Article contents
Cabinet Reshuffles in Latin America: A Function of Presidential Reputation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 June 2022
Abstract
In this article we propose an innovative comparative analysis of cabinet reshuffles in Latin American presidential systems, focusing on personal incentives as drivers of ministerial turnover. We analyse when and why risks of reputational damage to a president drive cabinet changes. These risks are contingent and dependent upon the interaction between a president's reputational assets, on the one hand, and the high ‘walk-away value’ of the minister, on the other. We argue that ministerial turnover is a function of presidents' political and reputational resources as well as of exogenous factors. However, who is fired from the cabinet depends on the ministers' walk-away values and how threatened the president feels by them. We analyse cabinet changes in single-party and multiparty presidential governments in Latin America. Our results confirm the explanatory power of personal incentives to better understand the mechanisms that drive cabinet reshuffles.
- Type
- Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited
References
- 3
- Cited by