² Thomas Poguntke, ‘Green Parties in National Governments: From Protest to Acquiescence?’, in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel et al. (eds), Green Parties in National Governments, London, Frank Cass, 2002, pp. 133–45; 142.

³ Christoph Egle, Tobias Ostheim and Reimut Zohlnhöfer's volume, Das Rot-Grüne Projekt. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder 1998–2002, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003, investigates to what extent such a common project has been constructed during Schröder's first term in office.

⁴ In the 20 elections held between March 1998 and September 2002 (eighteen state elections, the federal elections of 1998 and the European elections 1999), the Greens suffered losses on each occasion. For a more comprehensive analysis of the Green's crisis see Ingolfur Blühdorn, ‘Green Futures? A Future for the Greens?’, in Axel Goodbody (ed.), The Culture of German Environmentalism. Anxieties, Visions, Realities, New York and Oxford, Berghahn, pp. 103–21.

⁵ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Grün 2020. Wir denken bis übermorgen! Grundsatzprogramm, Berlin, 2002.

⁶ With 8.6% the Greens achieved their best ever federal election result.

⁷ For a detailed analysis see Ingolfur Blühdorn, ‘Red–Green and Beyond. The German Green Party after the 2002 Elections’, in Adrian Winnett (ed.), Towards an Environment Research Agenda, Volume III, Basingstoke/Houndmills, Palgrave, 2004, pp. 149–71.

⁸ State elections were held in Hesse and Lower Saxony in February, in Bremen in May, and in Bavaria in September. Whilst the Social Democrats suffered significant (in Bavaria catastrophic) losses, the Greens improved their previous results from 7.2 to 10.1% in Hesse, from 7.0 to 7.6% in Lower Saxony, from 8.9 to 12.8% in Bremen, and from 5.7 to 7.7% in Bavaria.

⁹ Just a week before the elections an opinion poll (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer) found that only 35% of the electorate favoured – whilst 49% disliked – a Red–Green coalition. Throughout the election campaign, a Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU–SPD) had been the electorate's favourite scenario. A more detailed analysis of coalition preferences is provided in Egle, Ostheim and Zohlnhöfer, Das Rot-Grüne Projekt, op. cit., pp. 13–15.

¹⁰ In The Theory of Coalitions, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962, William H. Riker suggests that political parties will try to create coalitions no larger than necessary to secure a majority. For a more detailed discussion in relation to the Red–Green coalition in Germany see Charles Lees, The Red–Green Coalition in Germany. Politics, Personalities and Power, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000; also Richter, Michaela, ‘Continuity or Politikwechsel? The First Federal Red–Green Coalition’, German Politics and Society, 1 (2002), pp. 1–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Roth, Roland, ‘Ein Jahr Rot-Grün. Ein politischer GAU für die neuen sozialen Bewegungen?’, Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen, 4 (1999), pp. 10–21.Google Scholar

¹² Jürgen Hoffmann, ‘Werden die Grünen überleben? Probleme einer Oppositionsbewegung an der Macht’, in Tilman Mauer et al. (eds), Der Kampf um die politische Mitte. Politische Kultur und Parteiensystem seit 1998, Munich, Olzog, 2002, pp. 113–35.

¹³ Joachim Raschke, Die Zukunft der Grünen. So kann man nicht regieren, Frankfurt, Campus, 2001, p. 420; also see: Jesse, Eckard, ‘Die wahrscheinlichen und die sinnvollen Koalitionen (vor) der Bundestagswahl 2002’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 3 (2002), pp. 421–35.Google Scholar Since the beginning of the election year, opinion polls had consistently placed the opposition parties well ahead of the Red–Green government.

¹⁴ A week before the elections, five different coalition scenarios still seemed possible (Der Spiegel, 16 September 2002, pp. 24–34). Once again, the option of a Grand Coalition, in particular, had enjoyed considerable public support throughout the election campaign. For a full analysis of the reasons for the unexpected Red–Green victory see Blühdorn, ‘Red–Green and Beyond’, op. cit.

¹⁵ Raschke, Die Zukunft der Grünen, op. cit., p. 419, my emphasis.

¹⁶ Lees, Charles, ‘The Red–Green Coalition’, German Politics, 2 (1999), pp. 174–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Hubert Kleinert, Aufstieg und Fall der Grünen. Analyse einer alternativen Partei, Bonn, Dietz, 1992, p. 235.

¹⁸ Infratest Dimap for Der Spiegel, election special, 24 September 2003.

¹⁹ In Germany the electorate have two votes each: the first for their local candidate who is elected in a majoritarian system; the second for the preferred party list. The 598 parliamentary seats are distributed proportionally on the basis of the party list votes, whereby the directly elected representatives of the 299 constituencies are figured into the respective quota and the remaining seats are filled from the party list. By tactically splitting their votes, the electorate can thus support two different parties.

²⁰ Figures according to Federal Office of Statistics.

²¹ The most obvious indicator for this is the fact that even after entering the governing coalition the party had still not replaced its foundation programme of 1980 and was still perceived as primarily concerned with the post-materialist issues of the 1980s.

²² Up to the present, the Greens are to a large extent relying on the (ageing) voter cohorts which were politically socialized during the 1960s and 1970s. They have not succeeded in attracting significant numbers of young party members or voters.

²³ Despite their merger with the east German civil rights movements and the east German Greens, Alliance 90/The Greens have so far essentially remained a party of the old West. In the federal elections of 2002, they achieved moderate gains on their 1998 results in all eastern Länder, but in each of them they remained well below the 5% mark. In all eastern state elections since 1998, the party's results were down on those in the previous elections.

²⁴ Kleinert, Aufstieg und Fall der Grünen, op. cit., p. 31.

²⁵ Lothar Probst (ed.), Kursbestimmung: Bündnis 90/Grüne. Eckpunkte künftiger Politik, Bonn, Bund, 1994, p. 25.

²⁶ Ralf Fücks, ‘Grüner Standort Deutschland. Deutschland im politischen und ökonomischen Umbruch’, in Probst, Kursbestimmung, op. cit., pp. 52–64; 57.

²⁷ Petra Kelly, Fighting for Hope, London, Hogarth Press, 1984.

²⁸ Thomas Scharf, ‘The German Greens: a Political Profile’, in Ingolfur Blühdorn et al. (eds), The Green Agenda. Environmental Politics and Policy in Germany, Keele, Keele University Press, 1995, pp. 131–42; 131.

²⁹ Fücks, ‘Grüner Standort Deutschland’, op. cit., p. 64.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Wolfgang Templin, ‘What is Left? Von der scheinbaren Folgenlosigkeit grüner Einsichten’, in Probst, Kursbestimmung, op. cit., pp. 162–82; 172.

³² Germany's structural inability and political unwillingness to adapt its welfare system and labour market and to the pressures of economic globalization and demographic change is widely debated as Germany's problem of ‘reform gridlock’ (Reformstau): e.g. Richter, ‘Continuity or Politikwechsel?, op. cit.; Harlen, Christine Margerum, ‘Schröder's Economic Reforms: The End of Reformstau?’, German Politics, 1 (2002), pp. 61–80 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair's joint paper on the ‘The Third Way/Die neue Mitte’ (in Bodo Hombach, The Politics of the New Centre, Cambridge, Polity, 2000) was supposed to provide the basis for the SPD's New Labour-style modernization. Yet, already the SPD's dual campaigning strategy in 1998 implicitly acknowledged that the concept of the Third Way was poorly anchored in the party at large. More recently, this was reconfirmed by the lasting inner party resistance against the set of reform suggestions for the labour market and the social security systems (Agenda 2010) which Chancellor Schröder presented in March 2003 and elements of which were finally agreed in the lower chamber of parliament (Bundestag) in mid-October 2003.

³⁴ The preamble explicitly states that a ‘set of basic values not an ideology’ provides the foundation of the Green programme. The same paragraph also emphasizes that Green thinking ‘has absorbed leftist traditions, value conservative positions as well as the belief in the liberal constitutional state’ (p. 6).

³⁵ The ‘key projects’ are labelled: The Solar Age; Ecological Mobility; The All-German Future; Transparency for Consumers; A New Agriculture; Basic Provision for All; Politics for Children's Needs; Knowledge Access as Citizens’ Right; The Immigration Society; Empowerment of Women; Citizens’ Europe; and Fair Global Trade and International Standards. The chapters bear the titles: Departure towards the ecological age; Departure towards an ecological and social market economy; Departure towards an emancipative social policy; Departure into the knowledge-based society; Departure towards the renewal of democracy; Departure towards gender justice; Departure towards Europe and the One World.

³⁶ Referring to the Greens’ radical past their new programme notes: ‘Without the idea of the radically different we would certainly not have achieved the successful intrusion of alliance-green ideas into the political systems in East and West. But now we are no longer the anti-party party, but the alternative within the party system.’ (p. 14).

³⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Grün 2020, op. cit., pp. 8 and 14.

³⁸ On the long history of reform gridlock in Germany see: Göttrik Wewer (ed.), Bilanz der Ära Kohl, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, 1998.

³⁹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Grün 2020, op. cit., pp. 8, 40–59.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 79.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 32–3.

⁴² Ibid., p. 28.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ In ‘Sind die Grünen regierungsfähig? Die Selbstblockade einer Regierungspartei’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 10 (2001), pp. 20–8Google Scholar Joachim Raschke diagnosed at least three different dimensions of self-blockage in the German Greens: inability to establish efficient organizatory structures, inability to overcome the tensions between competing ideological currents, and inability to formulate political objectives.

⁴⁵ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (parliamentary group), Wörlitzer Erklärung 2003. Reformen für die Zukunft, (http://www.gruene-fraktion.de/rsvgn/rs_dok/0,,18428,00.htm), as of 27 February 2003.

⁴⁶ In the 2002 federal elections as well as in the 2003 state elections, a surprisingly large percentage of the traditional SPD clientele (working-class voters, civil servants, young voters) turned to the Conservatives, whose campaigns put strong emphasis on issues of social justice, support for small- and medium-size businesses, pensioners’ interests etc.

⁴⁷ The electoral performance of the PDS in September 2002 (4.0%) and their development since the elections suggest that there is no future role for the party at the federal level.

⁴⁸ Hoffmann, Jürgen, ‘Schwarz-grüne Bündnisse in den Kommunen: Modell für Bund und Länder?’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 4 (1997), pp. 628–49.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ After the local elections of 1994, 24 local Conservative–Green partnerships were established. In 2003 a total of thirteen such alliances were in place (Das Parlament, 6–7 (2003), p. 9).

⁵⁰ Lees, ‘The Red–Green Coalition’, op. cit., p. 174.

⁵¹ Following the 2002 elections Göring-Eckardt and Sager became co-chairs of the parliamentary Greens. Other prominent Greens who in recent months publicly supported the idea of Conservative–Green cooperation include, inter alia, economics experts Fritz Kuhn and Werner Schulz, labour market specialist Thea Dückert, finance expert Christine Scheel, ecologist Reinhard Loske, the spokesperson for church-related matters Christa Nickels, and chair of the Greens in the Baden-Wurttemberg parliament Winfried Kretschmann.

⁵² Jürgen Rüttgers and Christoph Böhr, for example, CDU leaders in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Rhineland-Palatinate, signalled support for exploratory moves.

⁵³ ‘Schluß mit der Nibelungentreue. Es ist Zeit für eine schwarz-grüne Koalition’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 January 2003, p. 33.

⁵⁴ In the parliamentary elections of November 2002 the Austrian Greens had achieved their best ever election result (9.4%). Throughout the 1990s, the party had gradually adopted a pragmatic political profile, and in 2000 party leader Alexander van der Bellen had first suggested that a future coalition with the Conservatives should not be ruled out. Between December 2002 and February 2003 there seemed to be a realistic opportunity for a Conservative–Green coalition agreement. In the end the negotiations failed because differences about welfare reform could not be resolved. (Lauber, Volkmar, ‘The Austrian Greens after the 2002 Elections’, Environmental Politics, 3 (2003), pp. 139–44).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Hans Barbier, ‘Die Grünen sind erzkonservativ’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 January 2003, p. 35.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Jesse, ‘Die wahrscheinlichen und die sinnvollen Koalitionen’, op. cit., p. 429.

⁵⁸ Analysis of the election results shows that indeed only a minimal number of voters, if any, have split their votes between the Greens and the Conservatives, or have, since the elections of 1998, switched directly from one to the other (Infratest Dimap for Der Spiegel, election special, 24 September 2003).

⁵⁹ Poguntke, ‘Green Parties in National Governments’, op. cit., p. 133.

⁶⁰ Egle et al., Das Rot-Grüne Projekt, op. cit.

⁶¹ Christoph Egle, ‘Lernen unter Stress: Politik und Programmatik von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen’, in Egle et al., Das Rot-Grüne Projekt, op. cit., pp. 93–116.

⁶² In the first ten months of 2003 over 30,000 SPD members cancelled their membership, primarily in protest against Schröder's reform policies.

⁶³ Slogan of the Greens’ campaign; the revealing pun does not fully translate into English.

⁶⁴ Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer.