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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 October 2019
The eve of a major multilateral trade negotiation is a time to meditate. This is not because the atmosphere is beauteous, calm and free. Nor is it about to become so because major governments, after years of haggling, are ready — more or less — to enter the round. Indeed, the Conventions of trade negotiation are antithetical to a calm and clear understanding of what combination of aspiration and realism will do most to improve the conditions of international trade. In such negotiations, the general objective — the reduction of trade barriers — is referred to as a concession to others. ‘Standing firm’ and other forms of negativism are praised. Brinkmanship is encouraged— at least among those strong enough to do damage.
1 One of the best analyis of how the round might work if it is to deal with all the problems that will arise says. ‘These negotiations could last for a decade and could take on the appearance of being continuous and never-ending’. The authors suggest ‘intermediate deadlines to keep on the pressure for breakthroughs’. Each of these deadlines might lead to an agreement on a specific issue which could be abrogated later on ‘if progress in other areas was not achieved by subsequent deadlines’. Aho, C. Michael and Aronson, Jonathan David, Trade Talks, New York, Council on Foreign Relations. 1985, pp. 135, 136.Google Scholar
2 There are some execptions. Early in 1987 the Harley-Davidson motorcycle Company announced that it was ready to compete freely with imports before the escape clause action from which it had benefited had run its course. In the 1950s and 1960s a number of ‘voluntary’ Japanese export restraints were quietly dropped when the problems that first gave rise to them had been overcome.
3 Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics: System under Stress, Washington and New York, Institute for International Economics and The Twentineth Century Fund, 1986, p. 165 Google Scholar. The book shows how the political processes that supported a trade liberalizing policy for most of the postwar years deteriorated and came, in many cases. to operate in the opposite direction. It also provides detailed data an the increased use of countervailing and anti-dumping duties.
4 Hager, Wolfgang, ‘Atlantic Trade: Problems and Prospects’, Government and Opposition. Vol. 22. No. 1, Winter 1987, pp. 49-63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 There are some contrary views. It can certainly be argued, for instance, that it would be reasonable to hold down imports while older industries became sufficiently automated to be competitive or that hipg technology industries should be given aid so as to remain capable of supporting the future competitiveness ot the whole economy. As yet there is little discussion or clear thinking about these matters but there is widespread secpticism about the ability of government to carry our such measures with a high degree of skill or dependability.
6 Winham, Gilbert R.. International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton Univenity Press, 1986, p. 386.Google Scholar
7 Hager, op. cit., p. 59.
8 Department ot Commerce figures from a report by a panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences and two other bodies. Balancing the National Interest, US National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition, Washington, D.C., National Academy Press. 1987. p. 56.
9 Wellenstein, Edmund, ‘Euro-American Turbulence — The Trade Issue’. Government and Opposition. Vol. 21 No. 4, Autumn 1986, p. 389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
10 Patterson, Gardner, ‘The European Community as a Threat to the System’, in Cline, William R. (ed.), The Policy in the 1980s, Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1983. pp. 223-42Google Scholar, at p.241.
11 Hager, op. cit., pp. 60, 61.
12 Patrick, Hugh (ed.), Japan's High Technology Institute, Seattle, University of Washington Press; Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press. 1987, p. 31.Google Scholar
13 DePorte, A. W., Europe between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, New Haven. Yale University Press (A Council on Foreign Relations Book), 1986, p.viiGoogle Scholar, Preface to Second Edition.
14 Sorenson, Theodore C. in Pierre, Andrew J. (ed.), A Widening Atlantic? Domestic Change & Foreign Policy. New York. Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. Europe-America 4, p.62.Google Scholar
15 Wellenstein, op. cit., p.395.
16 Ibid., p. 387
17 Camps, Miriam and Diebold, William Jr., The New Multilateralism: Can the World Trading System be Saved?, New York. Council on Foreign Relations, 1983, p.5 Google Scholar. The pamphlet was reissued in 1986 with a new introduction reaffirming the conclusions. The quotation is on p. 21 of that version.