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Substantive Legitimate Expectations in South African and European Administrative Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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The doctrine of legitimate expectation was authoritatively accepted as part of South African administrative law in the landmark case of Administrator, Transvaal v Traub in 1989. In that case Chief Justice Corbett extended the scope of application of the rules of natural justice, specifically the audi principle, beyond the traditional “liberty, property and existing rights” formula to cases where something less than an existing right, a legitimate expectation, required a fair procedure to be followed. This acceptance followed the trend in other Commonwealth jurisdictions to extend the application of the rules of natural justice and hence afford greater procedural protection to individuals affected by administrative decisions. Although Chief Justice Corbett expressly stated that the content of the expectation may be substantive or procedural in nature, the protection of that expectation, if found to be legitimate, was exclusively procedural. Since the Traub decision, the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been deeply entrenched in South African administrative law to extend the scope of procedural rights afforded individuals affected by administrative action. It is now an established principle of South African administrative law that a person, who has a legitimate expectation, flowing from an express promise by an administrator or a regular administrative practice, has a right to be heard before administrative action affecting that expectation is taken. The doctrine, has however, by and large, remained one that provides procedural protection in South Africa. In a number of recent decisions by South African courts, ranging from the High Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, there have been increasing calls for the application of legitimate expectations beyond procedural claims.

Type
European & International Law
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A).Google Scholar

2 For a discussion of this development see Hoexter, Cora, The New Constitutional Administrative Law Volume 2, 209 (2002); Devenish, G E et al., Administrative Law and Justice in South Africa, 307 (2001); Hlophe, John, Legitimate Expectation and Natural Justice: English, Australian, and South African Law, 104 SALJ 165 (1987).Google Scholar

3 The audi alteram partem principle, which in its most basic form requires the administrator to afford affected parties the right to be heard before taking a decision which would adversely affect them.Google Scholar

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5 Id. 754G – 761D where Corbett CJ examines the development of the doctrine in English law and also refers to the acceptance of the doctrine in Australia and New Zealand.Google Scholar

6 Id. 758D: The expectation may be that the individual will acquire some substantive benefit, such as a license, that is a substantive expectation, or simply that the individual will be heard before a decision is taken, that is a procedural expectation. Corbett CJ also notes that the two forms of expectation may even merge, Id. 758E.Google Scholar

7 Id. 761E, 764A.Google Scholar

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11 Craig, P.P., Administrative Law, 611 (1999). The labels substantive and procedural in this context refers to the relief that the legitimate expectation entitles the individual to as opposed to the content of the expectation, which, at least in procedural legitimate expectation instances may be either substantive or procedural in nature, see note 6.Google Scholar

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130 See paragraph 1 note 1 above.Google Scholar

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137 Note 68 supra. See the discussion of that case in paragraphs 0 to 0 above.Google Scholar

138 As was suggested by Brand JA in Meyer v Iscor Pension fund, Id., and as illustrated by Corbet JA in the Traub case, note 1 supra, when he accepted the doctrine of legitimate expectation as part of South African law.Google Scholar

139 Supra note 68. See the discussion of that case in paragraphs 0 to 0 above.Google Scholar

140 Supra note 102. See the discussion in paragraph 0 above.Google Scholar

141 See paragraph 0 above.Google Scholar

142 See paragraph 0 above.Google Scholar

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