2 General René Schneider Chereau, 22 October 1970; Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, Minister of the Interior under Frei, killed by members of the Vangtuardia Organizada del Pueblo on 8 June 1971.

3 Reaching an all‐time low when Edmundo Péez was murdered and Abora, a UP magazine, printed ‘La derecha detrás del crimen’ on its cover when it was already known that extreme leftists, including a man recently pardoned by President Allende, were responsible. Abora, 15 June 1971.

4 El Mercurio, 7 May 1970.

5 Alexander, R. J., Prophets of the Revolution, 4th ed., the Macmillan Co., New York, 1969, pp. 53–74.Google Scholar

6 Edwards, Alberto, La Fronda aristocrática, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1945, PP. 173,Google Scholar Passim.

7 Ramirez Necochea, H., Balmaceda y la contrarrevolucián da 1891, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1969.Google Scholar For a critique see Blakemore, H., ‘The Chilean Revolution of 1891 and its Historiography’, HAHR, Vol. XLV (1965). PP. 393–421.Google Scholar

8 Ramirez N., H., Historia del Movimiento Obrero en Chile. Siglo XX, Taller‐Gráficos Lautaro, Santiago, 1956.Google Scholar For a critique see Santa Cruz, Anibal Pinto, Chile, un caso de desarrollo frustrado, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1962, pp. 36–40.Google Scholar Also Edwards, op. cit., p. 25 with another view.

9 From a synthesis of all available sources in Tapia V., J., Bureaucratic Power in a Developing Country. The Case of the Chilean Social Security Administration, unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 1969.Google Scholar

10 Donoso, R., Alessandri. Agitador y Demoledor, Fondo de Cultura Econá‐mica, Mexico, 1952, Vol. I, p. 206.Google Scholar Donoso writes: ‘These elements lacked…class consciousness and distributed themselves among the traditional parties.’

11 Pike, F. B., Chile and the United States 1880–1962, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 284.Google Scholar

12 Land was coveted by the nouveau riche as a symbol of social status, prestige and acceptance. See Lipset, S. M., ‘Values, Education and Entre‐preneurship’, in Lipset, and Solari, A. (eds.), Elites in Latin America, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 9–10.Google Scholar

13 Ratinoff, L., ‘The New Urban Groups: the Middle Classes’, in Lipset, and Solari, , op. cit., p. 74.Google Scholar

14 A complicating factor was the issue of concession versus repression ‐ it would seem likely that the shift in population towards the cities and the resulting ‘social question’ must inevitably coincide with an increasing defensive social rigidity on the part of the sector whose relative power is declining.

15 These are all figures relating to the elections of 1918, 1920 and 1921 and are from Oficina Central de Estadística, Censo Electoral 1921, Sociedad de Imprenta y Litografía ‘Universo’, Santiago, 1922.

16 Alessandri, A., Recuerdos de Gobierno, Editorial Nascimiento, Santiago, 1967, vol. I, p. 51.Google Scholar

17 In Tarapacá and Antofagasta the Alianza Liberal won 22 electors and their opponents only 2. Both of these provinces as well as Concepcián had serious economic problems at this time, as well as a tradition of hostility towards Santiago.

18 In the three congressional elections following the first up‐dating of the voting registers since 1890, the abstention rate was: 1915: 18.67; 1918: 469: 1921: 46–71.

19 R. Donoso, op. cit., Vol. I, Chapter 4, ‘La oligarquía Parlamentaria’.

20 Oyarzán, Enrique, Unpublished Memoirs, pp. 6–8.Google Scholar

21 Fuentes, Carlos Vicuña, La Tiranía en Chile, Imprenta O'Higgins, Santiago, 1945, Vol. I, pp. 114–19.Google Scholar

22 Ibid., p. 119.

23 Vicuña, Donoso and Oyanán, to name only three, concur on this point. Alessandri himself, attempting to refute the charges made against his confidants, lists his ministers ‐ an unconvincing debating trick. See A. Alessandri, ‘Rectificaciones al Tomo IX’, Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago, 1941, pp. 15–21.

24 The self‐nominated patricians of the rural aristocracy were not above this, In 1925 the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (SNA) received a subsidy from the government at a time when the president of the SNA was also Minister of Agriculture. The SNA was a self‐help society. See G. M. McBride, Chile, Land and Society, American Geographical Society, New York, 1936, p. 230.

25 On the disparaging attitude of the middle and upper groups towards the roto, see Pike, F. B., ‘Aspects of Class Relations in Chile 1850–1960’, HAHR, XLIII, No. 1, 02 1963, p. 17.Google Scholar

26 During the early decades of this century, Chile sent military advisers to a number of South American nations ‐ positions now occupied by US personnel

27 Though by expanding the officer corps against KÖrner's advice, the Chilean army created an over‐officered situation that was to plague it for decades.

28 Errázuriz, L., LA llamada movilizacián de 1920, Escuela Tipográfica ‘La Gratitud Nacional’, Santiago, 1923, pp. xii‐xxiii.Google Scholar

29 Columbano Millas, Los Secretos que divulga un secretario privado de los ministros ad Guerra…', Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago, 1923. His information on the incompetence and irresponsibility of some ministers (pp. 15–102) is very revealing.

30 See Walker Valdés, A., Revolucián?…La verdad sobre el motín militar, Imprenta Selecta, Santiago, 1919.Google Scholar

31 Ibid., p. 64.

32 Donoso, R., op. cit., p. 238 Google Scholar, Note 6; Millas, C., op. cit., p. 153 Google Scholar; basing himself on the trial, Walker Valdés denies this: op. cit., p. 39.

33 Donoso, R., op. cit., p. 237.Google Scholar Among those convicted were General Alberto Herrera and Major Ambrosio Viaux ‐ both fathers of future leaders of army conspiracies.

34 Würth Rojas, E., Ibáñez_z. Caudillo Enigmático, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1958, p. 18.Google Scholar

35 Boizard, R., Cuatro Retratos en Profundidad, Imprenta el Imparcial, Santiago, 1950, p. 12.Google Scholar

36 Würth, E., op. cit., p. 23.Google Scholar

37 Ibid., p. 24.

38 General Brieba in Actuacián del Ejército en las elecciones de 1924, Santiago, 1927, insists that the supervising officers were legally under executive control. Similar pressure had sparked the 1891 civil war.

39 Monreal, E., Historia completa y documentad? del período revolucionario 1924–25, Imprenta Nacional, Santiago, 1929, p. 135.Google Scholar

40 For a narrative of these events, see Nunn, F. M., Chilean Politics 1920–31, The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces, University of New Mexico Press, 1970.Google Scholar

41 Among those who acted were Marmaduke Grove, leading figure in the coups d'état of January 1925 and June 1932, and Ariosto Herrera who tried and failed in 1939. See Aldunate Philips, R., Ruido de Sables, Escuela Lito‐Tipográfica ‘La Gratitud Nacional’, Santiago, 1970, p. 32.Google Scholar

42 Oyarzán, E., op. cit., pp. 21–6Google Scholar, contains Francisco Huneeus's account of the events of September. The TEA coup was planned for November.

43 Morales, Carlos Saez, Recuerdos de un Soldado, Editorial ‘Ercilla’, Santiago, 1934, Vol. I, PP. 93–4.Google Scholar

44 Notably Oyarzán and his protegé Juan Antonio Ríos.

45 A leader of the Communist Party, later Trotskyite presidential candidate (1931) and early member of the Socialist Party.

46 The word ‘gestor’ in this context means the hired representative of private firms who uses his pull in governmental circles to obtain contracts for his principals.

47 Accián: Diario de purificacián nacional, 7 August 1925.

48 Oyarzán, E., op. cit., p. 181.Google Scholar

49 Guillermo Bañados and Pedro Leon Ugalde.

50 E. Oyarzán (p. 220) was pleased because most of the radicals named were Alessandristas and he was fighting them for control of the party.

51 Cruz Coke, E., Geografía Electoral de Chile, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1952, pp. 61–2.Google Scholar This work shows clearly how conservatives and liberals submerged their differences and co‐operated electorally, maintaining a disproportionately high level of representation during the period 1938–48.

52 Vicuña, C., op. cit., Vol. II, Sociedad de Imprenta y Litografia, Santiago, 1939, P. 62.Google Scholar

53 Oyarzán, E., op. cit., p. 192.Google Scholar

54 Vicuña, C., op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 30–1.Google Scholar

55 Among the signatories was Ibáñez's friend and admirer Carlos Zañartá. The killing of his son by carabineros on 24 July 1931 decided Ibáñez to leave the country without further struggle. See R. Boizard, op. cit., p. 60.

56 Níos, J. A., Durante el Gobierno del General Ibáñez ‐ Actuacián de la Junta Central Radical, Balcells y cia, Santiago, 1931, pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

57 Vicuña, C., op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 82–3.Google Scholar

58 Direccián del Registro Electoral, Santiago.

59 Cortes, Lia and Fuentes, Jordi, Diccionario Político de Chile, Editorial Orbe, Santiago, 1967, p. 499.Google Scholar

60 These contacts were during 1937–38 and 1951–52.

61 Public Record Office, A 5574/2158/9, Clark Kerr to Henderson, 24 July 1930_‐

62 Rojas Mery, Eulogio, Memorias de un joven octogenario, Imprenta Roma, Santiago, 1957, pp. 251–5.Google Scholar

63 Oyarzán, E., op. cit., p. 86.Google Scholar

64 Ibid., p. 70.

65 Ibid., p. 77. Like the anonymous tribunal of Accián, the ‘regenerators’ did not feel the need for legal proof in order to condemn.

66 Direccián del Registro Electoral. Basically a plebiscite, it was not accompanied by the usual bribery.

67 Cortes, L. and Fuentes, J., op. cit., p. 106.Google Scholar

68 Würth, E., op. cit., p. 155.Google Scholar

69 Sources: L. Cortes and J. Fuentes, p. 498; E. Würth, p. 153. Ibáñez demanded the right to name the congressmen while Figueroa merely allocated seats, leaving the names to the parties.

70 Cámara de Diputados, Sesiones Ordinarias, 2 June 1930. Cited by L. Cortes and J. Fuentes, p. 106.

71 Pike, F. B., Chile and the United States…, p. 188.Google Scholar

72 By Decree No. 5115, 26 December 1932, two days after assuming the presidency again, Alessandri separated the detective Investigaciones section from the corps of Carabineros and made it directly dependent on the president for orders, personnel and promotions. Though the ‘dictator’ Ibáñez created Investigaciones and was much condemned for using it as a political police force, the ‘democratic’ Alessandri confirmed it in that role.

73 PRO, A 4492/86/9, Thompson to Sir John Simon, 4 July 1932.

74 Donoso, R., op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 88–103.Google Scholar A common persecutor had mads many of the enemies of 1925 into friends and fellow conspirators.

75 PRO, A 4107/86/9, Thompson to Sir John Simon, 19 June 1932.

76 Jobet, J. C., El Partido Socialista de Chile, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1971, Vol. I, pp. 65–7.Google Scholar

77 PRO, A 4313/86/9, Thompson to Sir John Simon, 24 July 1932.

78 Jobet, J. C., op. cit., p. 49.Google Scholar ‘Bread, a roof and clothing’, better known as the election slogan of the Popular Front in 1938.

79 Thomas, J. R., ‘The Evolution of a Chilean Socialist’, HAHR, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, 02 1967, p. 22 Google Scholar , passim.

80 Matte was the Grand Master of Chilean masonry.

81 Some early members of Matte's Nueva Accián Páblica (NAP) left in anger after 4 June because NAP was not, in its essence, socialist.

82 Ibáñez, expecting Dávila to step down for him, returned on 6 July; three weeks later, disillusioned, he returned to exile, after a failed cuartelazo. See Montero, R., Confesiones Políticas, Empresa Editora Zig‐Zag, Santiago, 1958, PP. 80–9.Google Scholar

83 The call for ‘civilismo’ was originally launched by General Vignola from Antofagasta.

84 PRO, A 5074/86/9, Thompson to Sir John Simon, 28 July 1932.

85 Jobet, J. C., op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 65–6.Google Scholar

86 Each faction presented a candidate in the presidential election of 1931.

87 Junta de Gobierno Socialista, Los 30 puntos, Librería e Imprenta ‘Jordan’ Talcahuano, N.D.

88 Ibid., p. 2.

89 This had been an aim of the naval mutineers, whom Grove freed from prison. See, Cerda, J. M., Relacián Histárica de la Revolucián de la Armada de Chile, Sociedad de Imprenta y Litografía ‘Concepcián’, Concepcián, 1934.Google Scholar

90 Halperin, E., Nationalism and Communism in Chile, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p. 123.Google Scholar

91 Jobet, J. C., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 99.Google Scholar

92 The most long‐lived were: Unián Republicana, formed in 1931 to be Un Partido politico sin politiquería; Partido Agrario, formed in 1932 to represent agriculture in a future corporativist state.

93 El Debate, Santiago, 14 December 1933. Alessandri distorts this incident in his memoirs, perhaps to justify sacking the leader of the civilista movement that ended the chaos in 1932. See Recuerdos…, Vol. III, pp. 20–1.

94 Its military effectiveness was not worth the bitterness, remembered to this day, that it created in the army.

95 PRO, A 1483/74/9, Sir R. Michell to A. Eden, 14 February 1936.

96 dela Cuadra Poisson, J., ‘La Verdad de las Incidencias Milicianas’, La Nacián, Santiago, 1935.Google Scholar

97 Formed by retired General Javier Díaz and by Aquiles Vergara, terror of the judiciary in 1927. See Ideología de la Accián Nacionalista de Chile, Editorial ‘La Cruz Svástica’, Santiago, 1932.

98 El Movimiento Nacional Socialista de Chile, Imprenta ‘La Traccián’, Santiago, 1932.

99 Cf. (i) ‘Un grupo sárdido, arribista y judío, resíduos de los duros días de dominio de los Guggenheim, se mantienen aferrados a la direccián del mineral’; p. 51 in R. Latcham, Chuquicamata Estado Yankee, Editorial Nascimiento, Santiago, 1926. Latcham was an early PS deputy. (ii) ‘Nuestra industria salitrera agoniza bajo las garras del judaismo internacional.’ Headline in Trabajo, the MNS newspaper, 27 July 1933.

100 Trabajo, 20 July 1933, p. 5.

101 Particularly the coup of 23 January 1925. Oyarzán, E., op. cit., p. 105.Google Scholar A more general picture can be found in Pinto Lagarrigue, F., La Masonería. Su influencia en Chile, Editorial Orbe, Santiago, 1966.Google Scholar

102 Genteel anti‐Semitism was and is common, but the same gentility prevented such people joining a pugnacious organization like the MNS.

103 Charges that the MNS was based upon German immigrants were unfounded. The MNS resented the racial exclusivity of the Bund and declared the two movements incompatible. Trabajo, 22 June 1935. Like the PS, the MNS drew a great deal of support from students and young workers.

104 A gun‐battle involving nacistas in Rancagua was the immediate justification of the ‘Law for Internal Security of the State’ which was and is the main legal weapon with which Chilean governments have defended themselves against verbal or physical extremism on the part of their opponents. For a survey of this and other strongly repressive legislation see Loewen‐stein, K., ‘Legislation for the Defense of the State in Chile’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. XLIV, 05 1944, pp. 366–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

105 See Stevenson, J. R., The Chilean Popular Front, Oxford University Press, 1942.Google Scholar The first electoral victory of the PF was the election of Cristábal Saenz, multi‐millionaire landowner, in a senatorial election in 1936.

106 Leader of the Radical Party during the dictatorship, later president of Chile 1942–45.

107 An early MNS member, expelled after a failed putsch against González. Today the extremely respectable editor of El Mercurio.

108 Montero, R., op. cit., pp. 94–7Google Scholar; Alessandri, A., Recuerdos, Vol. III, pp. 70–80;Google Scholar Donoso, R., Alessandri, Vol. II, pp. 182–3 Google Scholar and p. 188, note 6.

109 González, J., ‘La Violencia nacista y 10s partidos políticos’, Radio speech, 28 08 1936 Google Scholar, Imprenta Eyzaguirre, Santiago, N.D. See also, Tribunal de Sancián Nacional, quoted at p. 363 above. Cornelio Saavedra himself became the main target of MNS attacks on governmental corruption, the word ‘Cornelio’ becoming Nucista slang for ‘crook’.

110 The MNS had been the first group to declare Ibáñez's candidature and clung to him unflinchingly, despite his public announcements that he was anti‐fascist (Trabajo, 29 January 1938). Unfazed, Trabajo declared that the word fascist in Chile meant reactionary and that therefore the MNS too was anti‐fascist (30 January).

111 Grove swore he would vote for Ross before he would vote for Ibáñez. See E. Oyarzán, op. cit., Appendix p. 31.

112 Aguirre, leader of those radicals who opposed the PF strategy, had been defeated by its proponents led by J. A. Ríos. A few dozen deals later, Aguirre defeated Ríos to become the radical nominee for the candidature of the PF. Radical party politics have never been boring.

113 Montero, R., op. cit., p. 101.Google Scholar

114 Though some details emerged in the two trials that followed, the conspiratorial background was revealed in Trabajo, 24 March 1939.

115 He won by 2111 votes, less than 1 per cent of the vote.

116 Leonidas Bravo, R, Lo que supo un auditor de guerra, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1955, p. 90.Google Scholar

117 See Matte, Ismael Edwards, ‘La Historia de un Indulto’, Ercilla, 1 03 1949.Google Scholar

118 Mundt, Tito, Las Banderas Olvidadas, Editorial Orbe, Santiago, 1965, PP. 89–90.Google Scholar

119 Ravines, Eudocio, La Gran Estafa, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1957, p. 103.Google Scholar

120 See Parrish, Charles J. and Jorge Tapia, V., ‘Welfare policy and administration in Chile’, The Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. I, No. 4, 02 1970, PP. 455–75.Google Scholar

121 We have only to read Marmaduke Grove's articles in La Nacián, October to December 1924, to see how important this issue was in the movements we have discussed. Repeatedly he urged the need for government appointments to be made on the grounds of merit alone. For a soldier accustomed to taking examinations continuously in his career as a means of hastening promotion, the suggestion was an obvious one.

122 Andreski, S., Parasitism and Subversion. The Case of Latin America, Pantheon Books, New York, 1966, pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

123 Laws of inamovilidad funcionaria seem to be aimed more at protecting a government's appointees against possible future political dismissal than at creating a professional civil service.

124 Mercier, Luis, Mécanismes de pouvoir en Amérique Latine, Editions Universitaires, Paris, 1967, p. 173.Google Scholar

125 Ibid., p. 88.

126 Letter of November 1938 in the possession of Guillermo Izquierdo Araya. For other information on Herrera, I base myself on two interviews with Guillermo Izquierdo, supplemented by the text of the trial and the press of the period.

127 The more rabid anti‐communists and the anti‐Semites had split off earlier to form the Partido Fascista. A linear descendant is the Partido Nacional Socialista Obrero, blamed for setting fire to various synagogues during the 1960s.

128 A problem in fact created by Ibáñez by his undue expansion of the officer corps in the fat days between 1927 and 1929. An ‘over‐officered’ situation had been an important factor in 1919 and 1924.

129 See Ercilla, 22 March 1953, p. 5. Leonidas Bravo, op. cit., p. 146; R. Montero, op. cit., p. 78 and pp. 104–19.

130 Olavarría Bravo, A., Chile centre dos Alessandri, Editorial Nascimiento, Santiago, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 41–53.Google Scholar

131 Campaign manager for Aguirre Cerda (1938), Ibáñez (1952) Alessandri (1958) and Allende (1964). In essence, a radical.

132 Conservative youth leader, later unwilling candidate of the nationalistic Accián Nacional in 1964, after gaining a reputation as an Ibáñez minister.

133 Radical presidential candidate, 1964.

134 Founder member of the PS and leader of the anti‐communist socialists after 1941.

135 Bray, D. W., ‘Peronism in Chile’, HAHR, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, 02 1967, p. 40.Google Scholar Leonidas Bravo, op. cit., p. 238.

136 The trade union movement had recovered so well from the fragmentation of the mid 1940s that by 1950 a strike led by Clotario Blest and his union ANEF (Associacián de Empleados Fiscales) had caused the fall of a cabinet. Los Condores were convinced that a greater provocation could force the trade union movement into a revolutionary general strike. (Izquierdo interview).

137 They were not averse to the scheme.

138 Cruz‐Coke, E., Geografía Electoral, p. 94.Google Scholar Published May 1952.

139 A. Olavarría, op. cit., pp. 292–3.

140 R. Montero, op. cit., p. 187.

141 Olavarría's group.

142 See particularly René Montero, op. cit. Also D. W. Bray, op. cit. For a more complete study see the same author's Ph.D dissertation, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibáñez Government 1952–8, Stanford, 1961. A civilian‐military conspiracy called Linea Recta, reviving some of the Armstrong plot's aims, planned to ‘strengthen the executive’ and to oblige the executive to be strong. A participant was Major Roberto Viaux, Ercilla, 22 March 1955, p. 5.

143 For the events of 1955, see articles in Ercilla, Nos. 946–60, April‐September 1965.

144 Formed in March 1958 by those parties averse to the candidature of Jorge Alessandri, supported by the traditional rightist parties. It was believed that the elimination of bribery would cause Alessandri's candidature to collapse.

145 Julio von Mühlembrock, leader of the right wing of PAL led that section into the Liberal Party.

146 Oscar Jiménez Pinochet, right‐hand man of Jorge González in the tragic coup of 5 September 1938, was briefly Minister of Health in the first government formed by President Allende after his victory in 1970. Tarud, Allende's campaign manager in 1970, had been the leader of the progressive wing of PAL.

147 Julio Durán, achista to this day, leads a dissident anti‐communist section of the party, the Democracia Radical.

148 It was the first CP in Latin America, if not the world, to applaud the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

149 Though the completely personalist candidature of Jorge Alessandri in 1970 still showed the power of an appeal to end politiquería.

150 The constitutionalist argument is expressed in Silva Bascuñan, A., Tratado de Derecho Constitucional, Editorial Jurídica, Santiago 1963.Google Scholar His views on party proliferation are to be found in Vol. III, p. 388, passim.

151 Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the president of the PN has led the party towards a posture which combines the ‘Travaille, Patrie, Famille’ of Pétain and de Gaulle, with a leaning towards the example of the present Peruvian regime.

152 The decline of the Radical Party must be attributed, in part, to the fact that its fabled machine is out of date.

153 For an account _of the events in 1969 and 1970 see Lebarca Goddard, Eduardo, Chile al Rojo. Ediciones de la Universidad Técnica del Estado, Santiago, 1971.Google Scholar He refers to the ambivalent attitude that the socialists adopted towards Viaux on pp. 62–5.

154 See proclamations of the Union Cívica Democrática in the press of 13 December 1971. Prat died shortly afterwards, his funeral being attended by Onofre Jarpa, fellow leader of Accián Nacional in 1964 and by the nacionalista Mario Arnello, both leaders of the PN in its search for a new ideological posture.