Article contents
On cosmopolitan self-determination
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 September 2012
Abstract
In order to arrive at an adequate understanding of the changing Westphalian world, it is necessary to distinguish political self-determination from its cosmopolitan counterpart. While political self-determination has its place in a familiar and common space, cosmopolitan self-determination stands for unbounded collective self-determination among strangers. Two forms can be distinguished. In its mixed form, it is tied in with political self-determination, adopting the latter as a medium for realizing common autonomy among those who are foreign to one another. Virtual representation is essential to understanding how cosmopolitans are connected to bounded political spaces. In its pure form, by contrast, cosmopolitan self-determination detaches itself from political judgement and finds its major role in authorizing risk management and crisis intervention. It lends expression to the impoverishment suffered by collective freedom in an administered world. Any calibration of the relationship between political and cosmopolitan self-determination must examine the general social conditions enabling an autonomous life.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012
References
1 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time (trans. Stambaugh, J, New York University Press, Albany, 1996) 9.Google Scholar
2 Slaughter, Ann-Marie, The New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001).Google Scholar
3 For example, the remarkable set collected in de Búrca, G and Scott, J (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006).Google Scholar
4 Crouch, Colin, Post-Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004).Google Scholar
5 Lyotard, Jean-François, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (trans. Bennington, G and Massumi, B, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984).Google Scholar
6 See Kant, Immanuel, ‘On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but is of no use in practice’ in his Practical Philosophy (Gregor, MJ ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) 273–310.Google Scholar
7 See, in particular, Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995) 237Google Scholar; also his Cosmopolitanism. Ideals and Realities (Polity Press, London, 2010).
8 For example, Singer, Peter, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002).Google Scholar
9 Habermas, Jürgen, The Divided West (trans. Cronin, C, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006) 134.Google Scholar
10 See generally, Drysek, John S, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000)Google Scholar; more specifically, Wheatley, Steven, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010).Google Scholar
11 This is not to deny that there may be good reasons to trust the wisdom of majorities. See Vermeule, Adrian, Law and the Limits of Reason (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008).Google Scholar
12 Preuss, Ulrich K, ‘Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Viable Concept’ in Dobner, P and Loughlin, M (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 23–46.Google Scholar
13 Arendt, Hannah, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Beiner, R ed, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989)Google Scholar; Vollrath, Ernst, Die Rekonstruktion der politischen Urteilskraft (Klett Cotta, Stuttgart, 1977).Google Scholar
14 One the concept of Entlastung, see Gehlen, Arnold, Der Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (12th edn, Aula Verlag, Wiebelsheim, 1978) 71Google Scholar (English translation as Man, his Nature and Place in the World, C McMillan and K Pillemer, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988).
15 Schmitt, Carl, Legality and Legitimacy (trans. Seitzer, J, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004) 53.Google Scholar
16 Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (1774), available at <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html>.
17 Hart Ely, John, Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982).Google Scholar
18 Williams, Melissa S, ‘Burkean “Descriptions” and Political Representation: A Reappraisal’ (1996) 29 Canadian Journal of Political Science 23–45.Google Scholar
19 Schmitt (n 15).
20 See Cases Rs. C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-3649.
21 Hirschl, Ran, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004).Google Scholar
22 Somek, A, ‘Administration without Sovereignty’ in Loughlin, M and Dobner, P (eds), The Twilight of Constitutional Law? (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 267–78.Google Scholar
23 On the service conception of authority, see Raz, Joseph, ‘The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition’ in his Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Politics and Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) 341–54.Google Scholar
24 For an attempt to come up with an account of these developments, see Jackson, Vicki C, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010).Google Scholar
25 Case C-209/03 The Queen (on the application of Dany Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills, [2005] ECR I-2119.
26 Siehe BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II).
27 Case 84/95 Bosphorus v Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 (2006) 42 EHRR 1.
28 Somek, A, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ in Avbelj, M and Komárek, J (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 343–79.Google Scholar
29 This interpretation even tries to base itself implicitly on the doctrine of virtual representation. See Maduro, Miguel Poiares, We The Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998)Google Scholar. In far less elaborate form it is to be found in the jurisprudence of the Court. See Somek, A, ‘Idealization, De-Politicization and Economic Due Process: System Transition in the European Union’ in Iancu, B (ed), The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public Law Adjudication (Eleven, Utrecht, 2009) 137–67.Google Scholar
30 I cannot elaborate this point here. See Fritz W Scharpf, ‘The Double Asymmetry of European Integration, Or: Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy’ (2009) 09/12 MPIfG Working Paper.
31 For a very useful introduction, see Peters, Anne, ‘Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur Neubestimmung der Verhältnisse’ (2010) 56 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 3–63.Google Scholar
32 Or this is what I have argued before. See Somek, A, ‘From the rule of law to the constitutionalist makeover: Changing European conceptions of public international law’ (2011) 18 Constellations 556–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
33 Rensmann, Thilo, ‘The Constitution as a Normative Order of Values: The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the Evolution of Modern Constitutionalism’ in Dupuy, P-M et al. (ed), Common Values in International Law (NP Engel, Kehl, 2006) 259–78.Google Scholar
34 For a programmatic statement, see Kingsbury, Benedict, Krisch, Nico and Stewart, Richard B, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15–61.Google Scholar
35 See Durkheim, Emile, The Division of Labour in Society (trans. Halls, WD, Free Press, New York, 1964).Google Scholar
- 4
- Cited by