This note has been written within the framework of a research project on the Law of European Integration (IAP 4/04) funded by the Belgian Federal Government and jointly carried out by the Universities of Liège, Ghent and Brussels (ULB).Google Scholar

Speech of Foreign Minister J. Fischer at the European Parliament on 12 January 1999, see Bulletin der Bundesregierung 2/1999, 9.Google Scholar

See, e.g. Hoyer, W., ‘Europa braucht eine Verfassung’, Die Welt (11 February 1999); E. Teufel, ‘Regierungserklärung zu aktuellen Perspektiven der Europapolitik’, Plenarprotokoll 12/65, 5109 at 5111 (28 April 1999); W. Schäuble/K. Lamers, Europa braucht einen Verfassungsvertrag, FAZ of 4 May 1999; J. Rau, Die Quelle der Legitimation deutlich machen. Eine föderale Verfassung für Europa, FAZ of 4 November 1999; K. Kinkel, ‘Eine Verfassung tut not’, Rheinischer Merkur of 24 December 1999 – Rejecting the idea of a constitution for Europe: E. Stoiber, ‘Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?', Die Welt of 26 January 1999 and R. Scholz, ‘Zu früh für eine Verfassung', Die Welt of 19 February 1999.Google Scholar

See C. Dorau/P. Jacobi, ‘The Debate over a “European Constitution”: Is it Solely a German Concern?‘, 6 (2000) European Public Law 413–428.Google Scholar

This became particulary clear in the case of the French Prime Minister when he tried, during several months, to ignore the matter.Google Scholar

See e.g. the Internet site ‘Futurum’ at http://www.eiz-niedersachsen.de/. This site contained in August 2001 not only 27 contributions from Germany but also contributions from Belgium (7), France (5), Italy, The Netherlands, Austria and Portugal (each 3), from Sweden, the UK, Greece (each 2), Spain, Ireland (each 1). One can find there also statements from some candidate countries (as from the Czech Republic, Poland, Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lituania and Lettland).Google Scholar

Case 294/83 Les Verts/Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 at 23. This formula has become well-established case law, see Case C-2/88 Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365 at 16; Opinion 1/91 EEA I [1991] ECR I-6079 at 21 (‘the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law‘).Google Scholar

See point 3 of the Declaration: ‘… the Conference calls for a deeper and wider debate about the future of the Union. IN 2001, the Swedish and the Belgian Presidencies, in cooperation with the Commission and involving the European Parliament, will encourage wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties: representatives of national parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion, namely political economic and university circles, representatives of civil society, etc. The candidate states will be associated with this process in ways to be defined.‘Google Scholar

22 BVerfGE 293 at 296.Google Scholar

Most prominently two ex-judges of the German Federal Constitutional Court, P. Kirchhof (most recently in an article published in the Handelsblatt of 8 August 2001) and D. Grimm (see, e.g. ‘Does Europe need a constitution?’ (1995) European Law Journal 282 et seq.); see also C. Koenig, ‘Ist die Europäische Union verfassungsfähig?', (1998) Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 268 et seq.Google Scholar

See on this point e.g. C. Dorau/P. Jacobi, ‘The Debate over a “European Constitution”: Is it Solely a German Concern?‘, 6 (2000) European Public Law, l.c.Google Scholar

See hereto also M. Zuleeg's contribution in 2 Germ. L. J. (2001), number 14, 1 September 2001.Google Scholar

They have successfully made ‘prophylactic use’ of the veto power, which Article 23 BL confers to the Bundesrat at national level in the ratification process, which all Treaty amendments have to stand pursuant to Art. 48 EU. On the influence the Länder had on the previous IGC 1996/97 see K. H. Goetz, ‘Integration Policy in a Europeanised State: Germany and the Intergovernmental Conference’, 3 (1996) Journal of European Public Policy 40 et seq. and, most recently C. Mazzucelli, ‘Much Ado about Amsterdam: CDU/CSU Politics, Länder Influence and EU Treaty Reform’, 2 Germ. L. J. (2001), number 14, 1 September 2001 (http://www.germanlawjournal.com).Google Scholar

In fact, it appears that the Länder's aim was essentially about avoiding the application of the Community's competition and state aid rules in fields covered by their ‘public economy’ (Daseinsvorsorge) and to get back the competence in the field of regional policy. See the debate in the Bundesrat of 4 February 2000 (Stenographischer Bericht der 747. Bundesratssitzung at 1 et seq.) and Resolutions of 4 February 2000 (Bundesrats-Drucksache 61/00, I.2.) and 10 November 2000 (Bundesrats-Drucksache 680/00). See also the Resolution of the Länder's Prime Ministers of 24/25 March 2000 (Europa-Archiv Nr. 165, Mai 2000, II.2.).Google Scholar

Some require, e.g., the repealment of Articles 95 and 308 EC (see for such a proposal W. Clement, Prime Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen, in a speech delivered on 12 February 2001 at the ‘Forum Constitutionis Europae’ of the Walter Hallstein Institute [Humboldt University Berlin], availaible under http://www.nrw.de/aktuell/reden/mskr20010212_f.htm). However, no valuable proposals have been made in order to cope with the negative consequences such a repealment would imply with respect to the functioning of the internal market and which, we submit, even Mr Clement would not accept.Google Scholar

See e.g. the proposals made by I. Pernice, ‘The European Constitution’ (Paper presented at the 16th Sinclair House Talks in Bad-Homburg, May 2001).Google Scholar

See on this the Report from the European University Institute on the reorganisation of the European Treaties http://www.iue.it/RSC/Treaties.html Google Scholar

See for a comparative analysis D. Hanf, Bundesstaat ohne Bundesrat? (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1999).Google Scholar

Examples are e.g. Arts. 72 (2) and 106 (4) BL in their original version ('Einheitlichkeit der Lebensverhältnisse') or the ‘interstate-commerce-clause’ of the US-Constitution.Google Scholar

‘[E]stablish[ing] … a more precise delimitation’ appears to exclude a renationalisation of EC competences.Google Scholar

For an account of this ‘dialogue’ see e.g. D. Hanf, ‘Le jugement de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande sur la constitutionnalité du Traité de Maastricht. Un nouveau chapitre des relations entre le droit communautaire et le droit national’, (1994) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 391 et seq. (with references).Google Scholar

BVerfG, 2 BvR 1210/98, EuGRZ 2000, 175 et seq. (Alcan) and BVerfG 2 BvL 1/97, EuGRZ 2000, 328 et seq. (Banana).Google Scholar

See e.g. another former judge at the Federal Constitutional Court, E.W: Böckenförde, ‘Welchen Weg geht Europa?‘ (Siemens Stiftung, Munich 1997).Google Scholar

On this see the convincing study of A. Beierwaltes, Sprachenvielfalt in der EU – Grenze einer Demokratisierung? (Discussion Paper C 5/1998 of the Centre for European Integration Studies Bonn).Google Scholar

A classical example proving the contrary is Belgium.Google Scholar

A particularly striking example being the German Länder who have converted themselves, during the last decade into real ‘European players’, which also start to cooperate together with ‘constitutional regions’ of other Member States (see: ‘Politische Erklärung der konstitutionellen Regionen Bayern, Katalonien, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Salzburg, Schottland, Wallonien und Flandern’ of 28 Mai 2001 at http://www.eiz-niedersachsen.de/cgi-bin/frameset.pl?page=futurum/index.htm&title=EIZ Niedersachsen>).).>Google Scholar

E.g. the various consumer protection associations, NGOs, (as negative but striking example) the recent ‘anti-globalisation’ manifestations or — why not? — the European Parliament.Google Scholar

Habermas, J., ‘Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung? Nur als politisches Gemeinwesen kann der Kontinent seine in Gefahr geratene Kultur und Lebensform verteidigen’, DIE ZEIT of 29 June 2001; see the commentary by Felix Arndt, Habermas and the Preservation of European Modernity: Defining the Challenge. For a European Constitution, in: 2 Germ. L. J. (2001), Number 14, 1 September 2001 (http://www.germanlawjournal.com).Google Scholar

Which explains the proposal made recently by I. Pernice (l.c.9 to establish a ‘Parliamentary Subsidiarity Committee’ composed by members of the national parliaments and the EP.Google Scholar

This is notably the case in the UK and Denmark.Google Scholar

“Für Gefühlsstarke”, FAZ of 1 August 2001 (http://www.gouvernement.lu/gouv/fr/doss/discour/juncker.html).Google Scholar

See e.g. A. von Bogdandy, The Euro is Forcing the Realization of Political Union — and Perhaps a New Community, in: 2 Germ. L. J. (2001), number 14, 1 September 2001 (http://www.germanlawjournal.com), and J. Habermas, l.c. This approach has also been chosen by the French Prime Minister L. Jospin in its Speech of 28 May 2001 (Maison de la Radio, Paris).Google Scholar

This becomes again apparent in the recent ECJ's case law related to the law of social security.Google Scholar

Seeon this J.C. Juncker's speech, l.c.Google Scholar

See on this A. von Bogdandy's contribution, supra note 31.Google Scholar

Speech of 28 May 2001, l.c.Google Scholar

This applies also to foreign affairs and defense policy. The reader may wonder that no particular reference is made here to this policy field. This is due to our conviction that foreign affairs and defense policy are not necessarily an element of a future political union or a European constitution. On this point see the arguments put forward by A. von Bogdandy, supra note 31.Google Scholar

On this subject see the recent book of B. De Witte/D. Hanf/E. Vos (eds.), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia, Antwerp 2001).Google Scholar

In particular by ‘differentiating’ not only the Council in case of closer cooperation but also the EP.Google Scholar

See the recent study carried out by the European University Institute on the possible reforms of the Treaties' Amendment Procedures at: http://www.iue/RSC/Treaties.html.Google Scholar

See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 200 (29 August 2001).Google Scholar