‘EVERY ELECTION GENERATES ITS OWN MYTHS, MYTHS ABOUT WHAT the politicians were saying, about what the electorate thought they were saying, and about what the electorate meant by its votes.’ Butler's and Kavanagh's comment on the 1979 election applies with even more force to the outcome in 1997. For when an opposition party secures an unexpectedly large victory, there is a seemingly insatiable demand for explanations which stress the positive appeal of the winners — and a corresponding tendency to understate the significance of disenchantment with the outgoing administration. Such myths become entrenched when, as in 1979 certainly and in 1997 probably, the election does turn out to represent a political turning-point. This article therefore applies a degree of deconstruction to the 1997 election. In the afterglow of Labour's famous victory, it is as well to remember that the campaign was rather humdrum. The outcome was predictable, the lengthy campaign had little impact on Labour's lead and turnout fell significantly. Even if the election does transpire to have initiated major change, there is precious little evidence to suggest that in 1997 (any more than in 1979) a large body of electors was voting with that end in mind. What voters intend, and what elections achieve, are two different things. If there is a lesson to be drawn from the 1997 election, it seems to be rather limited and obvious. When governments are divided and directionless, the pendulum swings.