For more than four decades the analysis of party organizations in the European democracies has been completely separated from analyses of American party structures. The first part of this article examines how and why such a separation was to emerge in the aftermath of Duverger's and Epstein's path-breaking original work. It then goes on to outline how an analytic framework might be developed so that more wide-ranging comparative studies of party organizations in democratic regimes can be undertaken in future. Only with such research can the limitations of ‘exceptionalist’ and ‘regionalist’ explanations of party structure development and change be overcome.

Interactions between ruling and opposition parties in India have long been sorely neglected by political analysts. This study finds clear contrasts between interactions at national and state levels in this federal system, and further, often marked variations across the 28 states – each of which has its own Westminster-style legislature. Government–opposition relations range from semi-civilized to caustic, although most cases are situated some at distance from those extremes. So, despite a recent confrontation in the Indian Parliament, there are no strong trends towards either deterioration or greater accommodation. This is a study in ambiguity.

The existing literature on party organization is deeply divided over the question of how much freedom of choice decision-makers in a party enjoy in relation to their environment. Although the resulting theoretical deadlock seriously weakens our understanding of party formation and change, no attempt has been made to reconcile the different approaches. This article aims to do just that by offering a historical institutionalist perspective on party organization. Studying the development of political parties in South Korea, it argues that party organizations are best understood as strategic responses to electoral markets. Party organizations reproduce and change, as advantaged factions defend the status quo, while disadvantaged factions work towards organizational reform.

Although Turkey took its initial steps toward establishing democracy in 1950, it has thus far failed to become a fully functioning democracy. Using the comparison cases of Spain and Greece, this article discusses two related variables that are likely to have thwarted the development of full democracy in Turkey: the country's experience with authoritarian rule, and the lack of elite settlement or convergence towards acceptance of the democratic rules of the game. The article ultimately contends that despite the EU's attempt to push Turkey towards full democracy in the modern day it is unlikely that it will become a fully functioning democracy unless it manages to achieve civilian elite agreement regarding the rules of the Turkish democratic game, and that Turkey's experience with authoritarian rule may, in turn, have hindered the development of such rules.