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Theorizing Transnational Law – Varieties of Transnational Law and the Universalistic Stance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Matthias Mahlmann

Extract

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It is difficult to put a label on a historical period. Human history is full of variety, complexities and contradictory developments. Consequently, the precondition of grand theories of history is often their openness to unjustified simplification. On the other hand, some orientation is indispensable, and for this, general descriptions are helpful if one stays aware of their limited function and value. With this in mind it is possible to state that the post-war period is marked by what one may call a universalistic stance.

Type
GLJ@TEN – Theorizing Transnational Law
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 10 , Issue 10: Contributions to the German Law Journal's 10th Anniversary Symposium “The Transnationalization of Legal Cultures” , 01 October 2009 , pp. 1325 - 1336
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by German Law Journal GbR 

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