There are good prima facie reasons to believe that directly electing a prime minister may provide the holder of that office with a tremendous power resource. Indeed some countries with weak prime ministers have debated this possible change, and one, Israel, carried it through. Using a theoretical argument based on the number of veto points in a political system, this article proposes that a directly elected prime minister will not increase the power of a prime minister. It studies what actually happened in Israel, and offers alternative explanations for the weakness of and lack of cohesion in its executive. Similarly, other factors are identified as causes of prime ministerial weakness in Italy and Japan.

This paper critically assesses the description ‘empire’ as applied to the United States in the twentieth century, proposing that US policy makers lack the territorial and occupation motives pre-requisite to being an imperial power. It is proposed that the USA is better described as an empire by accident than by design. Americans’ domestic experience of nation-building within the USA, since the early twentieth century, helps account for their unwillingness to permit the USA to be an imperial nation.

This article offers a critical engagement with two important strands of left theorizations of European Union integration and globalization, namely, ‘new constitutionalism’ (a sub-form of neo-Gramscian analysis) and ‘structural dependence’ theory (rooted in a more orthodox Marxist approach). These approaches suffer, respectively, from an uncritical or one-sided approach to constitutionalism and competitiveness; and from a theoretical conflation of national with regional political economy. While new constitutionalism under-theorizes regionalism partly because of its implicit ‘methodological nationalism’ and attachment to the ethics of national political economy, structural dependence theory neglects regionalism in pursuing a highly pessimistic structuralist approach to globalization.

This article makes a two-fold contribution to the European Parliament (EP) literature. First, it challenges the dominant assumption that post-Amsterdam the EP has experienced an increase in its powers. Through analysis of the Socrates case the article shows that the EP is now potentially weaker under the post-Amsterdam co-decision procedure (co-decision II), than it was under the earlier variant, co-decision I. Second, the article uncovers a hitherto overlooked aspect of internal divisions within the parliament, by revealing that there is scope for inter-committee conflict in the EP over budgetary allocations for multi-annual programmes. It is argued that such conflict can weaken the parliament in co-decision negotiations with the council, and that the negotiation of the EU's new multi-annual budgetary framework provides the perfect conditions for such internecine conflict to occur once more.

In the second of two articles the authors show what integrationist critics of consociational theory can learn from the case of Northern Ireland, namely, that consociation may be more realistic than integration, that a ‘grand coalition’ may have more virtue than the ‘minimum-winning’ variety, that consociations can be both liberal and democratic, and that PR-STV has considerable advantages over integrationists’ preferred electoral system, the Alternative Vote.

By adopting a longue durée approach this paper aims to move the debate on Italy's foreign policy under the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi beyond the presentism and personalization currently dominating it. It argues firstly that the equation of Italian foreign policy with Berlusconi – irresistible as it may be – does not ultimately hold, and secondly that Berlusconi's ‘new course’ in foreign policy has to be put in a broader context. A more historically informed reading of the subject can on the one hand confer meaning and substance to what otherwise could appear to be a supremely ephemeral foreign policy, and on the other help illuminate its current trajectory and future implications. Far from being the product of ‘one man alone’ and his surreal quirks, the recent change in Italy's foreign policy results from a particular dialectic interplay between structural and contingent developments, which have come to intersect at this particular time.

Some studies suggest that market-based economic development with state policies based on the rule of law are essential in stabilizing democracy and protecting civil and political rights. This article explores a possible association between weak civil and political rights, democratic instability and the delay in a state-regulated market development under the rule of law in Turkey. Despite its experience with democratic institutions since the 1950s, Turkey can be characterized as an ‘illiberal’ democracy because of its poor record on human rights. The lack of a relatively autonomous and competitive market economy may be explained by clientelist and inegalitarian forms of state intervention. These in turn contribute to the perpetuation of low income levels, a clientelist rent-seeking political and economic culture and unstable and illiberal democracy.