In Practice Theory and International Relations, Silviya Lechner and Mervyn Frost make a useful distinction between ‘praxis’ and ‘practices’ and correctly insist on the importance of describing the identity of distinct practices. They also make the important point that practices have ethical value for their participants. There is much to like about Lechner and Frost’s argument, including its solid philosophical grounding. However, from the perspective of a social scientist, there are some points of concern as well. First, while they champion ‘description’, they settle for ‘naming’ practices. Proper description requires more attention to detail than what the authors offer in the book. Second, the authors appear to discriminate between social practices in spatial terms rather than in functional terms. As a consequence, they end up with a description of the practices of international relations, where the different practices are all animated by the same value of freedom. As such, Lechner and Frost offer a reductionist interpretation of the ethical significance of international practices. Third, the authors push their anti-foundationalism too far. When one interprets the (ethical) significance of social practices, it is useful to bring on board philosophical–anthropological models, even if only because it opens up one’s interpretive horizons.