Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-4rdrl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-05T23:45:37.208Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Minority Governments and Pledge Fulfilment: Evidence from Portugal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 May 2016

Abstract

In an age of rampant distrust and disaffection, pledge fulfilment is important for the quality of delegation between voters and elected officials. In this article, we make an empirical appraisal of pledge fulfilment in Portugal. Do Portuguese minority governments fulfil their pledges? How do they fulfil those pledges? What is the role of opposition parties? Using an original data set with over 3,000 electoral pledges for three Socialist governments, as well as interviews with former ministers and party leaders, our evidence suggests that: (1) minority governments fulfil at least as many pledges as their majority counterparts; (2) the main opposition party manages to extract the most policy benefits; and (3) economic conditions and cohabitation situations matter for pledge fulfilment.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Catherine Moury is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the FCSH-Universidade Nova, Lisbon. Contact email: [email protected].

Jorge M. Fernandes is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Comparative Politics at the University of Bamberg. Contact email: [email protected].

References

Adams, J. and Merrill, S. (2009), ‘Policy-seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation: A Valence-Uncertainty Model’, British Journal of Political Science, 39(3): 539558.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Amorim Neto, O. (2003), ‘Portugal: Changing Patterns of Delegation and Accountability under the President’s Watchful Eyes’, in K. Strøm, W.C. Müller and T. Bergman (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 552572.Google Scholar
Amorim Neto, O. and Lobo, M.C. (2009), ‘Portugal’s Semi-Presidentialism (Re)Considered: An Assessment of the President’s Role in the Policy Process, 1976–2006’, European Journal of Political Research, 48(2): 234255.Google Scholar
Andeweg, R.B. (2000), ‘Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process between Cabinet and Ministers’, European Journal of Political Research, 37(3): 377395.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Artés, J. (2013), ‘Do Spanish Politicians Keep Their Election Promises?’, Party Politics, 19(1): 143158.Google Scholar
Artés, J. and Bustos, A. (2008), ‘Electoral Promises and Minority Governments: An Empirical Study’, European Journal of Political Research, 47(3): 307333.Google Scholar
Becher, M. and Christiansen, F.J. (2015), ‘Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining’, American Journal of Political Science, 59(3): 641655.Google Scholar
Belchior, A.M. (2008), ‘Party Political Representation in Portugal’, South European Society and Politics, 13(4): 457476.Google Scholar
Christiansen, F.J. and Damgaard, E. (2009), ‘Parliamentary Opposition under Minority Parliamentarism: Scandinavia’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 14(1–2): 4676.Google Scholar
Christiansen, F.J. and Pedersen, H.H. (2012), ‘Minority Coalition Governance in Denmark’, Party Politics, 20(6): 940949.Google Scholar
Costello, R. and Thomson, R. (2008), ‘Election Pledges and Their Enactments in Coalition Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Ireland’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 18(3): 239256.Google Scholar
Dalton, R., Farrell, D. and McAllister, I. (2011), Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elgie, R. (1999), Semi-presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Fernandes, J.M. (2016), ‘Intra-Party Delegation in the Portuguese Legislature: Assigning Committee Chairs and Party Coordination Positions’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 22(1): 108128.Google Scholar
Field, B.N. (2009), ‘Minority Government and Legislative Politics in a Multilevel State: Spain under Zapatero’, South European Society and Politics, 14(4): 417434.Google Scholar
Ganghof, S. and Brauninger, T. (2006), ‘Government Status and Legislative Behaviour: Partisan Veto Players in Australia, Denmark, Finland, and Germany’, Party Politics, 12(4): 521539.Google Scholar
Green-Pedersen, C. (2001), ‘Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the “Danish Miracle”’, Journal of Public Policy, 21(1): 5370.Google Scholar
Huber, E. and Stephens, J. (2001), Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: Chicago University Press).Google Scholar
Indridason, I.H. and Kam, C. (2008), ‘Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift’, British Journal of Political Science, 38(4): 621656.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
ISSP Research Group (2008), International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government IV – ISSP 2006 (Cologne: GESIS Data Archive).Google Scholar
Jalali, C. (2007), Partidos e Democracia em Portuga, 1974–2005: da Revolução ao Bipartidarismo? (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais).Google Scholar
Katz, R. (1986), ‘Party Government: A Rationalist Conception’, in F.G. Castles and R. Windenmann (eds), Visions and Realities of Party Government (Florence: EUI): 3171.Google Scholar
Leston-Bandeira, C. (2004), From Legislation to Legitimation: The Role of the Portuguese Parliament (London: Routledge).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leston-Bandeira, C. (2009), ‘Dissent in a Party-Based Parliament: The Portuguese Case’, Party Politics, 15(6): 695713.Google Scholar
Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press).Google Scholar
Lupia, A. and Strøm, K. (1995), ‘Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections’, American Political Science Review, 89(3): 648665.Google Scholar
Magalhães, P.C. (2012), ‘After the Bailout: Responsibility, Policy, and Valence in the Portuguese Legislative Election of June 2011’, South European Society and Politics, 17(2): 309327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mansbridge, J. (2003), ‘Rethinking Representation’, American Political Science Review, 97(4): 515528.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mansergh, L.E. (2004), ‘Do Parties Make a Difference? The Relationship Between Government Intention and Government Output in the Public Policy Sphere: The Case of Governments in Ireland 1977–1997’, PhD dissertation, Trinity College, Dublin.Google Scholar
McCluskey, N. (2008), ‘Election Manifesto Pledge Fulfilment in New Zealand, 1972–2005’, PhD dissertation, University of Canterbury.Google Scholar
Moury, C. (2011), ‘Italian Coalitions and Electoral Promises: Assessing the Democratic Performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II Governments’, Modern Italy, 16(1): 3550.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moury, C. and De Giorgi, E. (2015), ‘Introduction: Conflict and Consensus in Parliament During the Economic Crisis’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 21(1): 113.Google Scholar
Müller, W.C. (2000), ‘Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work’, European Journal of Political Research, 37(3): 309333.Google Scholar
Müller, W.C. and Strøm, K. (1999), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Naurin, E. (2009), ‘Promising Democracy: Parties, Citizens and Election Promises’, PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen.Google Scholar
Naurin, E. (2011), Election Promises, Party Behaviour and Voter Perceptions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).Google Scholar
Powell, B. and Whitten, G. (1993), ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context’, American Journal of Political Science, 37(2): 391414.Google Scholar
Rose, R. (1984), Do Parties Make a Difference? (London: Macmillan).Google Scholar
Royed, T. (1996), ‘Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and the United States: Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher Eras’, British Journal of Political Science, 26(1): 4580.Google Scholar
Schimmelfennig, F. (2001), ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization, 55(1): 4780.Google Scholar
Shugart, M. and Carey, J. (1992), Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, A. (2004), Election Timing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Strøm, K. (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Strøm, K. (2000), ‘Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 37(3): 261289.Google Scholar
Thomson, R. (2001), ‘The Programme to Policy Linkage: The Fulfilment of Election Pledges on Social-Economic Policy in the Netherlands, 1986–1998’, European Journal of Political Research, 40(2): 171197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomson, R. et al. (2014), ‘The Program-to-Policy Linkage: A Comparative Study of Election Pledges and Government Policies in Ten Countries’, paper presented at APSA Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 28–31 August.Google Scholar
Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar