¹ JH Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (1990) cited in Dunoff, JL, ‘The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case of the World Trade Organization’ in Dunoff, JL and Trachtman, JP (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 185.Google Scholar

² Among international relations scholars, it is widely held that international order rests in a scaffolding of international rules that create incentives, shape interests, and guide expectations for states. This is common across schools of thought, and includes liberalism in its various forms, the English School and international society theorists, and many constructivists. The main dissenters from this consensus are materialist realists and Marxists, who in their different ways see international order as following from the internal pressures generated by military stockpiles or social forces respectively. On liberal order, see Ikenberry, GJ, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011).Google Scholar On English School, see Bull, H, The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Order (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1977).Google Scholar On constructivist rules-based order, see Kratochwil, FV, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014)Google Scholar and Kratochwil, FV, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).Google Scholar On materialist realism and Marxism, see Brooks, SG and Wohlforth, WC, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2008)Google Scholar and Hardt, M and Negri, A, Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000).Google Scholar

³ For instance Dunoff, JL and Pollack, MA (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012)Google Scholar; in a policy-setting: Brooks, R, ‘10 Ways to Fix the Drone War’ Foreign Policy online, 11 April 2013, at <http://atfp.co/110QXyK>Google Scholar and Bergen, PL and Rothenberg, D (eds), Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014).Google Scholar

⁴ The functional importance of international rules that reduce the inefficiencies of the interstate system is a common theme in liberal philosophy, including in I Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch, trans T Humphrey in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Hackett, Indianapolis, IN, 1983); see also Bull (n 2).

⁵ In this characterisation I mean ‘constitutional’ in the sense of a hierarchically superior set of rules that order political relations and either validate or make possible primary, regulative rules on conduct. See Section III below.

⁶ See Abbott, KW and Snidal, D, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 International Organization 421Google Scholar; and Hafner-Burton, E, Victor, DG and Lupu, Y, ‘Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field’ (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 47.Google Scholar

⁷ Farrall, JM, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 39.Google Scholar Also, R Brooks, ‘All the Pentagon’s Lawyers’, Foreign Policy online, 29 August 2012.

⁸ In this large literature, see inter alia: Tamanaha, B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004)Google Scholar; Raz, J, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 The Law Quarterly Review 198Google Scholar; Bingham, T, The Rule of Law (Penguin, London, 2001)Google Scholar; Ginsburg, T and Moustafa, T (eds), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008).Google Scholar

⁹ Tamanaha (n 8) ch 9.

¹⁰ Chesterman, S, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331, 337.Google Scholar Hayek provides a similar list, with the important addition of a substantive list of rights without which he believes the rule of law cannot exist; see Hayek, F, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge, Abingdon, 1960).Google Scholar

¹¹ Fuller, L, Morality of Law (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1969).Google Scholar Also Murphy, C, ‘Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 239Google Scholar; Brunnée, J and Toope, SJ, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).Google Scholar

¹² World Justice Project ‘Rule of Law Index’ at <http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/>.

¹³ Raz (n 8) 198.

¹⁴ F Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law (1955) cited in Greenfell, L, Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) 69.Google Scholar

¹⁵ J Raz (n 8) 198 (emphasis in original).

¹⁶ Tamanaha (n 8) 114.

¹⁷ AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law (1885/1945) cited in Bingham (n 8) 4.

¹⁸ Alter, K, The New Terrain of International Law: Court, Politics, Rights (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2013) 340.Google Scholar

¹⁹ T Moustafa and T Ginsburg, ‘Introduction: The Function of Courts in Authoritarian Politics’ in Ginsburg and Moustafa (n 8).

²⁰ Tamanaha (n 8) 126.

²¹ Raz (n 8) 200.

²² Cane, P, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart, Oxford, 2002)Google Scholar; Veitch, S, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (Routledge, Abingdon, 2007).Google Scholar

²³ J Raz (n 8) 201.

²⁴ JP McCormick, ‘Identifying or Exploiting the Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy: An Introduction to Carl Schmitt’s Legality and Legitimacy’ in Schmitt, C, Legality and Legitimacy trans Seitzer, J (Duke University Press, Durham, VT, 2004).Google Scholar

²⁵ See Bingham’s historical narrative in The Rule of Law (n 8).

²⁶ P Johnson, The Wall Street Journal, 10 March 1999.

²⁷ See the UN Rule of Law project at <www.unrol.org>. Also Carothers, T (ed), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, NY, 2006)Google Scholar and Farrell, JM, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).Google Scholar

²⁸ Tamanaha, B, Law as a Means to an End: The Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 2 and ch 12.Google Scholar

²⁹ For instance, Buchanan, A, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2007).Google Scholar For empirical connections between legitimacy and law, see Tyler, TR, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2006).Google Scholar Also Dworkin, R, Law’s Empire (Belknap, Cambridge, MA, 1986).Google Scholar

³⁰ Raz (n 8) 196.

³¹ L Fuller (1975) cited in Tamanaha (n 8) 95.

³² Compare Tamanaha (n 8) ch 7 and the Introduction to Ginsburg and Moustafa (n 8).

³³ These themes are raised in Wiener, A, Lang, AF, Tully, J, Maduro, MP and Kumm, M‘Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 1.Google Scholar

³⁴ On the first, see for instance TM Franck, ‘What, Eat the Cabin Boy? Uses of Force That Are Illegal but Justifiable’ in Franck, , Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002)Google Scholar and Simma, B, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 1.Google Scholar On the second, see the literature on jus cogens including de Wet, E, ‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15(1) European Journal of International Law 97Google Scholar, and on Carl Schmitt’s ‘community will’ in Schmitt (n 24).

³⁵ Raz (n 8) 209 (emphasis added). Michel Rosenfeld observes that the requirements of the rule of law and democracy can conflict; see Rosenfeld, M‘The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy’ (2001) 74 Southern California Law Review 1307.Google Scholar

³⁶ Report of the Secretary General on ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’, S/2004/616, para 6.

³⁷ Bingham (n 8) 9.

³⁸ Veitch (n 22).

³⁹ Koskenniemi, M, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001)Google Scholar and Koskenniemi, M, ‘The Advantage of Treaties: International Law in the Enlightenment’ (2009) 13 The Edinburgh Law Review 27.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ The Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey), Judgment of 7 September 1927, PCIJ Series A, No 10, at 18.

⁴¹ T Reinold and M Zürn, ‘The Rule of Law and the “Rules about the Rules”’ (2012) Rule of Law Center Colloquium working paper, WZB, 9 July, 1.

⁴² Ibid 12.

⁴³ See, for instance, the UN Charter, and United Nations, ‘The Role of the United Nations in International Law’ United Nations Fact Sheet #2 on Strengthening the Rule of Law (2012) at <http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2012/Press_kit/fact_sheet_2_english.pdf>.

⁴⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 174, 1947, A/RES/174(II).

⁴⁵ Secretary-General’s Letter to Heads of State and Government, 9 May 2012, available at <http://bit.ly/QFvrcF>.

⁴⁶ Goldstein, J, Kahler, M, Keohane, RO and Slaughter, AM, ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’ (2000) 54 International Organization 385, 387.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Franck, T, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) 52.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Ibid 53.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid 54.

⁵¹ Klabbers, J, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) ch 1.Google Scholar

⁵² Bradley, CA, ‘Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution’ (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 307.Google Scholar

⁵³ Helfer, LR, ‘Exiting Treaties’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1579.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Cited in Hurd, I, International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) 197.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ CJ Tams, ‘Current Developments: Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (Case Note: Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) Judgment of 4 December 1998)’ (2009) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1413823>.

⁵⁶ Though several states have challenged the legality of Iceland’s position, and so the legal issue at the heart of this example is contested. See the details of objection and counter-objection contained in the Schedule to the ICRW at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/schedule.htm>.

⁵⁷ This is true with respect to the ICRW. There can be other limits in other treaties to which Turkey is a party, including CITES which regulates the international trade in some whale parts.

⁵⁸ <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf>.

⁵⁹ See inter alia Helfer, LR, ‘Exiting Treaties’ (2005) 91Virginia Law Review 1579.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Raz (n 8) 203.

⁶¹ Jus cogens rules may constitute an exception to this rule as the concept implies universality. See Hossain, K, ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation under the UN Charter’ (2005) 3 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 72–98.Google Scholar

⁶² A/RES/55/2, II/9.

⁶³ Reinold and Zürn (n 41) 12.

⁶⁴ Raz (n 8) 203.

⁶⁵ Hayek, FA, The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1994).Google Scholar

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⁶⁸ I Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch, 1795, section 354, trans Humphrey, T in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Hackett, Indianapolis, IN, 1983).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Büthe, T and Mattli, W, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the New Economy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2012).Google Scholar

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⁷⁷ The literature on the special role of Great Powers, singly or collectively, in generating international order is large and varied. It includes classical writings on great power politics including Morgenthau, HJ, Politics Among Nations (Knopf, New York, NY, 1967)Google Scholar; Carr, EH, The Twenty-Years Crisis 1919–1939 (Macmillan, London, 1939)Google Scholar; Bull, The Anarchical Society (n 2). It also encompasses significant strands of writing on the needs of US foreign policy such as Ikenberry, GJ, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2001)Google Scholar; Jones, Bet al., Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Brookings, Washington DC, 2009).Google Scholar A more critical variant sees it as an aspect of hegemony or empire: Simpson, G, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004)Google Scholar; Foot, Ret al., (eds), US Hegemony and International Organizations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003)Google Scholar; Byers, M and Nolte, G, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003)Google Scholar; Hardt, M and Negri, A, Empire (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).Google Scholar

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⁷⁹ South Africa’s argument does suggest that the consensus is something short of universal, or at least that there remains an opening for the strategic use of their complaint when it serves their interests. On informal Charter amendments, see Hurd, I, ‘Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice in Russett, B (ed), The Once and Future Security Council (St Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1997).Google Scholar

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⁸¹ Hurd, I, ‘The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law’ (2014) Chinese Journal of International Politics 361.Google Scholar

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⁸³ Hurd, I, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007) ch 7.Google Scholar

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⁹⁰ Alvarez, JE, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 71.Google Scholar

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⁹² Summary of the Summary of the Judgment of 27 February 1998 at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=460&p1=3&p2=3&k=82&p3=5&case=88&PHPSESSID=31e7e012b66d5744748863cc574778a3>.

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¹⁰³ Kumm et al. (n 101) 1.

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¹⁰⁷ Besson (n 102).

¹⁰⁸ JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutions’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (n 1).

¹⁰⁹ I mean ‘instrumental’ here in Tamanaha’s sense of being implicated in the agent’s interests, in On the Rule of Law (n 8), and not in the sense used by Koskenniemi in ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization’ (n 96). Tamanaha warns against instrumentalism, as a nefarious dangerous development, but here I suggest it is elemental to the international legal–political system.

¹¹⁰ This makes possible a dynamic interaction between legal resources and state interests, as outlined in Wunderlich, C, ‘Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics’ in Müller, H and Wunderlich, C (eds), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 2013).Google Scholar

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¹¹⁴ For instance, Forst, R, Justification and Critique: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics (Polity, Malden, MA, 2013).Google Scholar

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