This article is a critical examination of the claim that the emergence of private self-regulatory regimes in the transnational sphere signals a new trend of self-constitutionalization outside the limits of nation-state based or intergovernmental control. It deals with the question to what extent the diffusion of public authority in the sphere beyond the state affects the responsibility of the state(s) to procure the legitimacy of such private self-regulation. First, a conceptual argument is developed which identifies private self-regulatory regimes as rule systems nested in a specific constitutional order of the international society, here described as ‘neo-Westphalian’ (Section I). Second, implications for the responsibility to procure the legitimacy of collectively binding regulatory functions performed by private actors in the sphere beyond the state are considered (Section II). Often cited as a model example of autonomous societal self-regulation, the lex sportiva renders particularly strong plausibility for the claimed non-existence of purely private self-regulation. The regulation of performance-enhancing substances can serve to demonstrate the complex interactions between multiple public and private sites of constitutional authority (Section III). In conclusion (Section IV), I argue that, although the ultimate responsibility for providing legitimacy continues to lie with the state/world of states, the political order of the international society as construed in neo-Westphalian terms provides a dispersed and fragmented constitutional-style legal framework with few reliable guarantees that states are capable or willing to enact their background role. Therefore, a substantial part of the burden of – initial – legitimation must be carried by those directly involved in private self-regulation by constituting and exercising public authority.

Transnational civil society activism has become increasingly prominent in world politics. However, there are significant questions about how these emerging processes of transnational activism can and should interface with existing forms of global and national governance. This essay contends that republicanism can explain how transnational activism can productively relate to global and national governance. Republicanism is able to develop an approach which draws upon both constitutional and discursive aspects of democracy by developing a greater focus on the roles that citizens can play with respect to both formal state institutions and the deliberative practices with respect to transnational activism. This essay develops a position termed critical republicanism which demonstrates that these transnational forms of activism can be best understood as early stages of an incipient process of transnational democratization and that the virtues of citizens need to be rethought so that citizens are concerned about the changing nature of domination at home and abroad, and be willing to engage with transnational sources of information and activism.

The article attempts to illuminate how the concept of accountability is diversely shaped and signified in the theoretical legal discourse. It engages in a threefold mapping review: (i) it portrays, according to the basic divide between the angles ‘within the state’ and ‘beyond the state’, the geographical and functional contexts in which real-world political accountability mechanisms exist and interact; (ii) it interprets an influential legitimating discourse that is being used as a benchmark to appraise institutions and political processes beyond the state – the Global Administrative Law project (GAL); (iii) it highlights how this sort of accountability discourse is tied with demands for legitimacy in global governance that cannot be detached from the old political ideals. Largely oriented towards due process, I argue that the GAL project, in order to maintain a normative appeal, should not ignore larger political ideals, however controversial they might be. Otherwise, it remains a manipulable and hence unreliable cause to be endorsed.

The paper presents a theory of the moral structure of international human rights. It proceeds by drawing on recent scholarship on the philosophy of national constitutional rights, which has shown that there is now an emerging global consensus on certain structural features of constitutional rights; in previous work I have summarized this under the label ‘the global model of constitutional rights’. Starting from the theory of rights underlying the global model, the paper asks what modifications, if any, are required to turn that theory into a suitable theory of international human rights. In particular, it examines the widely held view that international human rights are more minimalist than national constitutional rights. Discussing recent work by Ronald Dworkin (on political/constitutional versus human rights) and Joseph Raz (on legitimate authority versus national sovereignty), the paper concludes that it is not possible to make rights more minimalist than they already are under the global model. It follows that the moral structures of national constitutional rights and international human rights are identical. The final section of the paper examines some implications of this result, addressing the issues of the workability of the proposed conception of international human rights in practice, its point and purpose, and discussing the obligations of states to participate in international mechanisms for the protection of human rights.