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Arms Control and Nuclear Safety: The National and International Politics of Russia's Nuclear Arsenal*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Christoph Bluth
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RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS STILL IN A STATE OF FLUX. LIKE the other former republics of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation seeks to come to terms with being an independent state needing to define its national interests and foreign and security policy objectives.

The principal element in the new frame of reference for Moscow is the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. For forty years, most of the territories controlled by Moscow were adjacent to territories protected by the United States, or else to China. The Russian Federation is now virtually surrounded by former Soviet republics, all with deep political, social and economic problems, and some of which are highly unstable and subject to violent civil conflicts. The territory of the Russian Federation itself, about 75 per cent of the territory of the former USSR with about 60 per cent of its population, is still not properly defined, given that significant sections of the borders are purely notional, and the degree of control that Moscow can exercise over the entire Federation is uncertain.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , 01 October 1995 , pp. 510 - 532
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1995

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References

1 For a more detailed exploration of these factors, see Arbatov, Alexei C., ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 5–43Google Scholar.

2 Sergei Karaganov, A., Russia: The New Foreign Policy and Security Agenda, London, Brassey’s, 1992 Google Scholar.

3 The exception are various statements by Zhirinovsky, but it is difficult at this time to assess their significance and seriousness.

4 For the text of the military doctrine, see Voennaya Mysl’, No. 11, November 1993; for analysis see Charles Dick, ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 1, January 1994.

5 Bluth, Christoph, ‘American-Russian Strategic Relations: From Confrontation to Cooperation?, The World Today, Vol. 49, No. 3, 03 1993, pp. 47–50Google Scholar.

6 See Bluth, Christoph, ‘Strategic Nuclear Weapons and US-Russian Relations: From Confrontation to Cooperative Denuclearization’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 04 1994 Google Scholar; ‘Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine’, Bulletin of Arms Control, No. 14, May 1994, pp. 17–21. For a more general analysis of the problem of nuclear weapons in the former non-Russian Soviet republics, see Alexei Arbatov, Iadernoe Vooruzheniia i respublikanshiy suverenitet, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992.

7 Nikolaichuk, A., Krivokhizha, V. I. and Kuznetsov, E. N., ‘Dorog SNV-2: Problemy i resheniia’, Moscow, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies/Institute for the United States and Canada, 1994 Google Scholar.

8 For a detailed analysis of the adoption of ‘launch-on-warning’ in the Soviet Union and the United States, see Blair, Bruce, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1992 Google Scholar.

9 This contrasts, however, with a statement by Foreign Minister Kozyrev to the effect that although such a decision had been taken, it had not yet been implemented. (Izvestiia, 13 February 1992).

10 Based on conversations with experts at the FCO in London and the Ministry of Defence in Bonn.

11 Interview with Grachev in Rossiskaia Gazeta, 21 October 1992, p. 2; see also hvestiia, 15 October 1992.

12 For more detail, see Blair, Bruce, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Washing ton, Brookings Institution, 1995, pp. 78–89Google Scholar.

13 Doug Clarke, ‘Yeltsin Makes Best of Missile False Alarm, OMRI Daily Digest, No. 20, pt 1, 27 January 1995; Doug Clarke, ‘Defense Ministry Said to Have Been Told about Norwegian Missile’, OMRI Daily Digest, No. 22, pt 1, 31 January 1995.

14 For detailed proposals along these lines, see Blair, Zero Alert, op. cit.

15 Sergei A. Karaganov, Russia: The New Foreign Policy and Security Agenda, London, Brassey’s 1992, pp. 24 and 25; it should be added that Karaganov supports the scrapping of all tactical nuclear warheads and some reductions in strategic nuclear forces.

16 See Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat, Stra tegic Stability Under the Conditions ojRadical Nuclear Arms Reductions, Moscow, Novosti 1987; Alexei Arbatov, ‘Strategic Equilibrium and Stability’, in Primakov, Yevgeny (ed.), Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook, Moscow, Novosti, 1988, pp. 239–63Google Scholar.

17 This means that even in the event of the worst case of a first strike by the United States, Russia would still retain sufficient nuclear weapons for use against soft targets (cities and industry) to be able to inflict what is called ‘unacceptable damage’ to the United States.

18 For more detail, see Christoph Bluth, ‘The Russian View of its Strategic Nuclear Arsenal’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1994, pp. 263–67; Handler, Joshua, ‘The Future of Russian Strategic Forces Jane’s Intelligence Review’, Vol. 7, No. 4, 04 1995, pp. 162–65Google Scholar.

19 Arbatov, Alexei, ‘START II, Red Ink and Boris Yeltsin’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 04 1993, pp. 16–21, p. 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 This is the number known to exist from deployments at the end of the cold war. It has become clear that there is a larger number of older warheads still in existence, and the total number could be about 50,000.

21 See Bluth, Christoph, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine’, Bulletin of Arms Control, No. 14, 05 1994, pp. 17–21Google Scholar.

22 See Anton Surikov and Igor Sutyagin, Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union - Safety and Security Aspects, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994.

23 The account on the warheads missing from East Germany is based on inter views with British officials. The other story was published in Postfactum, Moscow, May 1992.

24 For more detail, see Bluth, Christoph, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Assessing the Risks’, The World Today , Vol. 49, No. 8/9, 1993, pp. 146–47Google Scholar; Bluth, Christoph, ‘Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Ambitions in Ukraine — a Recipe for Catastrophe?’ Bulletin of Arms Control , No. 12, 11 1993, pp. 5–8;Google Scholar Sutyagin, Igor, ‘How Russia Ensures Safety of Its Nuclear Weapons’, Military Journal, No. 7, Postfactum Analytical Series, No. 83, 1993, pp. 7–12Google Scholar.

25 For more detail, see Theodor Galdi, The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduc tion Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement, CRS Report for Congress, Congres sional Research Service, 6 December 1994.

26 Philip Zelikow, ‘Current Organization of the International Community for Cooperative Denuclearization’, in Graham Allison, Ashton, B. Carter, Steven, Miller, E. and Zelikow, Philip (eds), Cooperative Denuclearization, Cambridge, MA: CSIA 1993 Google Scholar, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 2; President Clinton appointed Ashton Carter to a position at the Defense Department to oversee denuclearization.

27 For details of all the programmes and moneys appropriated, see Nuclear Succes sor States of the Soviet Union, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Monterey Institute for International Studies, No. 2, December 1994.

28 Based on interviews with officials from the FCO and US Department of Energy.

29 Dismantlement means dismantlement to the so-called ‘pit level’, when the ‘pit’ of primary fissile material is separated from the surrounding secondary thermonu clear fuels and the high explosives which are detonated to create a critical mass for nuclear fission. For more detail, see Ashton B. Carter and Owen Cote, ‘Disposition of Fissile Materials’, in Allison, Carter, Miller, Zelikow (eds), Cooperative Denucleari zation, pp. 117–136.

30 For more detail on the various alternative methods of the disposal of fissile materials, with various cost estimates, see Carter and Cote, ibid.

31 Some embarrassment was caused by the revelation that this had been an un authorized ‘sting operation’ by the German Intelligence Services. German intelligence officers actively procured the radioactive material, which was obtained in Russia. For more detail of this and other incidents, and the status of nuclear export policies in the former Soviet Union, see Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, No. 2, December 1994, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Moscow.

32 Handler, Joshua, ‘Radioactive Waste Situation in the Pacific Fleet’, Greenpeace Trip Report, Washington, 27 10 1994 Google Scholar.

33 For more detail on the institutional problems in Russia regarding the safeguard ing of nuclear materials, see Bukharin, Oleg, ‘Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union’, Survival, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994–95, pp. 53–72Google Scholar.

34 For more details on such contacts and recommendations for their intensifica tion, see Allison, Graham, ‘Defense and Military Cooperation in Denuclearization’, in Allison, , Carter, , Miller, and Zelikow, (eds), Cooperative Denuclearization, pp. 146–62Google Scholar.

35 For more details, see Handler, Joshua, ‘Russia’s Pacific Fleet — Problems with Nuclear Waste’,Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 03 1995, pp. 136–39Google Scholar.

36 For a more detailed survey, see the special edition of CIS Environmental Watch, No. 7, Fall 1994/ Winter 1995.

37 Based on the Military Balance 1993–94, London, Brassey’s for the IISS 1993, p. 235. The one variation from this source is with respect to the number of warheads for bombers after START II implementation where it is assumed that the United States will cut them in order to remain within the treaty limits.

38 These figures differ somewhat from those in (heMilitary Balance 1993–4, ibid., p. 236, on the basis of interviews with Russian experts.