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There Is No Europe—On Subjectivity and Community in the EU

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo

Abstract

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This Paper investigates legal subjectivity in the European Union. It takes seriously the principle according to which the individual is at the heart of the Union's activities and asks what kind of legal and political subjectivity the EU can render possible. The analysis draws on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and his conception of singular plurality. What comes to the fore is the interrelatedness of subjects and community. This implies that the subject should not be understood simply as an individual, nor as part of a communitarian whole. Neither view is ontologically plausible nor ethically sound. By conceptualizing subjectivity as both singular and plural, it may become possible to rethink the relationship between subjectivity and community in the Union. This is important because potential solutions to fundamental problems of legitimacy, solidarity, and the lack thereof, hinge on how the relationship is understood.

Type
Special Issue Traditions, Myths, and Utopias of Personhood
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 18 , Issue 5: Special Issue Traditions, Myths, and Utopias of Personhood , 01 September 2017 , pp. 1229 - 1246
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

References

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