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Testing Large Business's Commitment to Democracy: Business Organizations and the Secular–Muslim Conflict in Turkey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2013

Devrim Yavuz
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Abstract

This article argues that the Turkish economic elite – represented by the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) – has preserved its liberal democratic stance despite tensions between the religious Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the secularist establishment. Although secular itself, large business maintained a moderate position in the conflict and has continued to push for democratization thanks, in part, to organizational factors that ensure consistency in the larger goals of the association. The article thus claims that studying business as organization rather than business as capital can help the comparative literature understand how entrepreneurs' commitment to democracy under capitalism can become long term.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , 2010 , pp. 73 - 92
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2010.

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References

1 See Stephen Kinzer, ‘Businesses Urge Turkey to Broaden Democracy’, New York Times, 23 March 2007, for examples of reactions to the report, including the fact that the then chairman of TÜSİAD, Halis Komili, was summoned by military officials.

2 TÜSİAD, Türkiye'de demokratikleșme perspektifleri, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1997, or TÜSİAD, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1997. Most TÜSİAD documentation is available online at www.tusiad.org.tr.

3 Ayșe Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1994; and Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, London, Verso, 1987, offer good analyses of business–state relations in Turkey.

4 See Buğra, State and Business, for a good review of how the structure of the private sector has been affected. See Keyder, State and Class, for a review of how Turkish capital was compelled to accept the Turkish state's policies towards non-Muslim minorities, among other more sociocultural measures, because it represented a direct transfer of resource.

5 See ‘TÜSİAD'da korumasız hesaplașma’, Hürriyet Daily, 21 March 1997, for a summary of disputes within TÜSİAD. The foreword to the report, written by TÜSİAD's board of directors, was perhaps as contested by conservative members of the associate as the report itself because it clearly attributed a democratizing role to the association.

6 See TÜSİAD, Türk demokrasisi'nde 130 Yıl, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 2007. Although they are sceptical of the association's motivations for change, see Ziya Öniș and Türem, Umut, ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Citizenship in Turkey’, Comparative Politics, 34 (2002), pp. 439–56,Google Scholar for an explanation of the publication of the first report.

7 Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Huber, Evelyne and Stephens, John D., Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992 Google Scholar.

8 See Ayșe Buğra, ‘Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 30 (1998), pp. 521–39;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Kaya, İbrahim, ‘Identity Politics: The Struggle for Recognition or Hegemony?’, East European Politics and Societies, 21 (2007), pp. 704–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 As will be described below, TÜSİAD criticized the military for sending warnings to the AKP in a press release, TÜSİAD, ‘“Immediate Early General Elections is a Must to Protect the Integrity of Secularism and Democracy”’, press release, 30 April 2007, and it protested a court case to shutdown the AKP in another: TÜSİAD, ‘Closure of Political Parties is no Solution for a Modern Democracy’, press release, 16 March 2008. Both of these and other press releases are available in English and Turkish at http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad_cms_eng.nsf/PressRoom?OpenForm.

10 Of the interviews, 14 were TÜSİAD members and employees in 2008 and 30 were with individuals affiliated to the association in 2001–2.

11 See Thomas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950, for a description of why rights found in liberal democracies have emerged with the expansion of commercial activity. For a critique see Mann, Michael, ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, Sociology, 21 (1987), pp. 339–54,CrossRefGoogle Scholar where he explains that it was in fact Britain's consitutional past that led to the emergence of civil rights and not the emergence of capitalism. See John Hall, Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, for an explanation of why liberties may be conducive to the emergence of capitalist development.

12 Hirschman, Albert O., ‘Exit, Voice, and the State’, World Politics, 31 (1978), pp. 90–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 For instance Kingstone, Peter R. in ‘Corporatism, Neoliberalism, and the Failed Revolt of Big Business: Lessons from the Case of IEDI’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 40 (1998), pp. 73–95,CrossRefGoogle Scholar shows that one of the reasons Brazilian business failed to press collectively for government reform was the fact that individual members could gain favours from the state. Vedat Milor and Jesse Biddle expressed similar concerns about TÜSİAD in ‘Economic Governance in Turkey: Bureaucratic Capacity, Policy Networks, and Business Associations’, in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider (eds), Business and the State in Developing Countries, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 277–309.

14 For a good review of the theories on business and democracy in developing countries see Ernest J. Bartell and Leigh A. Payne (eds), Business and Democracy in Latin America, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995. For a more recent review see Ben Ross Schneider, Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

15 O'Donnell, Guillermo, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies University of California, 1979 Google Scholar; and Evans, Peter B., Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979 Google Scholar.

16 Buğra, State and Business.

17 Mustafa Sönmez, Türkiye'de holdingler: kırk haramiler, Istanbul, Arkadas Yayinevi, 1988.

18 See Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, ‘Entrepreneurs and the Transition Process’, in O'Donnell, Guillermo and Whitehead, Laurence (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 137–53Google Scholar.

19 Evans, Peter, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995 Google Scholar.

20 Silva, Eduardo, ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy – The Business–State Nexus in Chile's Economic Transformation, 1975–1994’, Comparative Politics, 28 (1996), pp. 299–320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 See Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, ‘Theories of Business and Business–State Relations’, in Maxfield and Schneider, Business and the State in Developing Countries, pp. 36–62, for different ways that business interests can be conceptualized.

22 Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, The Organization of Business Interests: Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper 99/1, Cologne, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1999.

23 Eduardo Silva and Francisco Durand, ‘Organized Business and Politics in Latin America’, in Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva (eds), Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America, Coral Gables, FL, North–South Center University of Miami, 1998, pp. 1–50.

24 Carlos Acuña, ‘Political Struggle and Business Peak Associations: Theoretical Reflections on the Argentine Case’, in Durand and Silva, Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 51–72.

25 Gibson, Edward, Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996 Google Scholar, demonstrates that part of the reason behind authoritarianism in Argentina can be explained by the lack of a strong business party pushing capital to favour other channels of representation.

26 Silva and Durand, ‘Organized Business’.

27 See Buğra, State and Business. Moreover, the declining ratio of minorities in Turkey, and deliberate state policies such as the wealth tax and transfers of population have eliminated what was a potentially autonomous bourgeoisie to lead to the creation of a Turkish Muslim class of capitalist that felt dependent on the state. See Keyder, State and Class; Ayhan Aktar, Varlık vergisi ve Türkleștirme politikaları, Istanbul, Iletişim, 2000.

28 Demir, Firat, ‘Militarization of the Market and Rent-Seeking Coalitions in Turkey’, Development and Change, 36 (2005), pp. 667–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29 Vehbi Koç, Hayat Hikayem, Istanbul, Apa Ofset Basimevi, 1973.

30 See Keyder, State and Class; Heper, Metin and Keyman, E. Fuat, ‘Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, 34 (1998), pp. 259–77;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Erdal Yavuz, ‘The State of the Industrial Workforce, 1923–1940’, in D. Quataert and E. Zürcher (eds), Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic 1839–1950, London and New York, Tauris Academic Studies, 1994, pp. 95–125, where he outlines that the lack of strong class interest at the turn of the twentieth century created a state tradition that did not incorporate economic interest. See Mousseau, Demet Yalcin, ‘Democracy, Human Rights and Market Development in Turkey: Are They Related?’, Government and Opposition, 41 (2006), pp. 298–326,CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a more recent treatment.

31 See Waterbury, John, ‘Export-Led Growth and the Centre Right Coalition in Turkey’, Comparative Politics, 24 (1992), pp. 127–45,CrossRefGoogle Scholar for an account of how liberal parties did not curb economic uncertainty. See Buğra, State and Business, for a more general account.

32 Arat, Yeșim, ‘Politics and Big Business: Janus-Faced Link to the State’, in Heper, M. (ed.), Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1989 Experience, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1991, pp. 135–48Google Scholar; Bianchi, Robert, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 See Buğra, State and Business; Keyder, State and Class.

34 Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development.

35 Ibid.

36 Sönmez, Türkiye'de holdingler.

37 Arat, ‘Politics and Big Business’.

38 TÜSİAD, TÜSİAD 1989 Yılı Çalıșmaları, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1989.

39 TÜSİAD, TÜSİAD 1989 Yılı Çalıșmaları, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1991; TÜSİAD, TÜSİAD 1992 Yılı Çalıșmaları, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1992; TÜSİAD, TÜSİAD 1993 Yılı Çalıșmaları, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1993; TÜSİAD, TÜSİAD 1994 Yılı Çalıșmaları, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1994; TÜSİAD, TÜSİAD 1995 Yılı Çalıșmaları, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 1995.

40 Their objections lay either in the timing of the report or in specific issues ranging from the role of the military to religious education in schools.

41 See Devrim Adam Yavuz, ‘Business as Usual? Turkish Industrialists, the State and Democratization’, PhD dissertation, McGill University, 2006.

42 See Kanra, Bora, ‘Democracy, Islam and Dialogue: The Case of Turkey’, Government and Opposition, 40 (2005), pp. 515–39,CrossRefGoogle Scholar for an account of how the AKP contributed to dialogue.

43 For a review of the different positions towards the EU see Polat, Necati, ‘Identity Politics and the Domestic Context of Turkey's European Union Accession’, Government and Opposition, 41 (2006), pp. 512–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

44 TÜSİAD, TÜSİAD 2002 Yılı Çalıșmaları, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 2002.

45 See ‘Tayyip Erdoğan’ın sırdaș danıșmanı ilk defa konușuyor', Hürriyet Daily, 15 November 2002.

46 See ‘Vehbi Koç büyük düșünmüș gelin siz de büyük düșünün’, Hürriyet Daily, 27 July 2003.

47 See Buğra, ‘Class, Culture, and State’; Kaya, İbrahim, ‘Identity Politics: The Struggle for Recognition or Hegemony?’, East European Politics and Societies, 21 (2007), pp. 704–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48 See Sabrina Tavernise, ‘Turkish Party's Pick for President Worries Secularists’, New York Times, 24 April 2007, for coverage on the choice of presidential candidate.

49 See ‘The Battle for Turkey's Soul; Democracy v Secularism in Turkey’, The Economist, 3 April 2007.

50 In 1989 Turgut Özal of the Motherland Party had not obtained a quorum but courts had not intervened then.

51 See Sabrina Tavernise, ‘In Turkey, Bitter Feud Has Roots in History’, New York Times, 22 June 2008, for an account of the major episodes of the conflict.

52 TÜSİAD, ‘The Presidency Ought to Reflect Societal Consensus and Democratic Legitimacy’, press release, 26 April 2007; TÜSİAD, ‘Immediate Early General Elections is a Must to Protect the Integrity of Secularism and Democracy’, Press Release, 30 April 2007.

53 TÜSİAD, 1 Ocak 2014 Tarihinde Avrupa Birliği'ne Tam Üyelik Hedefine Doğru: Güçlü Demokrasi, Güçlü Sosyal Yapı, Güçlü Ekonomi, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 2007.

54 Arzuhan Yalçındağ, speech delivered at the TÜRKONFED (Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation) meeting, Iskenderun, Turkey, 7 September 2007, transcript available in TÜSİAD, Türkiye ve TÜSİAD 2007 Yılı Gündemi, Istanbul, TÜSİAD, 2008.

55 TÜSİAD, ‘Anayasa Konvansiyonu Nedir, Neden Gereklidir?’, press release, 18 June 2008.

56 TÜSİAD, ‘Turkey's Democracy Proves to Be Strong’, press release, 31 July 2008.