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² See Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, Säkularität und Verfassung, in Verfassungstheorie § 5, pp. 3–4 (Otto Depenheuer & Christoph Grabenwarter eds., 2010).Google Scholar

³ See for the originally imperialist roots of legal extraterritoriality Turan Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty And Extraterritoriality In Japan, The Ottoman Empire, and China (2014); Chen Li, Chinese Law in Imperial Eyes: Sovereignty, Justice, and Transcultural Politics 29–68 (2015); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism (2013). Another concept of aggressive hyper-territorialisation is the wider sphere of influence (Großraumtheorie) presented by Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnungmit Intervention für raumfremde Mächte (3d ed. 1941). In fact, this is a concept aimed at overcoming of territorial jurisdictions and establishing a hierarchy of powers.Google Scholar

⁴ Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, Die Ordnungsfunktion der Staatsgrenze: Demokratizität, Liberalität und Territorialität im Kontext, in Der Staat in der Flüchtlingskrise. Zwischen gutem Willen und geltendem Recht 105, 107–08 (Otto Depenheuer & Christoph Grabenwarter eds., 2016).Google Scholar

⁵ Acquisition of nationality by ius sanguinis is—despite common contention—not an expression of ethnicity but of parental continuity. The German Federal Constitutional Court convincingly argued that the attribution of nationality by birth is necessary to protect the unity of the family, which is protected by Article 6 (1) Grundgesetz, and would be seriously hampered if parents and children did not share at least one nationality. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1 BvL 22/71, 21/72, May 5, 2974, 1 BvL 22/71, 21/72, in 37 BVerfGE 217, 247; Peter Michael Huber & Kirsten Butzke, Das neue Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht und sein verfassungsrechtliches Fundament, 52 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2769, 2771 (1999); Burkhardt Ziemske Die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit nach dem Grundgesetz 289 (1995) Anyone can hand down one's own nationality to her/his descendants irrespective of origin, culture, religion or ethnicity. E. g., if a Pakistani citizen is naturalized in Germany this week and gives birth to a child next week, under the current ius sanguinis (Sec. 4 German Citizenship Act) model the child would be German without any difference in right and status. It is a different discussion whether the dichotomy of social and economic inclusion and democratic-political exclusion should be overcome by disconnecting citizenship from nationality or encouraging naturalization. See Ruth Rubio-Marin, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge 99–129 (2000).Google Scholar

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⁷ Of course, there have always been attempts to abuse the concept of territoriality to redraw territorial boundaries by tracing ethnic settlement structures to exclude members of purportedly ‘alien’ ethnicity, and, thus, implicitly defining borders on racist concepts. Cf. Rosen, Deborah A., Border Law - The Fist Seminole War and American Nationhood 158–84 (2015). The bloody history of the secession wars on former Yugoslavian soil are the latest example of ethnic re-territorialisation. For the intricate blending of Montesquieu's theory of the particularity of legal culture and racist concepts of supremacy, see Kroncke, Jedidiah Joseph, The Futility of Law and Development: China and the Dangers of Exporting American Law 40–41 (2016). For the discriminating territoriality within the British Empire, see Gosewinkel, Dieter, Schutz und Freiheit? Staatsbürgerschaft in Europa im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert 83–97, 637 (2016). In contrast, modern models of “territorial pluralism” try to federalize conflicts in territorially concentrated communities. Cf. John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary & Richard Simeon, Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? 41, 63–67 (2008, Sujit Choudhry, ed.).Google Scholar

⁸ Paolo Novak, Back to Borders, in Critical Sociology (forthcoming 2016).Google Scholar

⁹ Of course, oversized states need additional mechanisms to enable democratic ruling and prevent drifting off into tyranny. Federalism can be a solution, if the right sentiment is met. Yet, external boundaries remain a prerequisite of any internal order.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Compare Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution 215 (2014). He argues that cosmopolitan complexity furthers tendencies to strengthen the executive branch, which can use superior knowledge and stave off the public by pointing to the inherent complexity of the subject matter.Google Scholar

¹¹ David Miller, On Nationality 179–80 (1995).Google Scholar

¹² In particular Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09, in 123 BVerfGE 267, 343–47, 350, 353–55, 381 (“Lissabon”).Google Scholar

¹³ Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality 46 (2009).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See, e.g., Burger, Hannelore, Passwesen und Staatsbürgerschaft, in Grenze und Staat 1, 91 (Waltraud Heindl & Edith Saurer eds., 2000).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, e.g.,. Nehal Bhuta, The Frontiers of Extraterritoriality - Human Rights Law as Global Law, in The Frontiers of Human Rights 1, 2–9 (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Lena Laube, Postsouveräne Räume: Makroterritorien und die Exterritorialisierung der europäischen Grenzpolitik, in Postsouveräne Territorialität – Die Europäische Union und ihr Raum 169, 171–81 (Ulrike Jureit & Nikola Tietze eds., 2015); Steffen Mau, Heike Brabandt, Lena Laube & Christof Roos, Liberal States and the Freedom of Movement: Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility 88–120 (2012).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ulrike Jureit & Nikola Tietze, Postsouveräne Territorialität, in Postsouveräne Territorialität – Die Europäische Union und ihr Raum 7–24 (Ulrike Jureit & Nikola Tietze eds. 2015) (providing with further references).Google Scholar

¹⁸ H. Patrick Glenn, The Cosmopolitan State 84–85 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Lucidly developed by Anuscheh Farahat, Progressive Inklusion 141 et seq. (2014). See also the proposals by Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States 189–200 (2007).Google Scholar

²⁰ Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics 21 (2000).Google Scholar

²¹ And where the model was and is imitated, the consequences are often disturbing.Google Scholar

²² Attempts to imitate 19th century European nationalism in Asia follow different paths and ideologies, in particular, in culturally, ethnically, and linguistically diversified countries like India and China.Google Scholar

²³ Uwe Volkmann, Grund und Grenzen der Toleranz, in 39 Der Staat 25, 352 (2000).Google Scholar

²⁴ It is still too early to say whether the disturbing revival of cloudy nationalism and the political pressure of right wing populism in many European countries—in particular, as a reaction to the growing numbers of refugees — poses a countermovement that has enough impetus to influence democratic practices and legislation.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Choudhry, Sujit, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? 3, 30–31 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); See Miller, supra note 11, p. 81–195.Google Scholar

²⁶ Gosewinkel, supra note 7, at 636–38. The traditional correlation of protection and authority is clearly expressed in Article 1 A (2) of the Refugee Convention, which defines a refugee, inter alia, as a person that “is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” G.A. Res. 429(V) Convention Relating to the status of Refugees (Dec. 14, 1951).Google Scholar

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²⁸ These categorical legal—not necessarily moral—differences are often blurred in public discourse when all foreigners are labelled “refugee.” Critical remarks by Christian Hillgruber, Flüchtlingsschutz oder Arbeitsmigration — Über die Notwendigkeit und die Konsequenzen einer Unterscheidung, in Der Staat in der Flüchtlingskrise. Zwischen gutem Willen und geltendem Recht 185–94 (Otto Depenheuer & Christoph Grabenwarter eds., 2016).Google Scholar

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³⁰ See, e.g., Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, Official Journal (Drucksache) 16/12588; BMI-Fact Sheet zur Durchsetzung der Ausreisepflicht (Abschiebung), https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/2016/07/factsheet-abschiebungen.html (11.11.2016); Eckart Lohse, Ablehnen ist einfacher als abschieben, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/fluechtlingskrise-ablehnen-ist-einfacher-als-abschieben-13909297.html (11.11.2016).Google Scholar

³¹ Sec. 60(7), Sec. 60a Residence Act [Aufenthaltsgesetz].Google Scholar

³² Shachar, supra note 13, at 137.Google Scholar

³³ Ulrich Becker & Jens Kersten, Demokratie als optimistische Staatsform, in 35 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 580, 584 (2016); Otto Depenheuer, Zwischen staatlicher Souveränität und Menschenrecht. Grundfragen staatlicher Einwanderungpolitik, in Festschrift für Georg Brunner 46, 57, 59 (2001); Gärditz, supra note 6, at 121–22; Thomas Groß, Postnationale Demokratie—Gibt es ein Menschenrecht auf transnationale Selbstbestimmung?, in 2 Rechtswissenschaft 125, 139–42 (2011).Google Scholar

³⁴ See, e.g., Gosewinkel, supra note 7, at 631; David Miller, Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship, in 16 J. Pol. Phil. 371–90 (2008).Google Scholar

³⁵ Phrase used by Shachar, supra note 13, at 134.Google Scholar

³⁶ See, e.g., Shachar, Ayelet, Citizenship, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 1002, 1018 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).Google Scholar

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³⁸ See, e.g., Volkmann, Uwe, Der Flüchtling vor den Toren der Gemeinschaft, in 49 Kritische Justiz 180, 190 (2016).Google Scholar

³⁹ This is the focus of the critique by Sofia Näsström, The Legitimacy of the People, 35 Political Theory 624, 647–50 (2007).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For an excellent overview of the European discussion, see Volkmann, supra note 36, at 183–90.Google Scholar

⁴¹ David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice 226–228 (2007).Google Scholar

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⁴³ Such effects can occur when immigration meets strong resistance and nourishes an anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic sentiment (internal de-democratization) or when the immigrants import antidemocratic sentiments from their societies. Both effect, which apparently occur, are not easily attributable: The refugee is neither responsible for xenophobic response nor for political misconceptions of numerous fellow-refugees. Nonetheless, a political order can take these effects seriously and try to restrict asylum or immigration rights to avoid political tensions a democratic society is probably unable to bear.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Shachar, supra note 13, at 137.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Becker & Kersten, supra note 33, at 582.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Joseph h. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration 283 (2013).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Volkmann, supra note 36, at 182. See also Ruhs, Martin, The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration 187–200 (2015). He demonstrates that states that bestow migrants with strong and effective rights tend to restrict entry, while those countries that prefer relatively open borders, in particular, for cheap workers tend to be reluctant to grant social entitlements. Even if exploitation of workers shall not be a political option for a liberal democracy, the conflict of interests is fairly illustrated. And even immigration countries can follow disparate strategies how to reconcile border control and immigrant rights. Regarding Canada, see Anderson, Christopher G., Canadian Liberalism and the Politics of Border Control (2013).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Naive denial by Carens, supra note 46, at 276.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Volkmann, supra note 36, at 188.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Id. at 188.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Dana Schmalz, Rezension, 49 Kritische Justiz 260, 262 (2016); Volkmann, supra note 36, at 191–92.Google Scholar

⁵² Notwithstanding a popular misconception, moral constraints conceptually cannot threaten legal sovereignty of states. Carens, supra note 46, at 273.Google Scholar

⁵³ Näsström, supra note 39, at 650.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ For a pragmatic and optimistic concept, see Benhabib, Seyla, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Citizens and Residents (2004).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Seyla Benhabib, Democracy, Demography, and Sovereignty, 2 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 1, 4 (2008).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Critically commented by Günter Frankenberg, Flüchtlingsabwehr oder Flüchtlingsschutz?, 49 Kritische Justiz 145, 147–48 (2016).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Udo Di Fabio, Sicherheit in Freiheit, 61 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 421 (2008); Christoph Möllers, Demokratie – Zumutungen und Versprechen 81 (2008).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Regulation No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, 2013 O.J. (L 180) at 31.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Compare Gerrit Hellmuth Stumpf, Der Ruf nach der „Rückkehr zum Recht“ bei der Bewältigung der Flüchtlingskrise, 69 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 357–68 (2016).Google Scholar

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⁶¹ Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz [Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act] of October 20, 2015, Bundesgesetzblatt I at 1722.Google Scholar

⁶² See, e.g., Möllers, supra note 57, at 68–69 (noting that democratic systems tend to be bureaucratic).Google Scholar

⁶³ Becker & Kersten, supra note 33, at 584.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Energetically advocated by Carens, supra note 46, at 225–54. Instead, Somek, supra note 10, at 209–16, illustrates the ambivalence of open borders which socially privileges some and puts others at a disadvantage.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Shachar, supra note 13.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ For the inherent value of pragmatic realism in refugee affairs, see Snyder, Jack, Realism, Refugees and Strategic Humanitarianism, in Refugees in International Relations (Alexander Betts & Gil Loescher eds., 2011).Google Scholar

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⁶⁸ Farahat, supra note 19.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Shachar, supra note 13, at 164–90.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See id. at 138. She argues that “citizenship laws, which mark the literal delineation between insider and outsider, member and nonmember, have coercive effects.” Thus, those feeling coercive authority should participate in the process of rulemaking. This idealistic position has its flaws, too. As long as democratic self-determination prevails, there is always membership and non-membership, rules practically affecting those who are not part of a body politic. Even if the border shifts from nationality-based citizenship to (permanent or more than temporary) residency, there will be borders. Her proposed ius nexi (p. 164 et seq.) also needs a body politic (with members) who allow a nexus to be established and to define what kind or degree of nexus shall be sufficient.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Gosewinkel, supra note 7, at 648–50.Google Scholar

⁷² See Gärditz, supra note 6, at 51–88.Google Scholar

⁷³ Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 52, 62 (1983).Google Scholar