1 On reigning and ruling coalitions see Almond, Gabriel, et al., Crisis, Choice, and Change, Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.Google Scholar

2 All these approaches to explanation are critically analyzed in Schmitter, Philippe, ‘Historical Bloc Formation and Regime Consolidation in Post‐Authoritarian Portugal,’ 11 1976 Google Scholar, mimeographed.

3 For a discussion of crises, transitions, and revolutions as decisive arenas of group and coalitional conflicts see Tilly, Charles, ‘Revolutions and Collective Violence’, in Greenstein, Fred and Polsby, Nelson, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, Reading, Mass.: Addison‐Wesley, 1975, chap. 5.Google Scholar A classical analysis of the crucial role of the inaugural phase in the establishment of party systems is Loewenberg, Gerhard, ‘The Remaking of the German Party System’, in Dogan, Mattei and Rose, Richard, eds., European Politics, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 259–279.Google Scholar

4 Gabriel Almond and his colleagues have devoted an entire volume to founding coalitions (Crisis, Choice, cit.), and Philippe Schmitter has centred the paper cited in n. 2 on the problem of building hegemonic coalitions in post‐authoritarian Portugal.

5 Given the topic of the paper, the focus is mainly on parties as transitional actors. Less attention is paid to the role of the grands corps, labour unions, constitutional organs, churches, presidents and prime ministers, or specially‐constituted transitional bodies. This is not to belittle their role. In Spain and Portugal the armed forces (and in Spain the monarchy as well) are crucial. Rather, we see these bodies as part of the context to which parties must respond. For an analysis of constitutional bodies in regime crises see Linz, Juan, ‘Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration’, in Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.Google Scholar

6 See on this point Palma, Giuseppe Di, Surviving Without Governing: the Italian Parties in Parliament, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977 Google Scholar, and Tarrow, Sidney ‘The Italian Party System between Crisis and Transition’, American Journal of Political Science, 21, 1977, pp. 193–224 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 For an analysis of the stages in the crisis of democracy see Juan Linz in Linz and Stepan, in The Breakdown, cit. The analysis is inspired by K. D. Bracher’s study of the collapse of the Weimar Republic.

8 For ease of presentation and comparison, this and the following tables report also the results of later elections, which will be commented on in the last part of the paper.

9 Sani, Giacomo, ‘Ricambio elettorale, mutamenti sociali e preferenze politiche’, in Tarrow, Luigi Graziano e Sidney, a cura di, La Crist italiana, Turin: Einaudi, 1979, pp. 303–328 Google Scholar. This is one of Sani’s several studies devoted to party realignments in Italy.

10 A less condensed treatment of all these points is found in Palma, Giuseppe Di, ‘Political Syncretism in Italy: Historical Coalition Strategies and the Present Crisis’, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 7, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978.Google Scholar

11 On limited pluralism, personalismo, legitimacy in an authoritarian regime, see above all Juan Linz’s seminal works, beginning with ‘An Authoritarian Regime: Spain’, in Allardt, Erik and Rokkan, Stein, eds., Mass Politics, New York: Free Press, 1970, pp. 251–283.Google Scholar See also, on the arbitrating role of Franco, his ‘political family’ and his cabinet in politico‐bureaucratic decision making, Richard Gunther, Public Policy in a No‐Party State: Spanish Budgeting and Planning in the Twilight of the Franquist Era, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, forthcoming.

12 See on these reforms and their relation to later democratic regimes Morlino, Leonardo, ‘Dal pluralismo limitato al pluralismo competitivo. Partiti e sindacati’, in de Vergottini, Giuseppe, a cura di, Una costituzione democratica per la Spagna, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1978, chap. 5.Google Scholar

13 The fact that the mutual exclusions of the Second Republic may have involved at the time a considerable dose of misperceptions and self‐feeding fears (or optimistic risk‐taking) does not subtract from, but may in fact be further motive for the more guarded tactics adopted at present. It remains the fact that the historical context within which ‘similar’ events occur may make a considerable difference and that history does not necessarily repeat itself. On democratic beginnings under the Spanish Republic, see Linz, Juan, ‘From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain’, in Linz, and Stepan, , eds., The Breakdown, cit.Google Scholar

14 A recent account of the transition from Franco’s death to the popular approval of the constitution is Coverdale, John F., The Political Transformation of Spain After Franco, New York: Praeger, 1979.Google Scholar

15 For an analysis of the revolution in this key see Schmitter, Philippe, ‘Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal’, Armed Forces and Society, 2, 1975, pp. 5–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 This dynamics of the events is standard interpretation among many authors. See Maxwell, Kenneth, “The Thorns in the Portuguese Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, 54, 1976, pp. 250–270 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bandeira, Antonio Rangel, ‘The Portuguese Armed Forces Movement: Historical Antecedents, Professional Demands, and Class Conflict’, Politics and Society, 6, 1976, pp. 1–56 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fields, R., The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement, New York: Praeger, 1976.Google Scholar

17 On Communist strategies in post‐authoritarian Portugal see most recently Mujal‐León, Eusebio, ‘Communism and Revolution in Portugal’, in Tökés, Rudolf L., ed., Eurocommunism and Détente, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979, chap. 5.Google Scholar

18 See on the two approaches to legitimation, applied respectively to Karamanlis’s Greece and to Portugal, Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘L’instaurazione dei regimi democratici in Grecia e Portogallo’, II Mulino, 238, 03–04, 1975, pp. 217–237. Pasquino distinguishes between electoral and problem‐solving legitimation.Google Scholar

19 It could have gone otherwise, but even admitting victory in battle there remains the fact that the military and the Communists failed to work out the material and ideational requirements needed to carry out a risk taking strategy and to implement a victory. Gianfranco Pasquino reverses the analysis of the demise of the military by linking its fragmentation to the divisive impact of the parties. See Pasquino, , ‘Le Portugal: de la dictature corporatiste à la démocratie socialiste’, (Association Française de Science Politique, ‘La Sortie des Dictatures’, Table Ronde, Paris, 6–7 May, 1977 ).Google Scholar

20 On Constitution‐making see de Vergottini, Giuseppe, Le origini della seconda repubblica portoghese (1974–1976), Milano: Giuffré, 1977.Google Scholar

21 Kitsikis, Dimitri, ‘Greece: Communism in a Non‐Western Setting’, in Albright, David E., ed., Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979, chap. 5.Google Scholar

22 Mouzelis, Nicos, ‘On the Greek Elections’, New Left Review, 108, 03-04 1978, pp. 59–74 Google Scholar

23 The reasons for the lateness in the appearance of a populist party like PASOK, despite an apparently conducive domestic and international environment, are analyzed by Mouzelis, ibid.

24 In the Italian referendum of 1946 only 54 percent of the voters chose the republic. Given that a large majority of Nea Democratia’s voters supported the monarchy, the fact that Karamanlis took no personal stand on the monarchy is understandable. Nevertheless, there was little doubt that the monarchy was doomed.

25 For an analysis of future (and past) developments in our countries, which does not always coincide with mine, see Linz, Juan, ‘Europe’s Southern Frontier: Evolving Trends Toward What Daedalus, 108, Winter 1979, pp. 175–209 Google Scholar

26 I have in mind Giovanni Sartori’s distinction between a limited and a moderate multi‐party system. See more recently Sartori, , Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, chap. 6.Google Scholar

27 On centrifugalism in extreme party systems see Sartori, ibid.

28 Readers may notice with disappointment the lack of treatment of regional parties and of regionalism in general. As to the former, I consider regional‐linguistic parties as parties which ‐ because they define their role mainly as issue‐specific and do not perceive their position in the party system as mainly encompassed by a left‐right continuum ‐ fall largely outside the spectrum of party competition. (See Palma, Di, Surviving, cit., chap. 6Google Scholar). At any rate, given their generally moderate stand in national politics, parties like the Basque Nationalists, the Convergéncia Democrática de Catalunya, or the Andalusian Socialist Party, may function ‐ especially in emergency ‐ as coalitional buffers between the two main parties. As to regionalism, despite its potentially explosive implications for democracy itself, I consider the issue very nearly an unbeatable parameter in the Spanish situation. As such, no amount of democratic accommodation can alone hope to solve it; and to illustrate the extent of the present accommodations would be beside the point, in the light of the present paper.

29 Di Palma, Giuseppe, ‘Risposte parlamentari alla crisi del regime: un problema di istituzionalizzazione’, in Tarrow, Graziano e, La crisi italiana, cit., esp. pp. 370–379.Google Scholar

30 Juan Linz’s projections in this regard are more guarded. See Linz, A, ‘Il sistema partitico spagnolo’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 8, 1978, pp. 363–414 Google Scholar

31 Interesting indications about communist opportunity for presence in civic and politico‐bureaucratic institutions are found in Constantine Menges, Christopher, Spain: The Struggle for Democracy Today, The Washington Papers, 6, 58. Beverley Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1978, chap. 6.Google Scholar

32 Palma, Di, ‘Political Syncretism’, cit.Google Scholar

33 See on many of these points Mclnnes, Neil, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, London: Oxford University Press, 1975.Google Scholar

34 Some political scientists have recently tried to show how hegemony could be strategically reconciled with democratic legitimacy. See Peter Lange, ‘II PCI e i possibili esiti della crisi italiana’, in Tarrow, Graziano e, La crisi italiana, cit., pp. 657–718 Google Scholar; Graziano, Luigi ‘Compromesso Storico e democrazia consociativa: verso una “nuova democrazia?’, ibid., p. 719–767.Google Scholar

35 Sattori speaks of a polarized dyarchy. See Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Calculating the Risk,’ in Ranney, Austin and Sartori, Giovanni, eds., Eurocommunism: The Italian Case, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978, chap. 10.Google Scholar

36 On the important role of foreign policy in Greek history see, more recently, Adamantia Pollis, ‘Persistence, Cleavage and Change in Greece’, (prepared for a seminar at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University, May 4, 1977); Vatikiotis, P. J., Greece: A Political Essay, The Washington Papers, 2, 8. Beverley Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1974 Google Scholar. For a balanced view of the political effects of Greece’s ‘dependent’ economic development see Mouzelis, Nicos, ‘Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post‐War Greece’, New Left Review, 96, 03–04 1976, pp. 57–80 Google Scholar Though moving from a leftist perspective, Mouzelis is critical of Poulantzas’ dependencia analysis ( Poulantza, Nico, La Crise des Dictatures: Portugal, Grèce, Espagne, Paris: Maspero, 1975 Google Scholar). See also Mouzelis, Nicos, Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London: 1978.Google Scholar

37 See similar observations in Agosta, Antonio, ‘Le elezioni del 1977 e le prospettive della nuova democrazia in Grecia’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 9, 1979, pp. 97–135.Google Scholar