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Aspects of the EEC Influence of European Groups in the Decision‐Making Processes: The Common Agricultural Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Terkel T. Nielsen
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Extract

ONE HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION in the European Community is the transfer of social sectors from the national political systems to the Community system. One such sector is agriculture. This article will focus on a limited, but significant part of the activities performed by the Community institutions: the collective decision-making process with reference to the common agricultural policy.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , 01 October 1971 , pp. 539 - 558
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1971

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References

1 See RamstrÖm, Dick, The Efficiency of Control Strategies. Communication and Decision‐Making in Organizations, Stockholm, 1967 Google Scholar, Chaps. 2 and 6 on the decision‐making process.

2 Cf. Lindberg, Leon N and Scheingold, Stuart A, Europe's Would‐Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970, on the agricultural sector in a Community context, pp. 141–81Google Scholar.

3 Cf. Lindberg, and Scheingold, , op. cit. on the political system and the problem of decision‐making, pp. 64–100 Google Scholar; Lindberg, Leon N, ‘Decision‐making and Integration in the European Community’, International Organization, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965 Google Scholar; Lindberg, Leon N, ‘The European Community as a Political System: Notes towards the Construction of a Model’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1967 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which has inspired the present concept of EEC authorities.

4 Répertoire des organizations agricoles non gouvernementales groupées dans le cadre de la Communautééconomique européenne; admission to the Répertoire is criterium of relevance.

UNICE = Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne.

CIAA = Commission des Industries Agricoles et Alimentaires de l'UNICE.

COCCE = Comité des Organisations Commerciales des Pays de la CEE

COGECA=Comité général de la Coopération Agricole des Pays de la CEE

5 See Feld, Werner, ‘National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXXI, No. 3, 1966 Google Scholar, on the activities of the national groups.

6 See Olmi, Giancarlo, ‘Common Organization of Agricultural Markets at the Stage of the Single Market’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 1, 1967–68Google Scholar, on agricultural decision‐making.

7 See Coombes, David, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community. A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC, London, 1970 Google Scholar, on the Commission as a European civil service, Chaps. 6 and 7; on the administrative, initiative, mediative, and normative functions of the Commission, pp. 234–42; and especially Chaps. II which treats the Commission as a bureaucracy with predominantly administrative and mediative functions.

8 On the consultation of the European Parliament, see Olmi, op. cit. pp. 402–4.

9 Neunreither, Karlheinz, ‘Le rôle du Parlement européen’ in La décision dans les Communautés européennes, ed. by Gerbet, Pierre and Pepy, Daniel, Brussels 1969, p. 126 Google Scholar.

10 See Salmon, Jean J. A, ‘Le rôle des représentations permanentes’ in La décision dans les Communautés européennes on instructions to the Permanent DelegationsGoogle Scholar.

11 Cf. Scheinman, Lawrence, ‘Some Preliminary Notes on Bureaucratic Relationships in the European Economic Community’, International Organization, Vol. XX, 1966, on the ‘bureaucratic interpenetration’Google Scholar.

12 Emile Noël, How the European Economic Community's Institutions Work, Community Topics, No. 27, p. 6.

13 Data from QE no. 156/66, JO. p. 1634/67 of 27 April 1967; QE no. 289/69, JO no. C156/8 of 8 December 1969; QE no. 71/68, JO no. C66/56; QE no. 148/69, JO no. C124/2 of 23 September 1969.

14 Bertram, Christoph, ‘Decision‐Making in the EEC: The Management Committee Procedure’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1967–68, p. 262 Google Scholar. A quantitative indicator of autonomy (defined as an input/output ratio) provides evidence that the autonomy of the Commission has increased from 1962 to 1967; the input/output ratio of telex messages of DG VI was in 1962 0.92 (230/250) and in 1967 0.52 (1400/2700), and this indicates ‘low’ and ‘high’ autonomy, respectively; data from Mitteilungen zur Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, 14/1967, Press and Information Service of the European Communities, p. 6.

15 See Kintein, Hartmut, Les institutions communautaires, College of Europe, Bruges, 1968 (unprinted paper).Google Scholar

16 See Heine, Joachim‐Friedrich, ‘Wie entstehen die Rechtsnormen der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ?’, Molkerei‐ und Käserei‐Zeitung, 16/1967 Google Scholar, Hildesheim, on the ‘Agri‐telex’ procedure.

17 On interest group activities see Sidjanski, Dusan, ‘Pressure Groups and the European Economic Community’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 2, no. 3, 1967 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Meynaud, Jean and Sidjanski, Dusan, ‘L'action des groupes de pression’ in La décision dans les Communautés européenes, ed. by Gerbet, Pierre and Pepy, Daniel, Brussels, 1969 Google Scholar

18 Deutsch, Karl W, The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communication and Control, New York, 1966, p. 154.Google Scholar

19 Cf. Gieseke, Wilhelm, ‘Die berufsständischen Organisationen der Land‐wirtschaft in der agrarpolitischen Willensbildung der EWG’, Agrarpolitik in der EWG ed. by Dams, Theodor et al., Munich, 1968, p. 218 Google Scholar, ‘nur die systematische Einschaltung auf allen Stufen der Beschlussfassung bringt Aussicht auf Erfolg’. Dr Gieseke occupies a high position in COPA.