways are only slowly and reluctantly revealed to the newcomer.

The Classical Model for Broadcasting Structures in Europe is one based on national autarchy and linguistic exclusivity. The model derives from the introduction of radio broadcasting in the 1920s. As always in the field of communications, developments art supply-led rather than demand-led. Thus the early radio manufacturers established local radio stations to demonstrate their new equipment at a time when governments had not formulated any policies to deal with the new phenomenon.

It is Part of Conventional Wisdom That Organized interests have a considerable impact on European policies and that economic interests in particular have had a greater influence on EC affairs than the European Parliament. Nevertheless, they have attracted relatively little academic attention in comparison with that devoted to parliamentary interest representation. This is even more astonishing if we take account of the leading role given to interest groups by the neo-functionalistic approach, which has dominated integration theory for a long time.

The Unification of Germany — not as a Confederation as most DDR intellectuals and many West German leftists and Greenish citizens had hoped for but by means of the Anschluss of the GDR — was a daring venture: would the East Germans accept the new national state? The Anschluss by the ‘unconditional surrender’ of the East Germans entailed enormous costs. Destabilization of West German democracy and non-acceptance of democracy by the East Germans was always a latent danger.

Resistance To The Poll Tax Has Been Described As ‘The greatest popular rejection of unjust law since Chartist time’. During the period 1990 – 91, for example, summonses for nonpayment in England and Wales were taken out agaha nearly a quarter of those registered for the charge, whilst in Scotland approximately 38 per cent of the registered population were pursued by legal means. Somewhat surprisingly in the light of the large numbers of people involved and the undoubted role which the unpopularity of the tax played in Mrs Thatcher's removal from the premiership, the campaign has reccived little attention from political scientists and none, as far as I know, from legal or political philosophers.

There Was Something Odd About The Order in which S. E. Finer published on so many unrelated subjects. This must have had something to do with the gifts of penetration, precision, concision and clarity manifested in his way of writing, as well as, from a different point of view, with his innate talents as a conversationalist, let alone a teacher. (Be it recalled in passing that he was the most brilliant English-speaking teacher of politics in his generation.) Hence his facility and success in tackling any subject.

During the Early 1990s the Term Social Market economy has been used rather loosely; this is not surprising since the theory is derived from a specifically German tradition of political economy with little or no resonance outside the Germanspeaking area. The leading thinkers in the genre are hardly known in English-speaking circles and most of their works remain untranslated.

The fundamental purpose of this article is to present this rich and diverse strand of thought to a non-German audience barely aware of its existence, to point out possibilities for developing the international aspects of such a theory, and to highlight policy issues concerning the post-cold war European and international orders which can be addressed from social market perspectives.

FREQUENTLY IT HAPPENS IN HISTORY THAT REVOLUTION is followed by restoration or sometimes by reaction. The events that have convulsed Italy for the past two years can be described as a legal revolution. The Italian elections of 27 and 28 March can be seen as forms of restoration, or reaction, or continuation of revolution by other means. From 1992, the enthusiastic popular acclaim which accompanied the thundering clang of prison doors and the scandalous tumble of famous heads resulted in an unexpected final conclusion: the victory of an assorted coalition of rightist and moderate forces, the Freedom Alliance, led by the media magnate Silvio Berlusconi, which gained an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and a qualified majority in the Senate. It was the most important Italian election since 1948, when, after the abolition of the monarchy, Stalinists attempted to seize power democratically.

The Coincidence In Time of The Commemoration of the First World War and the end of the negotiations of the Uruguay round of the GATT Treaty has not only a clear symbolic but also a chastening meaning. Above all, even above its economic significance, it has a political meaning already familiar to the readers of this journal, but which now can and must be fully explained as we look at the 550 pages of text signed by the 117 members of the new World Trade Organization (WTO).

Now, of course, before we take it for granted that everything has been finalized we should realize that, on the one hand, the treaty must be ratified (like the Maastricht Treaty) and that there may be some doubts about President Clinton's power to persuade the irate Hollywood celluloid-makers and about Premier Ministre Balladur's ability to influence unconvinced French farmers that the treaty was such a great French success, not to speak of the reservations of many developing countries.

The expression post-globalization was chosen here because it is more comprehensive than the now much more popular ‘post-cold war’. While the latter has the advantage of offering a chronological turning point (the formalities of the end of the 1980s), in reality it is only the ideologico-military effect of a series of simultaneous changes in the world brought about in the last decade by the still ongoing and unpredictable information revolution. These changes affect all information and kinds of communication in the whole world and therefore justify the name of globalization - and for the transitional era which follows, of post-globalization in which we now live.

Health Care Has Been Called ‘The World's Most successful industry’. That success is long-standing. In every nation for which we have reliable long-term evidence the proportion of Gross National Product devoted to health care is much higher than was the cast a generation ago. The state has been central to that expansion. In all advanced industrial nations it regulates health care industries; in many it pays most of the cost of care; and in some it directly employs those who do the caring. In the 1980s, however, most countries tried to slow down the growth of health care spending, or even to cut it absolutely. The ‘health care state’ is as a consequence being reshaped across the advanced capitalist world: its power structures are changing; the conditions under which it funds and delivers services are being altered; and its relations with the ‘consumers’ of care are being transformed.

This Article is Addressed to the Qufstion Which Has recently caught the attention of scholars of the role of elites in promoting, or conversely impairing, democracy. It is based on the thesis that when elites are separate and relatively autonomous from the political elite which is in government, this promotes democracy. Conversely, when elites are closely connected, this impairs proper democratidelectoral procedures. The paper marshals illustrative-empirical support for this thesis from the relations between two elites in one Westem-style democracy: the religious elite and the political elite of government parties in Israel. It traces the intricate connections between religious leaders and the leaders of the government. It shows that these damage the freedom of elections, and enfeeble Israeli democracy.

More Than Four Years Have Passed Since The Uprising against Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989. If the revolt of the Romanians, after years in which Ceausescu encountered practically no opposition to his personal harsh dictatorship, surprised the entire world, the subsequent evolution of Romanian society seemed to return to the sad pattern of old: a country with little democratic tradition and maybe the most damaged by communism of all Eastern European countries would be expected to meet great difficulties and take more time to become a freemarket, liberal-based democracy. What is left of this prognosis more than four years after Ceausescu's fall?

Communism is dead, but the communist spirit continues to hover over Eastern Europe. In most of the states there is a peculiar resilience of the class structures imposed by the previous regime. This is not a new situation, which could explain in part the relative popularity of that system even in the countries where it was imported from abroad by Soviet military occupation. To speak nowadays about the popularity of communism, however relative, may sound like an affront to the numerous people who either perished in gaols and camps or barely survived after almost fifty years of political homogenization and isolation.

A Discussion of Last Autumn's Debate over Candidate selection in the British Labour Party and a consideration of the party's links with the trade unions may seem inappropriately provincial in an international journal of comparative politics. However, when viewed as an example of the continued search for political relevance by socialist parties in opposition, the issues raised by Labour's struggle to modernize take on more general interest. During long periods in the wilderness parties characteristically try to revive their fortunes by reforming organizational structures, ideological platforms and electoral strategies. For Labour, this started under the leadership of Neil Kinnock and continued with John Smith. The party has moved cautiously towards the centre ground, streamlined its election machine, modernized its communication strategy, and produced a more unified and moderate image. Labour's reforms of its relationship with the union movement are clearly part of this general attempt to reverse its electoral fortunes.

The Dustjacket of S. E. Finer's Adversary Politics and electoral Reform, published in 1975, reminds us that his older brother Herman Finer was one of the staunchest and best-known opponents of proportional representation (PR), and points out that S. E. Finer long shared his brother's point of view: in fact, ‘until twelve months ago Professor Finer was still adhering to this view. In advocating proportional representation as he does in this book, . . . he has abandoned the intellectual convictions of a lifetime’. In his later essay ‘Adversary Politics and the Eighties,’ published in 1982, he again pinpoints 1974 as the year of his conversion to PR.