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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 December 2020
While proportionality analysis (PA) may have originated from Germany, it has not remained a European product. PA has been locally transplanted across Anglophone nations, found in mixed legal systems that are rooted in the common law and even adapted in parts of Latin America and Asia. This article explains why PA is flourishing in parts of Asia – for example, South Korea and Taiwan – and why it is faltering in other countries, such as Singapore and China, where the absence of PA can be attributed to the non-fulfilment of Kant’s first prerequisite for perpetual peace: a republican government (liberal democracy).
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4 See (n 3) Ch 2.
5 See (n 3) 55.
6 See (n 3) 55.
7 See (n 3) 56.
8 See (n 2).
9 I Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans M. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 [1797]) 89 [6:311].
10 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 12 July 1948, revised 1987, available at: <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/kr/kr061en.pdf>.
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15 Case on the House Head System, Korean Constitutional Court, 2001Hun-Ka9, 3 February 2005.
16 Ibid.
17 Case on Conscientious Objectors, Korean Constitutional Court, 2011Hun-Ba379, 28 June 2018.
18 Article 111(1) (See No 10) of the Constitution expressly provides that the KCC has jurisdiction over impeachment proceedings.
19 Impeachment of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case, 16-1 KCCR 609, 2004Hun-Na1, 14 May 2004.
20 See Article 9(1) of the Public Official Election Act, available at: <http://www.nec.go.kr/engvote_2013/05_resourcecenter/02_01.jsp>.
21 Article 66(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads: ‘The President shall have the responsibility and duty to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and continuity of the State and the Constitution.’
22 Article 72 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads: ‘The President may submit important policies relating to diplomacy, national defence, unification and other matters relating to the national destiny to a national referendum if he deems it necessary.’
23 Article 53(1) of the Constitutional Court Act reads: ‘Where a request for an impeachment is well-grounded, the Constitutional Court shall pronounce a decision that the respondent shall be removed from the relevant public office.’
24 See (n 19).
25 See (n 19).
26 See (n 19).
27 See (n 19).
28 Case on the Impeachment of the President (Park Geun-hye), KCCR, 2016 Hun-Na1, 10 March 2017.
29 See (n 28).
30 Geun-hye Park, ‘Choi-gate: South Korean President’s Approval Rating Tanks at 4%’, The Guardian, 25 November 2016, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/25/choi-gate-south-korean-presidents-approval-rating-tanks-at-4>.
31 See Yeh, Jiunn-rong, The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis (Hart, Oxford, 2016)Google Scholar.
32 See (n 13) Ch 6.
33 See J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 (Taiwan, 1999), available at: <https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=476>.
34 See J.Y. Interpretation No. 542 (Taiwan, 2002), available at: <https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=542>.
35 J.Y. Interpretation No. 710 (Taiwan, 2013), available at: <https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=710>
36 J.Y. Interpretation No. 712 (Taiwan, 2013), available at: <https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=712>
37 M Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’ (2015) 100 Cornell Law Review 391.
38 Article 65(4) of the Singapore Constitution; Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 9 August 1965, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5054.html>
39 See (n 13) 26–27.
40 Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (Cap 206, 1975, rev 2002), ss 21, 22, available at: <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/NPPA1974#pr22->.
41 Public Order Act (Cap 257A, 2009, rev 2012), s 2(1), available at: <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/POA2009>.
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43 Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs, SGCA, 2 SLR(R) 525, 1988.
44 This case primarily turned on the Court’s interpretation of Section 8(1) of the ISA, which authorized the Minister of Home Affairs to issue a detention order if the President of Singapore was satisfied that this was necessary to prevent that person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore. On the facts, the detention orders were signed only by the Permanent Secretary of Home Affairs and the affidavit he signed merely testified to the fact that the government was satisfied that the detention orders were necessary. The Court held unanimously that this recital was insufficient. Instead, the Court opined that, in the absence of direct evidence from the President, the Cabinet or the authorized Minister must provide evidence that the Cabinet (or the authorized Minister) and the President, after receiving the government’s advice, were satisfied that these measures were necessary.
45 Yong Vui Kong v PP, SGCA 20 at [59], 2010.
46 Yong Vui Kong v PP, SGCA 11 at [64], 2015.
47 Lim Meng Suang v AG, SGCA 53 at [77], 2014.
48 A Stone Sweet and J Mathews, ‘Proportionality and Rights Protection in Asia: Hong Kong Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan – Whither Singapore?’ (2017) 29 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 774 at 775.
49 Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs, SGHC, 1 SLR(R) 582, 2006, at [88].
50 Vellama v Attorney General, SGCA, 4 SLR 698, 2013, at [84].
51 See (n 50): [85].
52 Article 1 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution, revised in 2018.
53 Xin, He, ‘The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China’ in Ginsburg, T and , A Simpser (eds), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013)Google Scholar 245–60.
54 Article 59 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Chinese Constitution) 4 December 1982, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c31ea082.htm>.
55 Article 97 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution.
56 Article 97 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution.
57 See (n 53) 246.
58 Article 31 of the Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses of the People’s Republic of China.
59 Article 33 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution, revised in 2004.
60 Pils, E, ‘The Party and the Law’, in Lam, Willy Wo-lap (ed), Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party (Routledge, New York, 2018)Google Scholar 258.
61 Pei, Minxin, ‘China in 2017: Back to Strongman Rule’ (2018) 58 Asian Survey 21 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 26.
62 Ng, Kwai Hang and He, Xin, Embedded Courts: Judicial Decision-Making in China (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar 15.
63 Article 126 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution.
64 Zhang, Qianfan, The Constitution of China: A Contextual Analysis (Hart, Oxford, 2012) 99 Google Scholar.
65 See (n 64) 194.
66 Li, Ling, ‘The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence in China’ (2016) 64 American Journal of Comparative Law 37 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 57.
67 See Supreme People’s Court, 2016 White Paper on Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts Part IV, available at: <http://english.court.gov.cn/2016-03/03/content_23724636.htm>.
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69 Article 67 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution.
70 Epstein, L, Shvetsova, O and Knight, J, ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’ (2001) 35 Law and Society Review 117 Google Scholar, 128.
71 Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1803.
72 See (n 64) 174.
73 The 7th Decision of the Supreme People’s Court to Repeal Relevant Judicial Interpretations Released before 2007, 18 December 2008.
74 See also Corradetti’s contribution in this issue.
75 Law, DS, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy’ (2015) 163 University of Pennsylvania Law ReviewGoogle Scholar 927, 979 and 963.
76 See (n 13).
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78 See (n 3) 258.