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Cabinet Reshuffles in Latin America: A Function of Presidential Reputation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2022

Magna Inácio*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
Mariana Llanos
Affiliation:
German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, Germany
Bruno Pinheiro
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

Abstract

In this article we propose an innovative comparative analysis of cabinet reshuffles in Latin American presidential systems, focusing on personal incentives as drivers of ministerial turnover. We analyse when and why risks of reputational damage to a president drive cabinet changes. These risks are contingent and dependent upon the interaction between a president's reputational assets, on the one hand, and the high ‘walk-away value’ of the minister, on the other. We argue that ministerial turnover is a function of presidents' political and reputational resources as well as of exogenous factors. However, who is fired from the cabinet depends on the ministers' walk-away values and how threatened the president feels by them. We analyse cabinet changes in single-party and multiparty presidential governments in Latin America. Our results confirm the explanatory power of personal incentives to better understand the mechanisms that drive cabinet reshuffles.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited

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