1 Cf. A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice‐Hall Inc., 1965.

2 Among a considerable number of other works including the earlier work of Deutsch, K. W., The Nerves of Government, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963 Google Scholar.

3 As is the case in the well‐known structural‐functional approach of Almond, G. A. and Powell, C. B. Jr., Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1966.Google Scholar

4 For a substantial criticism of this same problem based on Almond's, G. A. model see Finer, S. E., ‘Almond's Concept of “the Political Systems”,' Government and Opposition, Vol. V, No. 1, Winter 1969–70, pp. 3–21 Google Scholar.

5 Cf. for example: Davis, K.: ‘The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology’, American Sociological Review, XXIV, 1959, pp. 757–73;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cancian, F.: ‘Functional Analysis of Change’, American Sociological Review XXV, 1960, pp. 818–27;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Young, O. R., ‘The Impact of General Systems Theory on Political Science’, General Systems IX, 1964, pp. 240–53;Google Scholar Martindale, D. (ed). Functionalism in the Social Sciences, Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1965;Google Scholar Jones, Roy E., The Functional Analysis of Politics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.Google Scholar This does not imply a lack of appreciation of the value of some partial analytical works on the ‘functioning’ of ‘particular organisms’, such as that of Gérard Bergeron, Le fonctionnement de l'état, Paris, Colin 1955, for those for whom going deeper into the functional approach is the stage before working on the structural concepts of political science.

6 Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit., p. 49.

7 Ibid., p. 57.

8 Taylor, G. R., The Angel‐Makers, London, Heinemann, 1958.Google Scholar

9 Easton, op. cit., pp. 59–75.

10 Easton, op. cit., p. 78.

^* Editorial note: Perhaps the chief dichotomy in 19th century Latin American politics was between conservatives and liberals. Conservative parties tended to be rural based and to favour decentralization, landowning interests, and clerical interests. Liberals tended to be urban based, business orientated, centralizing and anti‐clerical parties. They represented groups anxious to obtain elite status but not to transform the existing structure of society. Thus conservatives and liberals came to share a certain fundamental community of interests. In most countries the conservative‐liberal dichotomy has been complicated or superseded by the emergence of new social forces and political parties seeking a greater share in the benefits of the society. It is a measure of the resilience of Colombia's traditional elites and the large reservoir of loyalty they have been able to tap that, in Colombia, the old dichotomy survives, even if there are now doubts about its continued existence.

11 Consult for a general approach Garcés, Joan E., ‘La Continuidad del sistema a través del cambio: el bipartidismo en Colombia,’ Revista Latino‐Americana de Sociología, 1, 1970 Google Scholar. For field studies see: Reichel‐Doimatoff, G. and Reichel‐Doimatoff, A., The People of Aritania: the Cultural Personality of a Colombian Mestizo Village, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961 Google Scholar; Rogers, E. M., Elementos del cambio social en America Latins. Difusién de innovaciones, Bogoté, Ed. Tercer Mundo, 1966;Google Scholar Pearse, A. and Rivera, S., La tenencia de la tierra y sus implicaciones socio‐econémicas en Tenza, Colombia. Un estudio de minifundio, Bogoté, Univ. Nacional, Fac. de Sociología, 1963;Google Scholar Fals Borda, O., Facts and Theory of Socio‐Cultural Changes in a Rural Social System, Bogoté, Univ. Nacional, Fac. de Sociología, 1962;Google Scholar Rogers, E. and Herzog, W., ‘Functional Literacy among Colombian Peasants’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 01, 1966, pp. 190–203.Google Scholar

12 As the results of surveys made among the immigrants show. Cf. Reyes Carmona, M. F., ‘Estudio socio‐econémico del fenémeno de la inmigracién a Bogoté’, Economía Colombiana, 01, 1965;Google Scholar McGreevey, W. P., ‘Causas de la migracién interna en Colombia’, in Empleo y desempleo en Colombia, Bogoté, University of the Andes, CEDE, 1968, pp. 211–21.Google Scholar

^* Editorial note: The ‘National Front’ is a unique arrangement, written into Colombia's constitution, which provides for close cooperation between conservatives and liberals in the governing of the country. The experiment was inaugurated in 1958 and is due to end in 1974. Thus the ‘National Front’ has presented a single candidate, every four years, for the popularly elected presidency. The candidate has been alternately provided by the Conservative and Liberal Parties. Ministerial and other political appointments are made on the basis of parity between the two parties. Seats in congress are similarly divided. Other parties are officially excluded from the system though not necessarily outlawed. Consequently opposition candidates for the presidency have either been leaders of dissident groups within the established parties or, as in the case of General Rojas Pinilla in 1970, leaders of movements essentially opposed to the system but officially standing as conservatives or liberals. Likewise, congressional elections resolve themselves into competitions between rival factions within a party for that party's fixed share of seats. The ‘National Front’ was initially formed by leaders of the two major parties coming together to oppose and replace the incumbent military dictator, General Rojas Pinilla (1953–57). The military was drawn in when the traditional parties proved incapable of controlling the mass violence their conflicts had helped to unleash. Initially it was intended to provide for a rapid return to civilian rule but Rojas Pinilla subsequently tried to create a new authoritarian form of rule which seemed to threaten the political dominance of the traditional elites. Thus the two elite controlled parties combined to unseat him. They also combined in an attempt to secure a monopoly for the established parties and to foster habits of cooperation rather than the bitter rivalry which had so nearly led to the destruction of the old political system. Finally, the ‘National Front’ was conceived as an exercise in rational modernization under the aegis of the traditional elites and within the framework of the existing social order. It is the viability of all these goals which is now in serious doubt.

13 According to official data contained in Ministry of Interior, Programas de desarrollo de la comunidad en Colombia, Informe Nacional, Bogoté. Departmental copy, 1967. Another official study on Accién Comunal is that of A. Avila, Incidencias del desarrollo de la Comunidad en la estructura ecocémica y social de Colombia, Bogoté, Administrative Planning Department, 1966, mimeo. For other points of view see: London, R., “'La Accién Comunal”, medio de opresién capitalista' Documentos politicos, Bogoté, Nos. 62 and 63, 1966;Google Scholar Fals Bordé, O.: Accién Comumlen una vereda colombiana, Bogoté, Univ. Nacional, fac. de sociologyía, 1961.Google Scholar Reuter, R. W., Colombia; Communie Development. A Survey Report, New York, CARE, 1960, VIII, p. 141.Google Scholar

14 Captain Zambrano, R.: 'Siluetas para una Historia', supplement to No. 29 of the Revista del Ejército, Bogoté, 1967, p. 89.Google Scholar

15 Lecture by the Minister of Defence, G. Rebeiz, in the ESAP, Bogoté, May, 1966, P. 37.

16 Ibid. p. 38.

17 According to Barber, W. E. and Ronnings, L. N., Internal Security and Military Power. Counter‐Insurgency and Civil Action in Latin America, Ohio State University Press, 1966, pp. 144–5.Google Scholar

18 Ibid., p. 149.

19 Resémen de la Ayuda de los Estados Unidos a Colombia, Bogoté, Alliance for Progress, s.d. Fig. B Mimeo.

20 Ibid., Fig. A

21 Ibid., p. 40.

22 From Zschock, D. K., ‘Manpower Perspective of Colombia’, quoted in Seminar of Science and Technology for Development, Bogoté, Asociacién Colombiana de Universidades, 02, 1968, p. 75, mimeo.Google Scholar

23 From Vinegas Arango, J. A., Petréleo, oligarquía e imperio, Bogoté, Ed. ESE, 1968, p. 285, mimeo.Google Scholar

24 Summary of US. Aid to Colombia, Fig. A.

25 Administrative Department of Planning: Statement to CIAP: Summary of the Colombian Programme of Public Investments, 1968, Bogoté, January 1968, mimeo.

26 Ibid. Figures nos. 11–30.

27 Administrative Department of Planning, Division of Global Economic Studies, Bogoté, June 1966.

28 In 1966 the total bank reserve was only 2, 310 million pesetas (141 million dollars) one quarter of government spending in that year.

29 J. E. Garcés: ‘La Continuidad del sistema a través del cambio. El bipartidismo en Colombia’, Revista Latino‐Americana de Sociología, 1, 1970.

^* Editorial note: Gaitén was a politician of relatively humble origins who broke into the elite dominated leadership of the Liberal Party. Others had done this but he was unique in his efforts to build a personal power base by a ‘populist’ appeal to the urban masses and by pitting their interests against those of the ‘oligarchy’. In the presidential elections of 1946 he opposed the official liberal leader and so divided the liberal vote that a conservative president, Ospina Perez, was able to break a period of liberal dominance. Later Gaitén became the official liberal leader and his own following, plus support from the party machine, made him seem an almost certain victor in the 1950 presidential elections. His assassination in 1948 (it is not known precisely who lay behind it) was the immediate prelude to that lengthy ‘undeclared civil war’ known as la violencia. Some observers feel, on the basis of his record, that in office his policies would have proved less radical than his rhetoric. Also, his movement was not thoroughly institutionalized and may not have provided a sufficiently coherent base for a radically reforming administration. ‘Gaitanismo’ without Gaitén lost much of its impact though his name is now invoked, because of its popular emotive appeal, even by former enemies in the Liberal Party.

30 Eisenstadt, S. M., ‘Breakdowns of Modernisation’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, XII, 07, 1964, pp. 345–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^* Editoral note: In 1930 divisions in the Conservative Party ended a long period of conservative dominance. In 1934 Alfonso Lépez became president at the head of the reformist wing of the Liberal Party which, amongst other things, had been inspired by Roosevelt's New Deal. Lépez's ‘Revolution on the March’ sought important educational reforms, the promotion of industry, the creation of welfare benefits and the legal protection of trade unions. In 1942 he started a second term which was not completed as mounting opposition to his programmes induced his resignation. More orthodox liberals re‐asserted themselves and former allies fell away. The net effect was an awakening of popular expectations which could not be fulfilled. It was in this situation that Gaitén came to prominence. The radicalization of politics all this entailed provoked a strong reaction amongst extreme conservatives. The resulting polarization and heightening of tensions created a propitious atmosphere for la violencia.

31 McCamant, John, Las elecciones del 17 de marzo de 1968 en la cuidad de Cali, Cali Universidad del Valle, Dept. of Political Science, 05 1968, mimeo.Google Scholar

32 Official data gave 1,625,025 votes to M. Pastrana and 1,561,468 to Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo; Boletin de la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Bogoté, 15 07 1970.Google Scholar

^* Editorial note: There is a problem here concerning the interpretation of Rojas Pinilla's victory and Pastrana's defeat. The opposition believed it had been cheated but this was naturally denied by the government. The evidence is not really conclusive and if anything points away from an elaborate ‘plot’. If there was a plot then it was very poorly executed! The essential point, however, is that even according to official figures Rojas Pinilla nearly defeated the candidate of the two established parties ‐ something quite unprecedented during the ‘National Front's' history and significant for the future.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Amman, Peter, ‘Revolution: a Redefinition’, Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII, 03 1962, p. 38.Google Scholar

36 For example, Eckstein, Harry: ‘On the Etiology of Internal War’, History and Theory, IV, No. 2, 1965, pp. 133–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 The first manifesto of the Popular Gaitanist Movement was published on 8 June 1970. See El Tiempo, Bogoté, 9 June 1970.

38 Taking the meaning which Huntingdon, S. P. gives to this concept in ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, World Politics, XVII, 04 1965, PP. 393–405.Google Scholar

39 For a more detailed examination of the meaning of political modernization in Colombia see Weiner, R. S., Political Modernization in Colombia, New York, Colombia University, 1967 (unpublished thesis)Google Scholar; Garcés, J. E., Développement politique et développement économique, Etude Comparative de la Colombie et du Chili, Paris, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1970, unpublished thesis, (mimeo) Chap. III.Google Scholar

40 The memorandum sent by C. Lleras Restrepo to the presidential candidates on 28 April 1970 suggests already that he intends to push this reformist tendency within the present official two‐party system. The memorandum is reprinted in Criterio Politico, I, No. 7, May 1970, pp. 13–15.