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The Political Opposition and Democracy in Macao: Revolutionaries or Loyalists?1
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2013
Abstract
This article examines the nature of political opposition in the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) to give us an understanding of its role in and approach to political reform in the territory. It explores the emergence of the pro-democracy opposition in Macao since the end of the colonial era and the self-perception of pro-democratic opposition groups in the MSAR regime, and argues that the majority of opposition groups perceive themselves as ‘loyal’ opponents to the current regime. The groups aim at checking the authorities in the scope of the constitution as loyal constituents. Their assumption of this role is the result of several environmental factors, including a relatively weak civil society, a lack of resources and a pro-government media.
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Footnotes
This research is funded by a grant from the Research Committee, University of Macau (Project Title: Social Groups and Organizations in Macao: Formal and Informal Politics, Cativo No. 2495). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the Hong Kong Political Science Association in August 2009. The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for their comments and input.
References
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35 Ibid.
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39 See Macao Daily News, 26 April 2007, p. B02.
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41 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei Man-chow, 22 February 2008.
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45 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei Man-chow, 22 February 2008.
46 Personal interview with Fong Man-tat, 18 April 2008.
47 Personal interview with Paul Pun Chi-meng, 1 April 2008.
48 Ibid.
49 Coutinho indicated that he has not contacted Antonio Ng, who is regarded as the figurehead of the pro-democratic opposition, but that he does speak with Ho Heng-kuok, who is considered to take a softer line with the government. Personal interview with José Maria Pereira Coutinho, 13 March 2008.
50 José Carlos Matias, a local Portuguese and asisstant editor of Television De Macau, told the author that the Portuguese and Macanese communities support democracy in Macao but are unwilling to campaign for universal suffrage elections of the chief executive and legislature. Instead, they aim to practise democratic principles in their daily activities. Personal chat with José Carlos Matias, 18 March 2010.
51 One social group worker from the pro-Beijing camp told the author that his organization had been instructed to campaign for Lam's group in the 2009 election.
52 Lam expressed her view of Macao's democracy on her personal Facebook page, http://www.facebook.com/#!/agnesmacau?v=wall, accessed 2 June 2010.
53 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei Man-chow, 22 February 2008 and Ho Heng-kuok, 13 April 2009.
54 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei Man-chow, 22 February 2008, and Ho Heng-kuok, 13 April 2009.
55 Personal interview with Antonio Ng, 22 April 2008.
56 Personal interview with Antonio Ng, 22 April 2008, and Au Kam-san, 18 November 2007.
57 Personal interview with Leong Kam-chun, 18 March 2008.
58 Personal interview with Antonio Ng, 22 April 2008.
59 For the social politics of Macao elections, see Eilo Yu Wing-yat, ‘Formal and Informal Politics in Macao Special Administrative Region Elections 2004–2005’, Journal of Contemporary China, 16: 52 (2007), pp. 417–42.
60 Personal interview with Au Kam-san, 8 November 2007.
61 Journal of Citizens, 10 September 2010, p. 5; also see Cheng Pou, 24 September 2010, p. 1.
62 Personal interview with Wong Pui-lam, 4 November 2007.
63 Ibid.
64 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei Man-chow, 22 February 2008, and Ho Heng-kuok, 8 October 2007.
65 Personal interview with Ho Heng-kuok, 8 October 2007.
66 Personal interview with Wong Pui-lam, 4 November 2007.
67 Ibid.
68 Personal interview with Ho Heng-kuok, 13 April 2009.
69 Personal interview with Chan Wai-chi, 16 April 2008.
70 Personal interview with Fong Man-tat, 18 April 2008.
71 Personal interview with Antonio Ng, 24 October 2007.
72 Personal interview with Ho Heng-kuok, 13 April 2009.
73 Personal interview with Wong Pui-lam, 4 November 2007.
74 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei Man-chow, 22 February 2008.
75 Personal interview with Antonio Ng, 22 April 2008.
76 Since its return to China in 1999, Macao has experienced rapid economic growth. Between 2002 and 2008, Macao's GDP increased by double digits annually and GDP per capita increased to MOP$311,000 or US$39,000 in 2009. See the website of the Statistics and Census Service, MSAR government, http://www.dsec.gov.mo/getAttachment/14e16214-1515-4529-9373-8077efc88961/C_AE_PUB_2009_Y.aspx, accessed 30 September 2010.
77 Lo Shiu-hing, Political Development in Macau, pp. 68–70.
78 Ao had accepted bribes from land developers and government project contractors and was sentenced to 26 years' imprisonment.
79 The Audit Commission of the MSAR government reported that the overall expenditure for the games was MOP$4.4 billion, a figure that was 50.6 per cent over budget. Problems included the organizer's waste of governmental resources and the need to reconstruct many facilities due to faulty original designs.
80 See the website of Civic Power, http://www.civic-power.org/cp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=55, accessed 24 April 2009.
81 Journal of Citizens, 2 May 2010, p. 1.
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