¹ On ‘local agency’ see section I below.

² K Fierke, Introduction to this Special Issue 2.

³ Ibid 2.

⁴ Ibid 13.

⁵ As confirmed in Nicaragua v US (Merits), ICJ, Judgment of 26 August 1986, ICJ Reports (1986) 14, 100–101.

⁶ Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports (2010) 403.

⁷ See in this issue N Cornago, ‘Beyond self-determination: norms contestation, constituent diplomacies and the co-production of sovereignty’, suggesting that: ‘The line of argumentation is ascendant when it sets out from specific interests or the will of the specific actors, such as when the discourse is articulated around the central government concerns, or conversely, elaborated from inside the secessionist movement political strategy.’

⁸ UN Doc S/2008/692, para 26.

⁹ UN Doc S/2008/692 at 6–7.

¹⁰ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2008/692 (24 November 2008) para 4.

¹¹ UN Doc S/PV.6979 at 10.

¹² Schmitt, C, The Grossraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law in C Schmitt, Writings on War (Nunan, T (ed), Polity, Cambridge, 2011) 75, 111–12.Google Scholar

¹³ Indeed, about Schmitt’s affiliation with the Nazi regime in Germany, see the Translator’s Introduction in Nunan (n 12) 2–3.

¹⁴ The International Court has specified that ‘enforcement action’ under the Charter means a coercive action against the State, i.e., against its government. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962) ICJ Reports (1962) 151, 177.

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²⁷ On which see section V below.

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⁴¹ Ibid 101–3.

⁴² Ibid 199.

⁴³ Referred to in Schmitt (n 12) 171.

⁴⁴ See Temperley (n 37) 456.

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⁵² See <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/adoption-stabilisation-and-association-agreement-proposal-kosovo_en>.

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⁵⁶ Ibid 259ff.

⁵⁷ This they describe as the ‘prudential view’; Goldsmith, JL and Posner, EA, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 203.Google Scholar

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⁵⁹ UK Written Submission, 111 (para 6.28); the US Written Submission, at 68, similarly maintained that resolution 1244 allowed for the future status of Kosovo without Belgrade’s consent, mainly because this resolution contained references to the abortive Rambouillet Accords which, had they been signed by FRY, would indeed have provided for such possibility.

⁶⁰ UK Written Submission, 112 (para 6.29), also referring to the periodic review requirements (para 6.30), which, however, do nothing to reverse the requirement that the actual continuation of 1244 arrangements depends on the collective decision of the Security Council. Even if UNMIK faced difficulties in administering the entire territory of Kosovo (see para 6.47), it still does not follow that its mandate or any other aspect of the 1244 arrangements could be modified unilaterally; that is, without the Security Council’s collective decision.

⁶¹ The State Department’s relevant points were the following: ‘(1) The state of Yugoslavia collapsed in a non-consensual, exceptionally violent way, creating threats to international peace and security that have obliged the UNSC to act repeatedly. ... (5) In 1999, NATO’s 19 allies reached the consensus decision to take collective action to remove Milosevic’s police and military forces from Kosovo. (6) Kosovo is administered by the United Nations under U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, unanimously adopted (with China abstaining) on June 10, 1999, to address Milosevic’s actions. Elements of UNSCR 1244 include denying Serbia a role in governing Kosovo; setting up an interim UN administration; providing for local self-government; and envisioning a UN-led political process to determine Kosovo’s future status.’ Why Kosovo Is Different, US Department of State, <www.state.gov>.

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⁶⁴ Frederick the Great’s Political Testament (n 35).

⁶⁵ See Temperley (n 37) 460.

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⁶⁹ Buzan and Lawson also envisage the possibility that, under the ‘decentred globalism’, ‘regional powers will, for better or worse, have a stronger hand in their locales’. See Buzan and Lawson (n 66) 303.

⁷⁰ See arts 49ff, ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session (2001), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supp No. 10 (A/56/10).