SECURING ORDERLY TRANSITION OF POWER FROM ONE RULER TO another is a classic problem for polities of any kind. Historically, ruler succession episodes were often marred by fierce competition and infighting among members of the ruling elite. Even in stable democratic systems with effective electoral and other procedures for replacing heads of government, leadership rotation within political parties retains some of these brutal qualities. Party leadership successions are mostly ad hoc affairs, frequently rooted in either the incumbent's state of mind, dissatisfaction with the incumbent's performance within the party, or internal power struggles. Comparative studies find that party leadership successions often generate widespread uncertainty, agony and even trauma within parties and thus they weaken rather than consolidate or strengthen a party's public support base.

‘WITHOUT TRUST WE WILL NOT SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS,’ WARNED Johannes Rau, the former German Federal president in his last ‘Berlin speech’ in May 2004. As one reason for an alarming loss of trust in Germany, creating a serious obstacle to necessary changes, he identified an irresponsible, egoistic and greedy behaviour among parts of German elites. Actually, Johannes Rau did not blame only political elites but also elite members in other sectors such as business, trade unions or mass media. His statement implies that parts of German elites are causing a decline in trust in Germany by losing touch with the people. Likewise, various observers in the public discourse argue that the immoral, cynical and increasingly incompetent behaviour of several elite members especially fosters a crisis of trust in Germany by creating a diffuse climate of distrust, pessimism, uncertainty and Zukunftsangst.

CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS FINDS that the distribution of power between presidents and assemblies can vary significantly from one presidential polity to the next, and can even change within the same presidential regime over a relatively short period of time. Presidents are shown to exercise different levels of control over the law-making process according to the de jure legislative powers at their disposal – initiation, veto, veto override, budgetary and decree powers– and their de facto partisan power – the level of disciplined party support that they command within assemblies. Different combinations of these powers can have strikingly different institutional, behavioural and policy effects. Indeed, such variation has led some analysts to question the usefulness of models of executive–legislative relations that are based solely on the traditional distinction between presidential and parliamentary political systems.

The existence of a healthy, respected and respectful opposition is a common feature of democratic politics. For a democracy to function properly, it needs an opposition to provide political contestation and electoral competition, thus limiting the power of the ruling party. In other words: no opposition – no democracy.

In this regard, Africa has a poor track record. During the 1950s and 1960s, euphoria swelled throughout the continent following political independence from colonial rule. These new African democracies, however, rapidly began succumbing to authoritarianism. Political repression, single-party states and military rule flourished, causing authoritarian forms of government to become the norm throughout the continent. Opposition parties were, and in many countries still are, severely restricted and have generally had little chance to be heard. This is especially so in the many single-party states, characterized by a lack of democratic experience and culture, which became prevalent in post-independence Africa.