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³ Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 1) 4.

⁴ Krisch, N, ‘Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space’ (2011) 24 Ratio Juris 386–412.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See Búrca, G de, ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 221–78, D Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010) and J Habermas, The Divided West (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006).Google Scholar

⁶ K Macdonald and T Macdonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 89–119. This hinders rule-makers from enacting policies which rule-takers might demand.

⁷ MacCormick, N, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 528–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 1). MacCormick uses the phrase ‘radical’ pluralism, which I take to be coterminous with ‘systemic’ pluralism.

⁸ de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy beyond the State’ (n 5) 221.

⁹ Mitzen, J, ‘Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres’ (2005) 99 American Political Science Review 401–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ For a similar argument, see LR Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1–83. As a strategy, it makes sense to constrain the vertical and horizontal dimension to the same issue-space in order to see connections between the planes.

¹¹ On the methodological point, see AL George and A Bennett, Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Massachusetts, 2005).

¹² Though, to be sure, democratic legitimacy relates strongly to these other factors.

¹³ M Zürn, ‘Democratic Governance beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other International Institutions’ (2000) 6 European Journal of International Relations 183–221.

¹⁴ Scholte, JA ‘Reinventing Global Democracy’ (2014) 20 European Journal of International Relations 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹⁷ Wiener, A, Lang, AF Jr., Tully, J, Maduro, MP and Kumm, M, ‘Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Krisch separates between ‘foundational’ and ‘limiting’ versions of global constitutionalism.

¹⁸ Krisch, ‘Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism?’ (n 4) 387. Alec Stone Sweet has also documented a position called ‘constitutional pluralism’, which is similar to institutional pluralism. I leave it off the list to avoid confusing terminology. See Sweet, A Stone, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 491–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ Isiksel, ‘Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm’ (n 2) 160–1. Isiksel is referring specifically to legal pluralism in that article, but the logic also applied to constitutionalism.

²⁰ Brown, GW, ‘The Constitutionalization of What?’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 205–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²² A Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in J Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 264.

²³ Held, Cosmopolitanism (n 5). R Marchetti, Global Democracy: For and Against (Routledge, London, 2008).

²⁴ See JL Dunoff, ‘The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case of the World Trade Organization’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (n 16) 178–205.

²⁵ D Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’ in P Dobner and M Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 21.

²⁶ R Michaels, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 245. Private international law, as a conflict of laws approach, implicitly recognizes the notion of global legal pluralism.

²⁷ Isiksel, T and Theis, A, ‘Changing Subjects: Rights, Remedies, and Responsibilities of Individuals under Global Legal Pluralism’ (2013) 2 Global Constitutionalism 151.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ As suggested above, institutional pluralism closely resembles what Stone Sweet calls ‘constitutional pluralism’ and Matthias Kumm calls ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’. Stone Sweet, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Pluralism’ (n 18). M Kumm ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (n 16) 258–324.

²⁹ On the US case, see D Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (n 16). For the EU, see M Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is As Good As It Gets?’ in JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003).

³⁰ Over time, the US has become more constitutionalized and hierarchical, even though ultimate authority is left ambiguous.

³¹ Krisch, ‘Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism?’ (n 4) 387.

³² Koremenos, B, Lipson, C and Snidal, D, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’ (2001) 55 International Organization 761–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ Moreover, democratic mechanism can help sort out matters of distributive justice and aid in forming a ‘common good’. On this point, see also L Valentini, ‘Justice, Disagreement, and Democracy’ (2012) 43 British Journal of Political Science 177–99.

³⁴ N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). MacCormick eventually shied away from this systemic vision and accepted an ‘institutional pluralist’ stance.

³⁵ For a similar view in political theory, see C Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003).

³⁶ A Fischer-Lescano and G Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2006).

³⁷ Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 1) esp ch 8. This article begins to build upon and test Krisch’s claim about the democratic potential of systemic pluralism.

³⁸ Berman, P Schiff, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 10. Italics in original.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁴⁰ This is a particularly prominent example of path-dependent lock-in effects following a critical juncture in the international system. See Ikenberry, GJ, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴¹ Isiksel, ‘Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm’ (n 2) 162.

⁴² Archibugi, D, Koenig-Archibugi, M, and Marchetti, R, ‘Introduction: Mapping Global Democracy’ in Archibugi, D, Koenig-Archibugi, M and Marchetti, R (eds), Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 1–21.Google Scholar

⁴³ Held, Cosmopolitanism (n 5).

⁴⁴ D Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008).

⁴⁵ This is especially relevant given that electoral mechanisms seems a distant, and perhaps even undesirable, mode of democratic politics beyond the state. Macdonald and Macdonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics’ (n 6) 89.

⁴⁶ JS Dryzek, ‘Two Paths to Global Democracy’ (2008) 15 Ethical Perspectives 469.

⁴⁷ A Little and K Macdonald, ‘Pathways to Global Democracy? Escaping the Statist Imaginary’ (2013) 39 Review of International Studies 789–813.

⁴⁸ de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (n 5) 129.

⁴⁹ Scholte, ‘Reinventing Global Democracy’ (n 14) 1. I employ the term ‘the people’ to refer to affected individuals who deserve democratic standing in decision-making procedures. See below for a more extensive discussion.

⁵⁰ J Bohman, ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism’ in C Farrelly (ed), Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader (SAGE Publications, London, 2004) 172. Although Bohman is defending a conception of democracy based on non-domination, these two principals go beyond a republican view.

⁵¹ Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 1) 270.

⁵² R Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View’ in I Shapiro and C Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy’s Edges (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999) 19–36.

⁵³ J Bohman, Democracy across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007).

⁵⁴ P Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 52–75.

⁵⁵ Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (n 54) 61. Although this quote refers specifically to the public power exercised by a government, it could equally well refer to any site of authoritative rule-making.

⁵⁶ Bohman, ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism’ (n 50) 176.

⁵⁷ N Urbinati and M Warren, ‘The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory’ (2008) 11 Annual Review of Political Science 407. Of course, this is also true within the state.

⁵⁸ Cohen, J and Sabel, CF, ‘Global Democracy’ (2005) 37 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 763–97.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ On the ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory, see Goodin, RE, Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice after the Deliberative Turn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁰ Chambers, S, ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory’ (2003) 6 Annual Review of Political Science 307–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶¹ Gutmann, A and Thompson, D, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996).Google Scholar

⁶² Of the many examples, see J Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2001) or N Deitelhoff, ‘The Discursive Process of Legalization’ (2009) 63 International Organization 33–65.

⁶³ Mitzen, ‘Reading Habermas in Anarchy’ (n 9). N Krisch, ‘Pluralism in Global Risk Regulation: The Dispute over GMOs and Trade’ (2009) LSE Working Paper <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491608>, accessed 4 March 2014. P Lamy, ‘The WTO in Global Governance: Solid? Liquid? Gaseous?’ (2013) Global Policy <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/02/04/2013/wto-global-governance-solid-liquid-gaseous>, accessed 10 October 2013.

⁶⁴ C May, ‘The World Intellectual Property Organisation and the Development Agenda’ (2008) 22 Global Society 97–113. Though, to be sure, national systems were often highly self-contained.

⁶⁵ Sell, SK, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (SUNY Press, Albany, 1998).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ A Kapczynski, ‘The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property’ (2008) 117 Yale Law Journal 804–84.

⁶⁷ Ruth Okediji argues that although the relationship is not formally hierarchical, in practice the WTO has supremacy. See RL Okediji, ‘WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual Property Norms’ (2008) 39 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69–125. This claim is contested – rightly, in my view – by KJ Strandburg, ‘Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime’ (2009) 41 Connecticut Law Review 861–920.

⁶⁸ WTO-WIPO cooperation agreement, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtowip_e.htm>, accessed 15 October 2013.

⁶⁹ WHO, WIPO, WTO Trilateral Cooperation on Public Health, Intellectual Property, and Trade, <http://www.wipo.int/globalchallenges/en/health/trilateral_cooperation.html>, accessed 10 October 2013. On domestic legal acceptance of that policy, see ‘Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public health, intellectual property and trade’, <http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/global_challenges/628/wipo_pub_628.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2013, 229.

⁷⁰ Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 1) 294.

⁷¹ J de Beer, ‘Defining WIPO’s Development Agenda,’ in J de Beer (ed) Implementing the WIPO’s Development Agenda (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Ottawa, 2009) 1–23. See also ‘Overview of the Development Agenda’, <http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/overview.html>, accessed 10 October 2013.

⁷² Dobusch, L and Quack, S, ‘Framing Standards, Mobilizing Users: Copyright versus Fair Use in Transnational Regulation’ (2013) 20 Review of International Political Economy 52–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷³ The Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization, <http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf>, accessed 22 August 2013.

⁷⁴ On exactly this point of representativeness, see the A2K website which dedicates one strand of work to the ‘representation’ of consumer rights against WTO and ACTA policies. A2K, <http://a2knetwork.org/representation>, accessed 2 March 2014.

⁷⁵ Brazil, Thailand, South Africa and especially India have successfully adopted this tactic. See D Dionisio, ‘Trade and Access to Medicines: Things the WTO Should Consider’, <http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/10/14/trade-and-access-to-medicines-things-the-wto-should-consider/>, accessed 31 January 2014.

⁷⁶ Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting’ (n 10) 42.

⁷⁷ For an argument concerning the coercive nature of TRIPS compliance, see PK Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPs Agreement’ (2009) 46 Houston Law Review 979–1046.

⁷⁸ There was, almost exactly, a tenfold reduction in staff employed in the sector in the early 2000s. See Thayer, JD, ‘The Trade of Cross-Border Gambling and Betting: The WTO Dispute between Antigua and the United States’ (2004) 3 Duke Law and Technology Review 1–12.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Communication from the United States, ‘An Assessment of Services Trade and Liberalization in the United States and Developing Economies’ TN/S/W/12 (31 March 2003), para 50.

⁸⁰ S James, ‘U.S. Response to Gambling Dispute Reveals Weak Hand’ (2006) <http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/us-response-gambling-dispute-reveals-weak-hand>, accessed 13 October 2013.

⁸¹ KM Koepsel, ‘How Do Developed Countries Meet Their Obligations under Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement?’ (2004) 44 IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology 167.

⁸² Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPs Agreement’ (n 77) 979–1046.

⁸³ Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting’ (n 10) 42.

⁸⁴ Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting’ (n 10) 34.

⁸⁵ Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 1) 281.

⁸⁶ Dunoff, JL, ‘Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the Discipline of International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁷ See also the WTO Shrimp–Turtle case in which the DSB Appellate Body pressured the US to change domestic administrative law procedures to address the concerns of developing countries and traders. G Shaffer, ‘International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal World’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 688.

⁸⁸ Bohman, Democracy across Borders (n 53).

⁸⁹ Isiksel, ‘Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm’ (n 2) 177.

⁹⁰ Of the now 22 signatories, only Japan has ratified ACTA. This occurred in 2011. In a notable shift, the EU Parliament rejected ACTA in 2012.

⁹¹ 2004 was the same year that Brazil and other developing countries made public the pursuit of a Development Agenda in the WIPO.

⁹² PK Yu, ‘ACTA and Its Complex Politics’ (2011) 3 WIPO Journal 1–16.

⁹³ For an early statement in this vein, see SK Sell and A Prakash, ‘Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights’ (2004) 48 International Studies Quarterly 143–75. See also Kapczynski, ‘The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property’ (n 66).

⁹⁴ D Drezner, ‘The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity’ (2009) 7 Perspectives on Politics 65–70.

⁹⁵ M Geist, ‘ACTA’s State of Play: Looking Beyond Transparency’ (2011) 26 American University International Law Review 543–558.

⁹⁶ See, for instance, the Open letter from La Quadrature du Net, ‘ACTA: A Global Threat to Freedom’, <http://www.laquadrature.net/en/acta-a-global-threat-to-freedoms-open-letter>, accessed 19 February 2014.

⁹⁷ A Dür and G Mateo González, ‘Public Opinion and Interest Group Influence: How Citizen Groups Derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ (2013) Working Paper available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2376141>, accessed 12 February 2014.

⁹⁸ Dür and Mateo González, ‘Public Opinion and Interest Group Influence’ (n 97) 5.

⁹⁹ Weatherall, K, ‘Three Lessons from ACTA and Its Political Aftermath’ (2012) 35 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 575–603.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ STOPP ACTA campaign, <https://www.stopp-acta.at/>, accessed 2 March 2014.

¹⁰¹ See La Quadrature, ‘ACTA’, <http://www.laquadrature.net/fr/ACTA>, accessed 2 March 2014.

¹⁰² The Wellington Declaration, <http://acta.net.nz/the-wellington-declaration>, accessed 1 March 2014.

¹⁰³ SK Sell, ‘Revenge of the “Nerds”: Collective Action against Intellectual Property Maximalism in the Global Information Age’ (2013) 15 International Studies Review 67–85.

¹⁰⁴ SK Sell, ‘TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP’ (2011) 18 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 449.

¹⁰⁵ Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag>, accessed 18 October 2013.

¹⁰⁶ Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (n 61).

¹⁰⁷ Dür and Mateo González, ‘Public Opinion and Interest Group Influence’ (n 97) 20.

¹⁰⁸ Indeed it was an implicit argument that high IPR standards would generate these benefits.

¹⁰⁹ Yu, ‘ACTA and Its Complex Politics’ (n 92) 7. Moreover, because the DSB has ruled several times in favour of weaker states, developing states are increasingly unable to wield the ‘stick’ of trade sanctions.

¹¹⁰ Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (n 62).

¹¹¹ O Solon, ‘Netherlands Rejects ACTA, and Forbids any Similar Legislation’ (2012) <http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-05/30/dutch-acta-rejection>, accessed 6 March 2014.

¹¹² Dür and Mateo González, ‘Public Opinion and Interest Group Influence’ (n 97) 20.

¹¹³ M Ermert, ‘Unprecedented Vote: EU Parliament Trade Committee Rejects ACTA’ (2012) <http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/06/21/unprecedented-vote-eu-parliament-trade-committee-rejects-acta/>, accessed 18 October 2013.

¹¹⁴ M Schulz, ‘ACTA Wrong Solution to Protect Intellectual Property’ (2012) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press/press_release_speeches/press_release/2012/2012-july/html/acta-wrong-solution-to-protect-intellectual-property>, accessed 6 March 2014.

¹¹⁵ La Quadrature, ‘ACTA’ <http://www.laquadrature.net/fr/ACTA>, accessed 2 March 2014.

¹¹⁶ IP-Watch, ‘ACTA Debated at WTO; Petitions and Letters Fly in Brussels’ (2012) <http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/02/29/acta-debated-at-wto-petitions-and-letters-fly-in-brussels/>, accessed 7 March 2012.

¹¹⁷ IP-Watch, ‘ACTA Debated at WTO; Petitions and Letters Fly in Brussels’ (2012) <http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/02/29/acta-debated-at-wto-petitions-and-letters-fly-in-brussels/>, accessed 7 March 2012.

¹¹⁸ P Lamy, ‘WTO Responds to Concerns of the European Parliament on ACTA’ (2010) <http://keionline.org/node/838>, accessed 8 March 2014.

¹¹⁹ F Gurry, ‘Historic Treaty Adopted, Boosts Access to Books for Visually Impaired Persons Worldwide’ (2013) <http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2013/article_0017.html>, accessed 29 February 2014.

¹²⁰ Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 1) 280.

¹²¹ This case, happening largely within South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, would be particularly useful to test normative theories away from the traditional Western locations.

¹²² See, for instance, Stevenson, H and Dryzek, JS, ‘The Discursive Democratisation of Global Climate Governance’ (2012) 21 Environmental Politics 189–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹²³ Hoffman, MJ, Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ A normative assessment of either the horizontal or vertical level on its own may be plausible but, in my view, is insufficient for remedying the democratic deficit.