¹ See Griller, Stefan, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, in Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht – Ergebnisse eines Internationalen Symposiums in Wien 83, 97 (Robert Walter et al. eds., 2004). For an attempt to save dualism, see Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, International law and Interindividual law, in New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law 15, 22 (Janne Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2007).Google Scholar

² For this term (in German “äußeres Staatsrecht”), see G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts §§ 330 et seq. (1821) (noting that § 547 can be also understood as the origin of the monistic view with primacy of national law); cf. Lando Kirchmair, The “Janus Face” of the Court of Justice of the European Union: A theoretical appraisal of the EU legal order's relationship with international and member state law, 4 Göttingen J. Int'l L. 677, 688 (2012).Google Scholar

³ See Verdross, Alfred, Die völkerrechtswidrige Kriegshandlung und der Strafanspruch der Staaten 34 (1920) (“[R]einigendes Gewitter”).Google Scholar

⁴ See generally Verdross, Alfred, Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der Völkerrechtsverfassung (1923); see also Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre 329 (1960); Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 1, at 18 (speaking of “the natural unity of human kind … [a]s a matter of pure speculation”).Google Scholar

⁵ See Kelsen, Hans, The Pure Theory of Law [Reine Rechtslehre] 193–215, 215 (M. Knight trans., 1978) (1960) (“A norm of general international law authorizes an individual or a group of individuals on the basis of an effective constitution, to create and apply as a legitimate government a normative coercive order. That norm thus legitimates this coercive order for the territory of its actual effectiveness as a valid legal order and the community constituted by this coercive order as a ‘state’ in the sense of international law.”); see also Alfred Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926) (arguing from the viewpoint of a(n) (international) basic norm from which also municipal law derives) “The freedom of states is nothing else than a margin of discretion depending on international law.” Id. at 35 (translated by the author). According to Verdross, the lawmakers of public international law are not States, but the international community, acting through an international organ with supranational power. Id. at 48 et seq. But see Hugo Krabbe, Die moderne Staatsidee 305–09 (2d ed. 1919, reprinted in 1969).Google Scholar

⁶ For criticism against the other monistic concept with primacy of national law (which would consequently make international and supranational law to be governed by some almost 200 diverging national laws), see Kirchmair, supra note 2 at 681 n.12.Google Scholar

⁷ See, e.g., Bogdandy, Armin von, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 Int'l J. Const. L. 397, 400 (2008) (denoting those theories “intellectual zombies”). For examples of criticism of both theories, see Kirchmair, supra note 2; Lando Kirchmair, Is the EU legal order the tombstone of the dualistic and the monistic doctrine?, in La recherche en droit constitutionnel comparé (Michael Thaler & Michel Verpeaux eds., 2014).Google Scholar

⁸ See Jakab, András, Probleme der Stufenbaulehre—Das Scheitern des Ableitungsgedankens und die Aussichten der Reinen Rechtslehre, 91 Archiv für Rechts & Sozialphilosophie 333 (2005) (“Some valuable parts of PTL [”Pure Theory of Law“] might be used in other legal theories, but these are nothing but transplanted organs from the dead body of PTL whossewhose heart—SL [”Stufenbaulehre“]—can no longer keep the body alive.”).Google Scholar

⁹ See Kirchmair, Lando, Descriptive vs. Prescriptive (Global) Legal Pluralism: A gentle reminder of David Hume's is– ought divide (paper in preparation) (on file with the author).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Compare Berman, Paul S., Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing Global Legal Pluralism, 20 Ind. J. Global Legal Studs. 665, 665–95 (2013), with Mireille Delmas-Marty, Les forces imaginantes du droit (II): Le pluralisme ordonne (2006). See also Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World 44 (Naomi Norberg trans., 2009). With regards to constitutional pluralism, see Mattias Kumm, The Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism, in Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 216, 220 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012).Google Scholar

¹¹ As such, a demonstration is rather difficult. Jan Klabbers, The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009) (simply presuming it); Thomas Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht (2012) (refraining from strong normative claims). For a critical overview of “world constitutionalism,” see Oliver Diggelmann & Tilmann Altwicker, Is there something like a constitution of international law? A critical analysis of the debate on world constitutionalism, 68 Heidelberg J. Int'l L. 623, 623–50 (2008).Google Scholar

¹² Fitzmaurice, Gerald G., The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 Recueil des Cours de L'Académie de Droit Int'l, 1, 71 (1957) (calling this discussion “unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point”). Likewise, Fitzmaurice argued that “[i]n the same way it would be idle to start a controversy about whether the English legal system was superior to or supreme over the French or vice-versa, because these systems do not pretend to have the same field of application.” See id. at 71–72. For a practical approach concerning the relationship between international and national law, see Helen Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts 6 (2003). This, however, has been criticized by Griller, supra note 1, at 84 n.3.Google Scholar

¹³ In relation to this designation, see Jean-Bernard Auby, Globalisation et droit public, 14 Eur. Rev. Pub. L. 1219, 1219 (2002); Anne Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions, in New Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law 251 (Janne Nijman & Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2007); see also David J. Bederman, Globalization and International Law (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁴ But see Verdross, Alfred, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926); Klabbers, supra note 11; Diggelmann & Altwicker, supra note 11.Google Scholar

¹⁵ But see Griller, supra note 1, at 84 (arguing, roughly translated, that it is quintessential to analyze, the bases and validity of a norm in the context of its generation.) “Die […] Annäherung zwischen den Theorien macht die Auseinandersetzung mit den Grundsatzfragen nicht überflüssig. Man entkommt ihnen nicht, indem man sie für obsolet oder praxisfern erklärt. Welche Norm auf Grund welchen Rechtserzeugungszusammenhanges in einer konkreten Situation verbindlich ist, ist eine in der Praxis vielleicht bisweilen vernachlässigte, aber im Grunde ‘unentrinnbare allenfalls,‘ implizit beantwortete Frage.” Id. (emphasis in original).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Compare Delbrück, Jost, Grundfragen der innerstaatlichen Geltung des Völkerrechts, in Völkerrecht 98, 101 (G. Dahm et. al eds.,1988) (stating “Das Völkerrecht fordert nur, daß es, aber sagt nicht, wie es im inländischen Recht durchgesetzt werden soll”), with Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law, 235 Recueil des Cours 317–21 (1992). See André Nollkaemper, The direct effect of public international law, in Direct effect—Rethinking a classic of EC legal doctrine 179 (Jolande M. Prinssen & Antionette Schrauwen eds., 2002); see also Ward N. Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts 137 (2006). However, Ferdinandusse acknowledges, “When the general rule of freedom comes into conflict with the basic principle that States must perform their international obligations in good faith (pacta sunt servanda), the latter must prevail.” Id. at 135.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Bleckmann, Albert, Begriff und Kriterien der innerstaatlichen Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Verträge – Versuch einer Theorie des self-executing treaty auf rechtsvergleichender Grundlage 124 (1970) (referencing the Austrian and the Dutch doctrine in n.19–20); Nollkaemper, supra note 16, at 164; Karen Kaiser, Treaties, direct applicability, in Max Planck Encyclodpedia of Public International Law Online Edition [MPEPIL] para. 6 (R. Wolfrum ed., 2011); Gaby Buchs, Die unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Vertragsbestimmungen—Am Beispiel der Rechtsprechung der Gerichte Deutschlands, Österreichs, der Schweiz und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 37, 43 (1993); Martin Franz, Die unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit von TRIPS in Argentinien und Brasilien, 12 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz & Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 1001, 1004 (2002); Keller, supra note 12, at 14 n.40.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Yet, I would like to emphasize that I do not want to challenge or even improve already established general concepts of law, which work perfectly well in different contexts and with regards to other topics.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For a comparison of the theories of the social contract summarized, see Peter Koller, Neue Theorien des Sozialkontrakts (1987).Google Scholar

²⁰ See, e.g., Klabbers, Jan, An introduction to international institutional law 34 (2002) (“Legal theorists ordinarily have little business in trying to explain why states co-operate: such belongs to the social sciences properly. Moreover, the legal theorist is generally ill equipped to perform such a task: whenever lawyers engage in political analysis, more often than not the results fail to persuade professional political scientists.”).Google Scholar

²¹ See also Loos, Fritz, Zur Wert—und Rechtslehre Webers 111 (1970) (“Die logische Struktur der Rechtswissenschaft [von Kelsen] ist demgemäß dieselbe wie die der Sozialphilosophie i.S. Webers. Rechtswissenschaft und Sozialphilosophie suchen von hypothetischen vorausgesetzten Werten aus sinnhafte Konsequenzen zu entfalten, sind also in diesem Sinne normative Wissenschaften.” [footnotes omitted]). For the change from a real to a hypothetical contract (“hypothetische Konstruktion”), see Koller, supra note 19, at 14, (quoting Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: “Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis,” as the first to express the fiction of a social contract).Google Scholar

²² See Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan 96 (J. Schlösser trans., 1996) (1651).Google Scholar

²³ See Locke, John, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Regierung [Two Treatises of Government] 201 (H. J. Hoffmann trans., 1977) (1690).Google Scholar

²⁴ See Rousseau, John-Jacques, Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag oder Grundsätze des Staatsrechts [Du Contract Social; Ou Principes du Droit Politique] 17 (H. Brockard trans., 1986) (1762); compare Koller, supra note 19, at 25.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Weinberger's argument aiming at disclosing natural law based theories, Ota Weinberger, Norm und Institution—eine Einführung in die Theorie des Rechts 72–73 (1988) (“Der Positivismus geht demgegenüber vom Non-Kognitivismus aus, demgemäß es keine Möglichkeit gibt, richtiges Recht zu erkennen und überhaupt Normen rein kognitiv—dh ohne willensmäßige Stellungnahme—zu begründen.”).Google Scholar

²⁶ To be precise, it should say “almost objective” because complete objectivity does not seem attainable via consensus. This thesis does not aim at changing this. The notion of objectivity therefore refers only to an approximation to objectivity. Comparing to discourse theory, see Robert Alexy, Diskurstheorie und Menschenrechte, in Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs – Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie 127, 129 (Robert Alexy ed., 1995) (circumscribing discourse theory as “eine prozedurale Theorie der praktischen Richtigkeit [umschreibt]. Nach ihr ist eine Norm dann richtig und deshalb gültig, wenn sie das Ergebnis einer bestimmten Prozedur, nämlich der eines rationalen praktischen Diskurses, sein kann.”); Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen 299f (1997); Jürgen Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation 175 (1998); Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung—Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats 138 (1992) (“[G]enau die Regelungen Legitimität beanspruchen dürfen, denen alle möglicherweise Betroffenen als Teilnehmer an rationalen Diskursen zustimmen könnten.”); see also Seyla Benhabib, Another Universalism: On the Unity and Diversity of Human Rights, in 81 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 7, 21 (2007).Google Scholar

²⁷ See Koller, , supra note 19, at 12.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Rawls, John, Politischer Liberalismus [Political Liberalism] 120 (Wilfried Hinsch trans., 1998).Google Scholar

²⁹ Compromise is understood as a consensus achieved by Willensübereinkunft. Irrespective of the difference between compromise and consensus (not every consensus must be a compromise), these notions are used as synonyms here. See Norbert Hoerster, Was ist Recht? Grundfragen der Rechtsphilosophie 133 (2006) (“Die Bewertung des Rechts bzw. die Aufstellung normativer Anforderungen an das Recht ist in ihrer Begründung auf ethische Prämissen angewiesen. Nach der hier vertretenen Auffassung können diese Prämissen letztlich nur auf die Realisierung individueller Interessen bzw. eines Kompromisses solcher Interessen Bezug nehmen.”).Google Scholar

³⁰ See Kant, Immanuel, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre 100 (1797) (“Die Frage war: warum soll ich mein Versprechen halten? Denn daß ich es soll, begreift ein jeder von selbst … Es ist ein Postulat der reinen (von allen sinnlichen Bedingungen des Raumes und der Zeit, was den Rechtsbegrif betrift, abstrahierenden) Vernunft. …”). See also James Leslie Brierly, Brierly's The Law of Nations 56 (6th ed. 1963).Google Scholar

“The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, whether he is a single individual or whether he is associated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so far as he is a reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in which he has to live.”Google Scholar

Id. See Georg Dahm, Völkerrecht 12 n.17 (1958) (“Der Mindestbestand der völkerrechtlichen Ordnung muß zunächst die Regel pacta sunt servanda umfassen, ein Gebot zwar nicht der Logik, aber der praktischen Vernunft.”); see also Jost Delbrück, Begriff, Geltung u. Erscheinungsformen des Völkerrechts, in Völkerrecht27, 37 (Georg Dahm et al. eds., 1989) (saying “Wer den Konsens als Quelle des verbindlichen Völkerrechts gelten läßt, setzt damit schon stillschweigend das Bestehen einer Rechtsordnung voraus, aus der sich die Verbindlichkeit des Konsenses ergibt, die also zum mindesten den Grundsatz pacta sunt servanda enthält”); id. at 41 (“Das Völkerrecht gilt, weil es notwendig ist.” “[S]ie [pacta sunt servanda] ist notwendiges Recht in dem Sinne, daß ohne dessen Geltung das internationale Leben dem Chaos und der Anarchie anheimfallen müßte.”); Jost Delbrück, Verbindlichkeit und Geltungsbereich der Verträge, in 1 Völkerrecht 600 (Georg Dahm et al. eds., 2002) (stating that pacta sunt servanda and pacta tertiis are “selbstverständliches ius necessarium”); 4 Jules Basdevant, Règles generals du droit de la paix, 58 Recueil des Cours 642 (1936); Georges Scelle, Précis de droit des gens: Principes et systématique, Vol. I Introduction, le milieu intersocial 31 (1932) (localizing the fundamental condition of validity of (international) law in the “fait social”). Id. See Hans Wehberg, Pacta sunt servanda, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 775, 792 (1959); see also Kirsten Schmalenbach, Article 26, in Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties—A Commentary, paras. 13–22 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012).Google Scholar

³¹ For an interesting analysis arguing that rules are a cognitive phenomenon based on an inborn (moral) competence similarly to the language faculty brought up by Chomsky, see generally Matthias Mahlmann, Rationalismus in der praktischen Theorie—Normentheorie und praktische Kompetenz (2009). See also an overview of the current debate in evolutionary psychology given by Michael Tomasello & Amrisha Vaish, Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality, 64 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 231, 231–55 (2013).Google Scholar

³² See generally John Rawls, Eine Theorie Der Gerechtigkeit [A Theory of Justice] (Hermann Vetter trans., 1975); John Rawls, Das Recht Der Völker [The Law Of Peoples] (Wilfried Hinsch trans., 2002).Google Scholar

³³ Compare Koller, , supra note 19, at 17 (indicating that social contract theories have—on the one hand—to “akzeptablen Ausgangszustand bestimmen [müssen], von dem aus eine faire Übereinkunft aller Beteiligten über die Grundsätze ihres Zusammenlebens zustandekommen kann”) On the other hand these social contract theories aim to “zeigen, welche Grundsätze unter der Voraussetzung dieses Ausgangszustandes die vernünftige Zustimmung aller Beteiligten finden würde[n].” Id. Google Scholar

³⁴ Compare Hobbes, , supra note 22, at 102.Google Scholar

“Die Natur hat die Menschen in den körperlichen und geistigen Fähigkeiten so gleich geschaffen, daß sich zwar zuweilen einer finden lassen mag, der offensichtlich von großer Körperkraft oder schnellerem Auffassungsvermögen ist als ein anderer; jedoch wenn man alles zusammenrechnet, ist der Unterschied zwischen Mensch und Mensch nicht so beträchtlich, daß ein Mensch daraufhin irgendeinen Vorteil für sich fordern kann, auf den ein anderer nicht so gut wie er Anspruch erheben könnte. Denn was die Körperkraft betrifft, so hat der Schwächste genügend Kraft, den Stärksten zu töten, entweder durch einen geheimen Anschlag oder durch ein Bündnis mit anderen, die sich in derselben Gefahr wie er befinden. Und was die geistigen Fähigkeiten betrifft […], so finde ich noch eine größere Gleichheit unter den Menschen als hinsichtlich der Körperkraft.”

Id. But see Koller, supra note 19, at 18.

³⁵ See Locke, , supra note 23, at 203 (“Im Naturzustand herrscht ein natürliches Gesetz, das jeden verpflichtet. Und die Vernunft, der dieses Gesetz entspricht, lehrt die Menschheit, wenn sie sie nur befragen will, daß niemand einem anderen, da alle gleich und unabhängig sind, an seinem Leben und Besitz, seiner Gesundheit und Freiheit Schaden zufügen soll.”).Google Scholar

³⁶ See Rousseau, , supra note 24, at 17 (arguing even for expropriation in order to achieve equality). “Diese Bestimmungen [des Gesellschaftsvertrages] lassen sich bei richtigem Verständnis sämtlich auf eine einzige zurückführen, nämlich die völlige Entäußerung jedes Mitglieds mit allen seinen Rechten an das Gemeinwesen als Ganzes.” Id. Google Scholar

³⁷ See Rawls, , supra note 32, at 36. However, for a criticism of the idea of equality, see Robert Nozick, Anarchie, Staat, und Utopie [Anarchy, State, and Utopia] 214 (Hermann Vetter trans., 1976). See James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit, Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan [The Limits of Liberty, Between Anarchy and Leviathan] 1 (1984) (designing his social contract theory without individual equality). Compare Koller, supra note 19, at 19, 188, with Buchanan, supra note 37, at 2.Google Scholar

Im Gegensatz [zum elitären Kollektivisten, von dem man erwartet, daß er die Ziele für die Gesellschaft näher bestimmt] muß der methodologische Individualist die Existenz seiner Mitmenschen und deren Wertvorstellungen anerkennen. Er würde von Anbeginn gegen seine Prinzipien verstoßen, wenn er Menschen unterschiedliches Gewicht verleihen würde. Auch wenn es noch so verlockend ist, er kann nicht einfach Gott spielen.

³⁸ See supra note 26 (regarding objectivity). But see Weinberger, supra note 25, at 73.Google Scholar

³⁹ The binding character is considered to be an implied element of the consensus. See Eugenio Bulygin, Das Problem der Geltung bei Kelsen, in Hans Kelsen—Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts 80, 88, 95 (Stanley L. Paulson & Michael Stolleis eds., 2004).Google Scholar

See Matthias Knauff, Der Regelungsverbund: Recht und Soft Law im Mehrebenensystem 25 (2010) (speaking of a “weitgehend unangefochtene[m] Spezifikum des Rechts … as an ‘umfassender und unbedingter Verbindlichkeitsanspruch’, which 'nicht auf rechtstheoretisch zwingenden Gründen [beruht], sondern … vor allem nützliche Konvention [ist]”).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ If you, as the reader, do not support this definition of law, I would like to kindly invite you to replace this definition with your preferred definition and go ahead with the following arguments as a play of thoughts.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Recall the before mentioned pre-legal pacta tertiis principle. See discussion supra p.9.Google Scholar

⁴² See Kelsen, Hans, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen 99 (1979) (“Ein Konflikt zwischen zwei Normen liegt vor, wenn das, was die eine als gesollt setzt, mit dem, was die andere als gesollt setzt, unvereinbar ist, und daher die Befolgung oder Anwendung der einen Norm notwendiger-oder möglicherweise die Verletzung der anderen involviert.”); Kelsen, supra note 4, at 209; see also Ewald Wiederin, Was ist und welche Konsequenzen hat ein Normkonflikt, 22 Rechtstheorie 311, 318, 324 (1990) (“Ein Konflikt zwischen zwei Normen liegt nach einer verbesserten Version dann vor, wenn die Setzung des durch die erste Norm umschriebene, d.h. gebotene oder erlaubte Verhaltens dazu führt, daß die zweite Norm verletzt wird.”). This also applies in cases of de facto inability (“faktischer Unmöglichkeit”). See id. at 316; see also Erich Vranes, The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and Legal Theory, 17 Eur. J. Int‘l L. 395, 418 (2006) (arguing in favor of a broad definition of norm conflicts); Kiristen Schmalenbach, Article 53, in Vienna convention on the law of treaties—A commentary para. 54 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012). But see Karl Engisch, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung 46 (Heidelberg: Winter 1935); Karl Engisch, Einführung in das juristische denken 162 (1977). For him, legal norms conflict if “ein Verhalten in abstracto oder in concreto zugleich als geboten und nicht als geboten oder als verboten und nicht verboten oder gar als geboten und verboten [wird].” Id. at 162. See Thomas Zoglauer, Normenkonflikte—zur Logik & Rationalität ethischen Argumentierens 125 (1998). For a more narrow definition, which is often used on the international level, see Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int‘t L. 401, 426 (1953) (“A conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties.”); see also Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The Relationship Between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and Other Treaties, 35 J. World Trade 1081, 1084 (2001).Google Scholar

⁴³ See Vranes, Erich, Lex superior, lex specialis, lex posterior—Rechtsnatur der ‘Konfliktlösungsregeln, 65 Heidelberg J. Int‘l L. 391, 402 n.48 (2005).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See also supra Section B.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For more detailed references and discussion, see infra notes 46–48.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Verdross, Alfred & Simma, Bruno, Universelles Völkerrecht— Theorie und Praxis 550 (3d ed 1984); Stefan Griller, Die Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten auf zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen 355 (1989) (defining direct applicability [even related to the EU] as “die innerstaatliche Geltung der einzelnen Völkerrechtsnormen […] ohne Dazwischentreten eines weiteren staatlichen Aktes' mit ‘Durchgriffswirkung.”); August Reinisch, Zur unmittelbaren Anwendbarkeit von EWR-Recht, in Zeitschrift für Europarecht, Internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung 11, 15 (1993); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A CriticalAanalysis, 26 Virginia J. of Int‘l L. 627, 632 n.27 (1986); Buergenthal, supra note 16, at 317.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Kaiser, , supra note 17, at para. 1 (“A treaty is ‘self-executing’ or ‘directly applicable’ in domestic law, when its provisions will be applied by courts or executive agencies as provisions of domestic law without the need of further legislative or administrative measures.”). Even if Vasak subsumes two different things to the notion “self-executing,” he seems to share this notion. See K. Vasak, Was bedeutet die Aussage, ein Staatsvertrag sei “self-executing”?—Zum Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichtshofs vom 27.6. 1960, B 469/59, 24 Juristische Blätter 352, 352 (1961).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Compare this to the enumeration made by Delbrück. Jost Delbrück, Das Individuum im Völkerrecht, in 1 Völkerrecht 259, 263 (Georg Dahm et al. eds., 2002). See Griller, supra note 1, at 96, 98. See generally Anne Peters, Jenseits der Menschenrechte: Die Rechtsstellung des Individuums im Völkerrecht (2014).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Of those circles of which the larger circle includes all members of the smaller circle, see supra Figure 6.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The term “chain of validity” stems from J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System 105 (2d ed. 1980). See generally J. G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 British Yearbook of Int'l L. 66, 75 (1936); Catherine Richmond, Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European Law, 16 Law & Phil. 377, 388 (1997).Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Kelsen, , supra note 4, at 196, 221–22.Google Scholar

⁵² See id. For a critical account of the Stufenbaulehre, see, e.g., A. Jakab, Problems of the Stufenbaulehre: Kelsen's Failure to Derive the Validity of a Norm from Another Norm, 20 Canadian J. L. & Juris. 35 (2007).Google Scholar

⁵³ See Kelsen, , supra note 42, at 221; Verdross, supra note 14, at 35. Compare for criticism thereof (using the legal order of the EU as an example) Lando Kirchmair, Die autonome Rechtsordnung der EU und die Grenzen von Monismus und Dualismus, in Grenzen im Völkerrecht – Grenzen des Völkerrechts 275 (Matthias C. Kettemann ed., 2013). Also, for a comparison to the “competence-theory” of Verdross, which understands State-Sovereignty as a competence derived from international law and thereby assumes the existence of an international constitution (“völkerrechtliche Gesamtverfassung”), see Verdross, supra note 4, at 31–35. This assumption of the “Kompetenz-Kompetenz,” located at the international sphere, becomes even more clear by Verdoss's other work. See Alfred Verdross, Le fondement du droit international, 16 Recueil des Cours 247, 318 (1927). “Par conséquent, seule la compétence des États découle directement du droit international.’ And ‘Cependant, si la compétence des États est limitée par le droit des gens, la compétence de la communauté international est juridiquement illimitée; car la compétence de la compétence lui appartient.” Id. See generally ANKE Brodherr, Alfred Verdross’ Theorie des Gemäßigten Monismus 75 et seq. (2004) (discussing his “competence-theory”).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ The Holy Sea, the Red Cross, and the Order of Malta are not treated here.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Article 46 Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties:Google Scholar

1. 1.

   1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.

2. 2.

   2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.

⁵⁶ See Rensmann, Thilo, Article 46, in Vienna convention on the law of treaties – A commentary para. 33 n.86 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012). See also Mark E. Villiger, Article 46, in Commentary on the 1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties para. 8 (Mark E. Villiger ed., 2009); Georg Ress, Wechselwirkungen zwischen Völkerrecht und Verfassung bei der Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge, in Wechselwirkungen zwischen Völkerrecht und Verfassung bei der Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge 7, para. 23f n.7, 102f (Georg Ress & Christoph Schreuer eds., 1982). Also compare the commentary in the discussion of the presentation by Ress, by K. Zemanek. Id. at 101. Disputing, however, Bruno Simma. Id. at 110f. There is a reference to the “eistigen Vater […] des ILC-Entwurfs.” Id. See Special Rapporteur of the ILC to the VCLT, Waldock, YILC Bd. II, at 71, para. 6 (Mar. 19, 1965). See Luzius Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution – An International and Comparative Study 347f (1971).Google Scholar

It is rightly feared that to make the validity of agreements depend on their accord with each and every norm of constitutional law, written or customary, notorious or obscure, would gravely endanger the security of international transactions. States would feel encouraged to invoke their constitutional law to get rid of undesirable agreements or to ‘internationalize’ conflicts between municipal state organs or interest groups.

Id.

⁵⁷ Article 27 Internal law and observance of treaties. A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to Article 46. See Kirsten Schmalenbach, Article 27, in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A Commentary, para. 2 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012); Thilo Rensmann, Article 46, in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A Commentary, para. 22 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See supra note 56.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Article 14 Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance, or approval.Google Scholar

1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:Google Scholar

(a) the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification; (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification should be required; (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.Google Scholar

2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification. See, e.g., Hoffmeister Frank, Article 14, in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A Commentary para. 14 et seq. (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012). Consider the Austrian legal order (Art. 50 B-VG), which demands for all “politischen Staatsverträge und Staatsverträge, die gesetzesändernden oder gesetzesergänzenden Inhalt haben,” the composed ratification process that involves the parliament (“zusammengesetztes Verfahren”).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See generally Theo Öhlinger, Der Völkerrechtliche Vertrag im Staatlichen Recht – Eine Theoretische, Dogmatische und Vergleichende Untersuchung am Beispiel Österreichs (1973). Focus particularly on 12f. Id. at 12f.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Even though the Austrian Constitution refers to “state contracts,” this notion includes all international agreements. See id. at 103 (providing further references). Accordingly, the terms “state contract” and “international agreement” are used interchangeably.Google Scholar

⁶² See Theo Öhlinger, Art. 50 B-VG, in 2 Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht: Textsammlung und Kommentar para. 28 n.87 (Karl Korinek & Michael Holoubek eds., 2009); supra note 60 at 131 et seq.; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenfeldern, Transformation or Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law, 12 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 88, 103 (1963); Karl Zemanek, Das Völkervertragsrecht, in 1 Österreichisches Handbuch des Völkerrechts 45, 61 (Hanspeter Neuhold et al. eds., 2004).Google Scholar

⁶³ See, e.g., Griller, , supra note 46, at 352; Philipp Lindermuth, Das Recht der Staatsverträge nach der Verfassungsbereinigung – Eine verfassungsrechtliche Analyse der Neuregelung des Art. 50 B-VG durch die Novelle BGBl I 2/2008, 64 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 299, 302 (2009).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Öhlinger, supra note 62, at para. 27 n. 84.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ For a progressive analysis of the “identity” in former times, see Gunther Winkler, Der Verfassungsrang von Staatsverträgen, 10 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 514, 528f (1959/60); Orientierungen im öffentlichen Recht 51 et seq., 57 (1979); Öhlinger, supra note 60, at 166–77. Both take as a decisive criterion for the “identity” the quality of the organs involved and ignore or overlook the diverging size of the law creators' circles involved.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Öhlinger, supra note 62, at para. 43 (acknowledging the primacy of application (“Anwendungsvorrang”) of a more recent national law which is on the same rank as or a higher rank than the “integrated” treaty) This is based on the “identity” of the international and the national legal form of the international agreement. Id. See also Rudolf Thienel, Art. 48, 49 B-VG, in 2 Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht: Textsammlung und Kommentar, para. 70 (Karl Korinek & Michael Holoubek eds., 1999); Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht 258 (1899) (“Denn der jüngere Rechtssatz hebt den älteren nur dann auf, wenn er derselben oder wenn er einer höheren Rechtssetzungsgewalt entspringt, die über die Gültigkeit des älteren entscheiden kann.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ For another critical view, see Adolf J. Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht 113f (1927) (“[E]s mangelt jedoch umgekehrt zumindest dem einfachen Gesetze derogatorische Kraft gegenüber einem formellen Staatsvertrage, weil die zweiseitige Bindung nicht durch beliebigen einseitigen Akt aufgelöst werden kann.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See, e.g., Verdross & Simma supra note 46 at 550; Griller, supra note 46, at 355 (defining direct applicability [even related to the EU] as, “die innerstaatliche Geltung der einzelnen Völkerrechtsnormen […] ohne Dazwischentreten eines weiteren staatlichen Aktes' mit ‘Durchgriffswirkun'”); August Reinisch, Zur Unmittelbaren Anwendbarkeit von EWR-Recht, Zeitschrift für Europarecht, Internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung 11, 15 n.40 (1993); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 627, 632 n.27 (1986); Buergenthal, supra note 16, at 317.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Kaiser, , supra note 17, at para. 1 (“A treaty is ‘self-executing’ or ‘directly applicable’ in domestic law, when its provisions will be applied by courts or executive agencies as provisions of domestic law without the need of further legislative or administrative measures.” (internal citations omitted)). Even if Vasak subsumes two different things to the notion “self-executing,” he seems to share this notion. K. Vasak, Was bedeutet die Aussage, ein Staatsvertrag sei ‘self-executing‘? – Zum Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichtshofs vom 27.6 1960, B 469/59, 24 Juristische Blätter 352, 352 (1961).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Delbrück, supra note 48, at 263f; see also Griller, supra note 1 at 96 & 98 et seq. Google Scholar

⁷¹ In fact, such a proposal has been discussed in the Austrian Convention (in German “Österreich Konvent”). A major project on constitutional reform, which started in 2003. An extensive report has been presented on 28 January 2005. However, Article 140a B-VG has not been subject to change. For more information on the Convention, see The Austrian Convention and Constitutional Reform, Osterreich Konvent (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.konvent.gv.at/K/EN/Welcome_Portal.shtml.Google Scholar

⁷² See Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz geändert und ein erstes Bundesverfassungsrechtsbereinigungsgesetz erlassen wird (BGBl I 2008/2).Google Scholar

⁷³ If I refer to Article Q of the Hungarian Fundamental Law, I refer to the English translation of Article Q from the website of the Hungarian government. The Fundamental law of Hungary 8 (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf.Google Scholar

Article Q

1. (1)

   (1) In order to create and maintain peace and security, and to achieve the sustainable development of humanity, Hungary shall strive for cooperation with all the peoples and countries of the world.

2. (2)

   (2) In order to comply with its obligations under international law, Hungary shall ensure that Hungarian law be in conformity with international law.

3. (3)

   (3) Hungary shall accept the generally recognized rules of international law. Other sources of international law shall become part of the Hungarian legal system by promulgation in legal regulations.

4. Id.

⁷⁴ Even though regarding the previously applicable provision section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, which was adopted by Act XXXI of 1989, and was in force from 23 October 1989 to 31 December 2011, see Nóra Chronowski et al., Hungary, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems – Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion 259, 261 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011) (“Article 7(1) can only be understood and interpreted in conjunction with the decisions of the Constitutional Court.”). However, regarding treaties they understand (at least) section 7(1) as dualistic, see id. at 264. But see Peter Kovács, International law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court: Opening of a New Tendency?, in Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – Effects and Implementation 251, 253 (Anja Seibert-Fohr & Mark E. Villiger eds., 2014) (“In Article Q of the Fundamental Law however, a rather clear ‘receptionist’ version of dualism can be read.”).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Compare, for instance, the decisions 1053/E/2005 CC; 72/2006 CC; 32/2008 CC; 61/2008 CC; 143/2010 CC; However, the Hungarian Constitutional Court refers to notions such as “transformation system” and “adoption system,” which are likely to be equated with dualism and monism. This, however, is problematic because the specific reception technique does not represent or include all the theoretical assumptions that underlie dualism and monism. For an overview of the case law, see Tamás Molnár, Relationship of international Law and the Hungarian Legal System 1985-2005, in The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005, 484 et seq. (András Jakab et al. eds., 2007) (pinpointing at various monistic or dualistic tones, but there is not yet one clear reference towards one theoretical monistic or dualistic background).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Molnár, supra note 75, at 484 et seq.; Gábor Sulyok, Incorporation of International Law into Domestic Law under the Fundamental Law of Hungary, in The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal System 2010 – 2013, 31 et seq. (Péter Smuk ed., 2013).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See Decision 53/1993 CC (decided on the basis of the previously applicable provision section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, which was adopted by Act XXXI of 1989, and was in force from 23 October 1989 to 31 December 2011) interpreting this phrase (which didn't change in Article Q) as a “constitutional command.”Google Scholar

⁷⁸ International Law Act.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ This is also supported by the case law of the Constitutional Court 4/1997 (I.4), which ruled that even a (lower ranked) government decree, which was “promulgating” an international treaty might remain in force against a subsequent legislation of parliament. See Molnár, supra note 75, at 484 (criticizing the fact that the Constitutional Court ruled that it should remain within his discretion whether the “transformed” act shall prevail or not).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See, e.g., Sulyok, , supra note 76, at 31 et seq. Google Scholar

⁸¹ See, e.g., Molnár, supra note 75, at 484 et seq. Google Scholar

⁸² Also highlighting the authorization, see Béla Pokol, Értelmi konkretizálás: Az Alaptörvény alkotmánybírósági értelmezésének vitái, 3 Jogelméleti Szemle 71 et seq. (2013). I am grateful to Tamás Molnár for this reference.Google Scholar

⁸³ I use the term “reception” in a neutral understanding without referring to a specific theory such as monism or dualism.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ If ius cogens norms are to be understood as an independent source of international law, which is possible to argue—though not without controversy.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See discussion supra Part C.IV.1–3.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See Act L of 2005, art. 10(1), 12.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See, e.g., Sulyok, , supra note 76, at 31 et seq. Google Scholar

⁸⁸ But see Act L of 2005, art. 13; 53/1993 CC (X.13); 4/1997 CC (I.4).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Act L of 2005 on the procedure regarding treaties.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See supra note 79.Google Scholar

⁹¹ For instance, the parliament in case of a “treaty of outstanding importance to the foreign relations of the Republic of Hungary” according to Article 7 (1)(a) Act L of 2005.Google Scholar

⁹² See Act L of 2005, art. 10 (3)–(4)Google Scholar

⁹³ See supra Part C.IV.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.26–27 (Vienna, May 23, 1969) (ratifying Articles 26 and 27 by Hungary on 19 June 1987).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court. For an English translation see Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court (2011), http://www.mkab.hu/download.php?d=64.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See supra Part C.VI.3.2.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ For a detailed argumentation of the original defect of both theories, see Kirchmair, supra note 53, at 281. For criticism of the territoriality of both theories, see Catherine Brölmann, Deterritorialization in International Law: Moving Away from the Divide Between National and International Law, in New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law 84 et seq. (Janne Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2007).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See, e.g., Kirchmair, , supra note 2.Google Scholar