Approximately ten to fifteen years ago the “danger of Europeanization” of the German law on churches and religion was hotly debated. The churches in Germany feared that the influence of the European Union would dramatically change their legal framework. But also academic writers worried about the influence of the common market law or European antidiscrimination law on the legal situation of the churches in the member states – sometimes in rather shrill tone. One almost got the impression that Brussels replaced the Marxist Ideologiekritik (critique of ideology) as the main enemy of Christianity in Europe.

Many questions come to the mind if one starts thinking about morality and the law - questions about the epistemological or ontological status of morality, its content, motivating force or cognitive accessibility. They concern the content of norms, the enigma of justice and the demands of human solidarity. The universality, particularity or relativity of morality and material legal standards is as much an issue as the general relation of morality and the law.

The wave of democratization that has engulfed African countries since the 1980s has been characterized by the establishment of or return to multi-party politics. This has mostly happened in political systems with a long history of de facto and de jure constraints on the ability of political parties to function effectively. While few countries today (examples include Eritrea and Swaziland) continue to deny the principle and legitimacy of a pluralistic organization of political associations and parties, many political parties in “new democracies” still face insurmountable obstacles in creating a level playing field and have to cope with legal and administrative provisions that severely restrict their free operation.

Shakespeare's famed citation “What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet” may be one of the most used quotations in contemporary literature. It serves to provide guidance in reviewing ones assessment of new perspectives on a given topic. The implications of the quotation induce the reader to feel concordant with the assumption that whatever name a given phenomenon is accorded, it is of little importance because the objects are similar and hence there is no reason to emphasise a peripheral and meaningless concept such as a name and the idea which it embraces. By contrast, intellectual property rights, and therein trademark law, is conceptually based on the assumption that a verbal mark, figure or colour of a given good or service need to be protected since these immaterial notions give rise to patrimonial rights conferred to the owner of the registered trademark. A well known slogan or figurative mark is capable of having significant commercial value as demonstrated in the recent dispute between Apple and Cisco concerning the right of the former to use the trademark iPhone. However, it is important to note that the essential raison d'ětre of trademark law is not only to confer patrimonial rights to a legal or natural person and thus prevent an abusive use by a third party, but essentially to guarantee the origin of goods or services to the consumer and hence enable him, without any danger of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin. Having said that it should also be noted that traditional trademark theory is perceived on the assumption that trademarks serve to minimize the likelihood of consumer confusion and prohibits the use of a trademark with regard to competing or similar goods only. However the “dilution theory” challenges this approach to trademark law as it also disseminates the postulate to prohibit the use of certain famous and/or characteristic trademarks on non-competing goods on the ground that such use dilutes and possibly erodes a given trademark's commercial value and its hold on the consumer.