³ There were, of course, many others, including Robert Osgood, whose Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957, was one of the first works to put forward a critique of ‘massive retaliation’ and offer an alternative.

⁴ Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The Delicate Balance of Terror’, Foreign Affairs, 37: 2 (1959), pp. 213–36.

⁵ Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edn, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003, pp. 96–7.

⁶ Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1987, p. 95, n. 42.

⁷ Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, op cit., pp. 244–5.

⁸ Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1983, p. 329.

⁹ Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Ithaca, NY, and London, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., Fred Kaplan also uses the phrase ‘dark side’ with regard to US strategy in Vietnam (The Wizards of Armageddon, op cit., p. 336).

¹¹ On Brodie, who curiously is not mentioned anywhere in the book, see Barry H. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1991.

¹² Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, Westport, VA, Greenwood, 1976 [first published 1966], pp. 70–2.

¹³ Pape, Bombing to Win, op. cit., p. 331.

¹⁴ Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York, HarperCollins, 1971.

¹⁵ Schelling, Arms and Influence, op cit., p. 2.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁷ General Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat, Oxford, Public Affairs, 2002, p. 203.

¹⁸ Schelling, Arms and Influence, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 34.