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Terrorism as a Strategy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Abstract

In this article I discuss terrorism as a problem in the study of strategy rather than strategy as a problem in the study of terrorism. There is a developing literature now asserting that terrorist activity should be evaluated as strategy, so that dealing with the phenomenon requires not only denouncing it for its warped morality and inhumanity but also understanding motives and methods, treating it as purposive and instrumental and not just wicked. In this article I take it for granted that terrorism is strategic activity; my question is, what does this type of activity tell us about strategy? The case is interesting because terrorism is strategically generally demanding and prone to failure. Certainly when used on its own it is a poor support for political objectives, and may be counter-productive even when used with other methods. By looking at strategy at the fringes it is possible to illuminate aspects of strategic activity that have a wider application.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2007

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References

2 Kydd, Andrew H. and Walter, Barbara F., ‘The Strategies of Terrorism’, International Security, 31: 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 4980.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Neumann, Peter R. and Smith, M. L. R., ‘Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and its Fallacies’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 28: 4 (August 2005), pp. 571–95.CrossRefGoogle ScholarAlso on terrorism as a strategy see Martha Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’, in David C. Rapaport (ed), Inside Terrorist Organizations, 2nd edn, London, Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 13–31.

4 Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1938, p. 25.Google Scholar

5 These are considered in Freedman, Deterrence.Google Scholar

6 See for example the July 2005 letter purported to come from Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abus Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian leader of the Iraqi insurgency (who was later killed). The text can be found at http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html.Google Scholar

7 A lot of the confusion in the discussion of the effectiveness of terrorism suffers from not making the strategic/tactical distinction. For a thorough study of the poor success rate of strategic terrorism see Abrahms, Max, ‘Why Terrorism Does Not Work’, International Security, 31: 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 4278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar He notes that limited objectives may bring limited success.

8 See Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, ‘Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations’, Washington Post, 7 August 2005. They note that at the time of the 9/11 attacks there were 12 jihadist websites: four years later the figure was 4,500.Google Scholar