Feminists and women activists use manifestos to express their frustrations with legal and political systems, expose the harms suffered in their lived experiences under patriarchy, colonialism and capitalism, and call for radical political, legal and social change. This special issue on feminist manifestos and global constitutionalism considers the role of feminist manifestos in global constitutionalism. It interrogates the role of feminist manifestos in bringing about legal and political reform, their role as historical texts and sources of global constitutionalization, and their limitations as tools that are potentially both exclusionary and de-political. In their article, Ruth Houghton and Aoife O’Donoghue outline a role for feminist manifestos within feminist approaches to constituent power. Sheri Labenski uncovers from the archives the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom manifesto from 1924 and the outline for a ‘New International Order’. Gina Heathcote and Lucia Kula centre Lusophone African feminist action in Luanda, Angola, to problematize an approach to feminist manifestos that reiterates dominant feminisms, and instead argue for active silence by those more dominant feminist voices. In her conclusion to the special issue, Emily Jones uses posthuman feminism to interrogate and critique the claim of universality in global constitutionalism. Across this special issue, key themes emerge: the potential of inclusion and exclusion, and the role of manifesto as a method in knowledge production.

Women use a multiplicity of forms and methods to articulate harms and claim political spaces. Among these are manifestos.1 Women’s manifestos are concomitant with both political convulsion and the enduring, mundane inequalities faced by women; they play a key role in feminist attempts to achieve political and legal ends.2 Manifestos are overtly political acts of legal/political performance; they are in dialogue with each other, with counter and anti-manifestos, and with the legal-political infrastructures they inhabit.3 Manifestos seek to fracture traditional understanding and practices of law, often in the guise of claiming constituent power and political space.

Feminists have utilized manifestos and utopias in order to make important, often revolutionary, contributions to international law. However, these engagements have not been reflected in the substance of international law. The sources of international law – specifically customary international law – rely on a narrow understanding of historical knowledge. This article centres the 1924 manifesto and the ‘New International Order’ created by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, as tools to assess the exclusion of the under-utilized history of feminist peace work from the sources of international law. This allows for a reflection on customary international law’s weaknesses and reaffirms the importance of feminist approaches to international law.

Through an account of white feminisms and white privilege, this article examines the tensions between local and international knowledge frames. The article considers the possibility of a feminist approach to global constitutionalism and argues for a twofold critique: first, a feminist interrogation of the dominance of a specifically male history of Western and Anglo-European knowledge frames; and second, a self-critique within feminist approaches to global legal regimes that acknowledges the complicity of mainstream feminist tools in the racist histories of knowledge production. To this end, the article examines the space of gender expertise to explore how this can be both an aperture for plural feminist encounters and a refinement of diverse feminist approaches into a form digestible by the contours of international institutions. To explore alternative, decolonized encounters, the article centres Lusophone African feminist silence and action in Luanda, the capital of Angola. The article explores how Angolan gender relations, informal labour and histories of protest unsettle the frame of a feminist manifesto, to argue for a place for active silence as a methodology for undoing the status quo of global constitutional expectations of how knowledge arrives at the global and transnational levels.

There is a need for the field of global constitutionalism to consider a wider array of voices, such as women’s voices and perspectives from the Global South. Here, I argue that global constitutionalism must pay attention not only to a wider array of human perspectives, but also to non-human perspectives and to different understandings of what the law is and can be. Evaluating how international law categorizes the environment and non-human animals as things or objects to be exploited for human needs, I argue that posthuman feminism provides an alternative epistemic frame for rethinking both global constitutionalism and international law.

This article addresses the bastardization of constitutional law in Argentina and the corrosive power of legacies of authoritarianism. It offers a genealogy of the use by Argentina’s Supreme Court of self-restraint canons from the time when they were borrowed from the US Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century. Partly resulting from the country’s experiences with military rule, the court transformed or expanded these canons, which entailed a gradual depreciation of statutes as the (uneasy) cornerstone of constitutionalism. Based on a fresh dataset and employing narrative and network analysis, the article focuses on a slogan the court has invoked since the 1960s: invalidating a rule is a matter of extreme institutional gravity and hence a strategy of last resort. Under the 1976–83 dictatorship, the court applied the slogan to various rules, including those passed by the military. It thus invoked familiar canons outside its scope conditions, conveying an illusion of constitutional regularity by masking the abnormal in acceptable garb and contributing to the regime’s legitimation. While the democratic court abandoned the most blatant expressions of authoritarianism, connections persisted, manifesting in the frequent citations to the dictatorship court’s use of the slogan and its extension to any rule. Authoritarian legacies die hard.

This article studies the process of constitution-making in Jammu and Kashmir as a hegemonic process dominated by, and an ideological reflection of, the dominant political party of Jammu and Kashmir, the National Conference led by the popular leader Sheikh Abdullah. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir emerged as an outcome of their ideas. Though the process itself was punctuated by the exclusionary violence against diverse communities present in the state at that time, very little attention has been paid to the idea of a constitution as an exclusivist text that embeds ‘foundational violence’ within it, and that eliminates dissenting groups and prevents the inclusion of plural conceptions of politics by actualizing a monopolistic discourse in favour of the dominant party. This article locates the violence that went into constitution-making and further employs hermeneutical interpretation of the Constituent Assembly Debates of Jammu and Kashmir to locate the differing viewpoints that existed in the State Constituent Assembly. It also takes the surrounding political and ideological context into account. In doing so, it constructs an alternative and ‘unofficial’ version of the constitution-making process, which helps challenge the dominant historical narrative that the constitution-making in Jammu and Kashmir was a successful experiment in Indian federal democracy.

The constitutional design of Bangladesh is characterized by an ambivalent choice: it aspires to establish a republican yet a Bengalee state by putting itself in the conflicting terrain within the demos–ethnos binary. This article aims to examine the implication of this problematic choice along all three axes of the constitution’s elemental parts: its identity, rights and structure. While the identity element of the Bangladesh Constitution embodies the ethno-nationalist vision of the Bengalee state that transforms demos into ethnos, its rights and structural aspects reflect its republican promise to transform ethnos into demos. Contemporary scholarship seeks to confront the exclusionary dimension of the ethno-nationalistic choice in Bangladesh but ends up accepting ethnos as a politically superior value. Such an approach brings us to the politics of difference and, with that, undermines the integrationist potential of the republican constitution. In response, this article defends the republican promise of the Bangladesh Constitution while arguing that what we need in Bangladesh is the ‘de-ethnicization’ of the republic, one that can be achieved by transforming ethnos into demos and not the other way around.