This contribution examines the possible contribution the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) can make towards the achievement of transitional justice in countries or regions recovering from (civil) war or other serious conflict. It will first briefly epitomize the recent process culminating in the set-up of the PBC and then address the functions and tools of the Commission with particular focus on its transitional justice capabilities. Thereby, I will examine conceivable operative approaches the PBC might take in the first cases submitted to it, i.e., Burundi and Sierra Leone, and assess the Commission's potential and added value both in general terms but in particular with regard to transitional justice activities.

“Margin of appreciation” refers to the power of a Contracting State in assessing the factual circumstances, and in applying the provisions envisaged in international human rights instruments. Margin of appreciation is based on the notion that each society is entitled to certain latitude in balancing individual rights and national interests, as well as in resolving conflicts that emerge as a result of diverse moral convictions. In this regard, the doctrine is analogous to the concept of judicial discretion, where a judge, in line with certain constraints prescribed by legislation, precedent or custom, could decide a case within a range of possible solutions. The role of discretion is indispensable not only for bridging the gap between the law and changing realities of dynamic social organisms, but also for answering the particular questions of a given case in the absence of overall enacted or case law. In other words, judges are entitled to exercise discretion to make fair decisions in a specific case, without being locked into a formula that might not be applicable to every scenario.

During the past year, I have had an intensive and ongoing dialogue with European government officials about U.S. counterterrorism laws and policies, especially those relating to the detention, questioning, and transfer of members of al Qaida and the Taliban. During this same period, the U.S. legal framework governing the detention and treatment of detainees has evolved significantly, through the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act last December, the Supreme Court's decision in the Hamdan case in June, the transfer of 14 al Qaida leaders to Guantanamo in September, the announcement of new DOD detention policies in September, and the enactment of the Military Commissions Act earlier this month. It has been vexing that so many myths and misunderstandings about United States policies have proliferated. My dialogue with EU governments during the past year has helped to clear up some of these myths and to address issues that are troubling to Europeans. Tonight, I want to provide a comprehensive public explanation of our legal views and policy decisions with respect to the detention and treatment of terrorists, as these have evolved in the United States since September 11th.

In the last year John B. Bellinger, III, Chief Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State, has been engaging in a dialogue with politicians and legal scholars in European countries. These speeches and public appearances, like the remarks delivered at the London School of Economics in 2006 and republished in this issue of the German Law Journal, were meant to address the misimpressions, as Mr. Bellinger sees it, that have become prevalent in Europe over the last few years with respect to the US positions on questions of the legal basis and legal limits of the “war on terror” and the treatment of detained terrorists.