This paper considers the introduction of a bill of rights to a territory’s constitution as an example of the transnational transfer of norms. Using the case of the Cayman Islands Constitution promulgated in 2009 this analysis looks specifically at the creation of its bill of rights in light of local debate following the legalisation of homosexuality forced by the United Kingdom in 2000. The unique constitutional structure framing the political relationship between the United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories is outlined as explanation for the nature of the Cayman constitution, as well as the historical trajectory leading to it. This trajectory informs the context for the local debate over homosexuality and substantial local resistance to the transfer of an emerging European norm recognizing same-sex marriage to a Caribbean island firm in its Christian heritage. This case interrogates the transference and reproduction of ‘global human rights norms’ in the construction of constitutions in postcolonial societies anticipated by proponents of ‘norm diffusion’ and highlights the contested acceptance offered exogenous norms by the postcolonial society.

In the global ‘North-West’, liberal democracy is regarded as the universally valid model of political rule that is to be promoted globally via foreign and development policies. Democracy promotion, however, is frequently challenged by justice-related claims. Whereas external democracy promoters claim to help enforce universal individual rights, those resisting democracy promotion point to the collective entitlement to a self-determined political evolution. ‘North-Western’ governments see liberal democracy as the only embodiment of a just political order, but in those countries that are the targets of democracy promotion different understandings of appropriate norms and institutions may exist. Contestation of democracy promotion has, therefore, a crucial normative dimension that can be conceptualized as a series of conflicts over justice. If we conceive of external democracy promotion as a process of interaction instead of unidirectional export or socialization, such justice conflicts constitute a major normative challenge to democracy promoters. The paper argues for an alternative perspective on ‘democracy promotion as interaction’ and presents a typology of justice conflicts that will, in future research, enable us to empirically analyse the normative challenges brought about by the interactive nature of democracy promotion.

The paper discusses recent propositions that, after a period of ‘American exceptionalism’, forms of ‘European exceptionalism’ are now emerging. The paper first asks what makes a political entity ‘exceptionalist’. For this purpose inspiration is sought in the defining features of ‘American exceptionalism’. The paper then discusses whether ‘Europe’ displays comparable features in the fields of international legal policy and domestic rights culture. It also asks whether there are other aspects of European governance which could make it plausible to speak of a European exceptionalism. The paper concludes that it is misleading to use the term ‘European exceptionalism’ because the underlying phenomena are not comparable with what is usually understood as ‘American exceptionalism’.

The question of constitutionalization cuts through the heart of theoretical debate on the fragmentation of global governance. This paper aims to contribute to this debate through a comparison of global administrative law (GAL) and the conflicts-law approach. While the conflicts-law approach espouses the move towards global constitutionalism, GAL disavows constitutional ambition. I make a twofold argument. First, the differing diagnoses these two approaches make of global governance lead to their distinct proposed solutions. GAL identifies the lack of accountability as the underlying concern of global governance and responds to fragmented global governance through balancing-centred legal management. The conflicts-law approach instead attributes the challenges facing global governance to the ill-designed democratic institutions in nation states and turns to ‘democratic juridification’ as the solution. Second, GAL and the conflicts-law approach reflect two distinct images of constitutionalism. GAL’s ‘constitutional deficit’ suggests its implicit embrace of a version of constitutionalism rooted in the tradition of populist democracy. The conflicts-law approach situates transnational democracy in the conflicts-law process in which inter-regime conflicts are resolved, suggesting a prototype of constitutionalized global governance underpinned by an epistemic understanding of democracy.

The article explores the relationship between religious pluralism and national-majoritarian models of social cohesion in European human rights jurisprudence. Comparing the German, French and British interpretation of the ‘social cohesion limitation’ of freedom of religion it contends that, at the national level, concerns for social cohesion are fuelled by attitudes towards religious diversity that range from indifference to intolerance and that are difficult to reconcile with the normative premises of religious pluralism in a democratic society. The second section of the article traces the relationship between religious pluralism and social cohesion in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The analysis suggests that the diversity of national-majoritarian approaches to social cohesion in Europe prevents the Court from ensuring an effective trans-national protection of religious pluralism. The third section turns to the controversial Lautsi judgments of the European Court of Human Rights to place the Court’s approach to religious minority protection in the context of trans-national judicial politics in the European legal space. The concluding section suggests an alternative approach to religious pluralism and social cohesion that vindicates religious diversity and does justice to the counter-majoritarian telos of human rights protection.

Scholars have proposed a number of different ways to improve global accountability, but none has adequately addressed how individuals who commit widespread or systematic nonviolent wrongs can be held to account. I argue that for moral reasons individuals should be held accountable for nonviolent crimes against humanity and that an existing legal institution, the International Criminal Court (ICC), has the authority to prosecute such crimes. The ICC’s prosecutor should start exercising this legal authority because widespread or systematic nonviolent harms can be just as morally wrong as violent ones. What matters on my account is the gravity of a wrong, not whether it was committed violently or nonviolently. I situate these arguments in contemporary discussions of accountability, and provide evidence that individuals can cause widespread or systematic nonviolent harms that meet the legal definition of a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute, the ICC’s foundational document.