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Power Alternation in South Korea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Tat Yan Kong
Tat Yan Kong*
Affiliation:
Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
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Extract

Despite the dramatic final breakthrough in summer 1987, the democratization of South Korea (hereinafter Korea) displayed the hallmarks of a gradual or continuous transition from authoritarianism. These included: liberalization emanating from within the regime; continuity of personnel from the authoritarian ruling elite; continuity in economic and foreign policy; and the exclusion from power of the representatives of the economically disadvantaged groups. Such features of democratic deficit have been observed for Korea and for Brazil, two countries whose experiences of authoritarian developmentalism are commonly compared.

Events in recent years suggest the possibility of more fundamental reform of Korea's economic and political institutions. The financial crisis of late-1997 led to the most serious economic recession for 40 years. Held in the middle of the financial meltdown, the presidential election of December 1997 resulted in a victory for Kim Dae-Jung (or DJ as he is commonly known), a veteran dissident associated with the excluded constituencies (not only his own underdeveloped home region but also labour and progressivelyminded intellectuals and activists).

Type
Original Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , July 2000 , pp. 370 - 391
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2000

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References

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