1 One of the leading supporters of Tadeusz Mazowiecki reacted to his electoral defeat by saying that the Polish electorate proved itself unworthy of a democratic regime. Another respected commentator stated that Polish society was mentally sick and needed a psychiatrist. Such statements were duly repeated by the most important European newspapers. Can one imagine a better example of a complete misunderstanding by the speakers and by those who quoted them of the essence of democracy?

2 Informally, this group of people had already functioned since spring 1988 as a sort of political discussion group.

3 This explains in our view the bitterness of the clash. While attempting to reconstruct such conflict-loaded events, an analyst walks on slippery ground. Stakes are so big and emotions run high, so that actors use lies and distortions without even being aware of it.

4 Such an informal, well-knit group, once it succeeds in winning strategic positions of power in an established structure of public institutions, can exert enormous political influence. On the other hand, because its membership is so well-defined, and because it is so tightly integrated, it faces problems in developing a mass following. It draws decisive advantage from informal agreements, secret deals, and behind-the-scenes manipulations. Consisting of journalists and writers, it adroitly uses symbols of mass propaganda. Its high visibility and the aura of an heroic past attract the well-known figures of the artistic and intellectual world willing to bask in the glory and heroism. This additionally has enhanced its public presence.

5 See Schopflin, G., ‘The Prospects for Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe’, in Volten, Peter (ed.), Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democarcy, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990, p. 30 Google Scholar.

6 He also succeeded, during the Second Congress of the NSZZ Solidarnosc in avoiding the choice between the purely trade-unionist role for the organization and the role of the political movement. There is no doubt that now, once Walesa’s ambitions are fulfilled, the NSZZ Solidarnosc will transform itself into a normal trade union.

7 To cut a long story short, Walesa responded in March at a meeting of the Committee by asking its secretary, Mr Henryk Wujek, to give account of the Committee’s finances. A debate started during which the majority of speakers, the Prime Minister, Mazowiecki, included, pronounced themselves against Walesa’s demand. Subsequently, Walesa asked Wujec to resign. At the same time, he wrote to Michnik, the editor-in-chief of the Gazeta Wyborcza, suggesting that the GW stop using Solidarity’s label. The war entered a new stage. Wujec declined insisting that he was elected to his post and Walesa had no right to fire him. In fact, the Committee had no statute, and who had the right to do what was largely undefined? Michnik also refused to stop using Solidarity’s vignette. Henryk Wujec, on his own initiative, called a meeting of representatives of territorial committees for 1 July: a move clearly intended as part of the strategy to create the party-movement. The GC hurriedly tried to strenghen the bridge linking it directly to regional and local committees. That effort was not very successful.

8 The GC overestimated Walesa’s control over the partly new Committee, and neglected to do what was feasible: to vote for the dissolution of the Committee. They had left before the vote on the motion for the dissolution was taken.

9 The meeting called by Wujec for 1 July, preceded by another one called by Walesa, was a failure. Walesa’s gambit worked once more.