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²⁰ Loyola De Palacio was a leading member of the centre-right Partido Popular in Spain, having previously served as minister of agriculture and as a member of the European Parliament (briefly). She was appointed as vice-president of the Commission, responsible for relations with the European Parliament, alongside the Transport and Energy portfolios, under President Romano Prodi. Previously, Neil Kinnock, formerly leader of the British Labour Party, held the Transport portfolio in the Commission of Jacques Santer, 1995–99.Google Scholar

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³⁰ See K. Lavdas, The Europeanisation of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of Integration, London, Macmillan, 1997; P. Ioakimidis, ‘The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment’, in K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds), Europeanization and the Southern Periphery, London, Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 73–94.Google Scholar

³¹ Indeed, there is a very limited literature on privatization in general in Greece. Haritakis and Pitelis noted that the ‘particularly inefficient and corrupt public sector’ creates a need for privatisation in Greece (N. Haritakis and C. Pitelis, ‘Privatisation in Greece’, in D. Parker (ed.), Privatisation in the European Union: Theory and Policy Perspectives, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 134). Clifton et al. argued that the ‘overriding reason for [privatization] was to reach the convergence criterion to participate in EMU (J. Clifton, F. Comin and D. D. Fuentes, Privatisation in the European Union: Public Enterprises and Integration, London, Kluwer, 2003, p. 69). Indeed, Lavdas was surely correct to note that, ‘Economic liberalization and Europeanization have been the twin processes gradually reshaping the political economies of the European South since the 1980s’(K. Lavdas, ‘The Political Economy of Privatization in Southern Europe’, in D. Braddon and D. Foster (eds), Privatization: Social Science Themes and Perspectives, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996, pp. 233–60, p. 254). More directly relevant is G. Pagoulatos's study (‘The Enemy Within: Intragovernmental Politics and Organizational Failure in Greek Privatization’, Public Administration, 79: 1 (2001), pp. 125–46) of the privatization attempts of the earlier (centre-right) Mitsotakis government. He argued that policy failure was the result of such a concentration and the irony of a statist, impositional strategy for market liberalization. Pagoulatos's case study highlighted particular features of administrative ill coordination (indeed ‘intragovernmental feudalisation’, p. 138), lack of policy preparation, the isolation of key technocratic advisers, and the cavalier and arrogant attitude of ministers – key factors undermining effectiveness and coherence. These factors were of little relevance in the present case study, however.Google Scholar

³² Olympic Airways (OA) was founded as a private enterprise in 1957 by the Greek magnate Aristotle Onassis. The company was sold to the Greek state on 26 June 1975.Google Scholar

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³⁴ Lavdas, The Europeanisation of Greece; G. Mavrogordatos, Μεταξύ Πιτυοκάμπτη και Προκρούστη (Between Pitiokamptis and Procroustis: Professional Associations in Today's Greece), Athens, Odysseas, 1988; G. F. Koukoules, Ελληνικά Συνδικάτα; Οικονομική Αυτοδυναμία και Εξάρτηση, 1938–1984 (Greek Trade Unions: Economic Self-Reliance and Dependence, 1938–1984), Athens, Odysseas, 1984; Constantinos Tsoukalas, Κράτος, Κοινωνία, Εργασία στην Μεταπολιτευτική Ελλάδα (State, Society and Labour in Post-War Greece), Athens, Themelio, 1987.Google Scholar

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³⁶ The proposals of the Greek government for Olympic provided for: (a) the write-off of ECU1.4 billion (GDR427 billion) of accumulated debt; (b) the conversion of ECU209 million (GDR64 billion) of debt into equity; (c) a capital injection of ECU177 million (GDR54 billion) in three yearly instalments between 1995 and 1997; and (d) the extension of ECU300 million (GDR91.6 billion) of state guarantees to Olympic until the end of 1997.Google Scholar

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⁴² Commission of the European Communities, ‘Decision on Aid Granted by Greece to Olympic Airways’, Brussels, 14 August 1998 (OJ L 128/1), 21.5.1999). During the negotiations Athens accepted the Commission's claims of illegal state aid to Olympic during 1994–98 and agreed a deduction of ECU38.6 million (GDR11 billion) from the second and third instalments. During the same negotiations the Commission also authorized state loan guarantees of $378 million for the purchase of new aircraft for Olympic.Google Scholar

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⁴⁶ In 1999 OA employed 7,000 permanent and 3,000 seasonal staff. See To Vima, 14 April 2002.Google Scholar

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⁷² The divestment strategy was consistent with an array of potential solutions: placing OA under a major foreign strategic partner, seeking a foreign purchaser, and creating a new company as part of a radical restructuring plan. Each were intended to bring to an end the continuing drain on the state posed by OA's position; in that sense, they were indeed compatible with an end to state aids and the shift of OA to a fully commercial criteria of operation.Google Scholar

⁷³ Two sets of rational behaviour, shaped by distinct (though overlapping) institutional conditions, produced an outcome that both had worked hard to avoid (K. A. Shepsle and M. S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, London, W. W. Norton & Co., 1997, p. 204.Google Scholar

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