¹ Pangle, Thomas, The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Age, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1992;Google Scholar Steiner, David, Rethinking Democratic Education: The Politics of Reform, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1994;Google Scholar Gutman, Amy, Democratic Education, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987 Google Scholar; Winter, Micha de Kinderen als medeburgers: kinder- en jeugdparticipatie als maatschappelijk opvoedingsperspectief, Utrecht, De Tijdstroom, 1995.Google Scholar

² De l’esprit des lois, Book IV.

³ The distinction between normal politics and constitutional politics is elaborated in Bruce Ackerman, , We the People, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1991.Google ScholarPubMed

⁴ The founding father of this consensus was Marshall, T. H., Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950.Google Scholar

⁵ Crozier, Michel, Huntington, Samuel and Watanuki, Joji, the Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Govemability of Democracy to the Trilateral Commission, New York, New York University Press, 1975.Google Scholar

⁶ Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.Google Scholar

⁷ Gunsteren, Herman van, Eigentijds burgerschap, The Hague, Sdu uitgeverij, 1992.Google Scholar

⁸ Bruner, Jerome, Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990.Google Scholar

⁹ Douglas, Mary, ‘The Normative Debate and the Origins of Culture’ in Risk and Blame, London, Routledge, 1992.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Douglas, M., How Institutions Think, London, Routledge, 1987.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The Republic, Book VIII, 537–540.

¹¹ That common codes or meanings should be a condition of communication is refuted by Sperber, Dan and Wilson, Deirdre: Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, p. 15–21.Google Scholar Recently I found extensive treatment of this matter by Nicholas Rescher. I quote his conclusion. ‘Consensus is not a criterion of truth, is not a standard of value, is not an index of moral or ethical appropriateness; is not a requisite for co-operation; is not a communal imperative for a just social order; is not, in and of itself, an appropriate ideal.

All in all, our position is a markedly guarded one that downgrades consensus both as a theoretical standard and as a practical requisite. Consensus — so we have seen — is no more than one positive factor that has to be weighed on the scale along with many others.

Seen in this light, consensus can be viewed as an inherently limited good much like money. It has the character of being something one would welcome having if it can be secured — in the right way — by fair means and “at the right price”.’ ( Rescher, Nicholas, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 199.Google Scholar)

¹² For this notion of hierarchy as an order in which everything and everyone has its/his/her proper place, see Wildavsky, Aaron, The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political Leader, Alabama, The University of Alabama Press, 1984 Google Scholar, and Thompson, Michael, Ellis, Richard and Wildavsky, Aaron, Cultural Theory, Boulder, Westview Press, 1990.Google Scholar