¹ Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), 2002 O.J. (L108/33), hereinafter referred to as “Framework Directive.”Google Scholar

² Both drafts are available for download from the WWW at <http://www.tkrecht.de/index.php4?direktmodus=novelle-genese>..>Google Scholar

³ Framework Directive, supra note 1, at Article 15 (3).Google Scholar

⁴ Id. at Article 16 (2)-(4).Google Scholar

⁵ Id., at Article 16 (4).Google Scholar

⁶ Huppertz, C., Die SMP-Konzeption 210 (2003), calls the examination whether the market is effectively competitive – that is, Article 16 (2) of the Framework Directive – the “actual market analysis”.Google Scholar

⁷ Casa Fleischhandels-GmbH v. Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, 1989 E.C.R. 2789 (2808), para. 31; J.-D. Braun/R. Capito, “The Framework Directive”, in, EC Competition and Telecommunications Law 309 (C. Koenig et al. eds., 2002); J. Gaster, Zur anstehenden Umsetzung der EG-Datenbankrichtlinie (II), 1997 Computer und Recht 717, 719); Koenig, C. & Neumann, A., Gemeinsame Infrastrukturnutzung beim Aufbau eines UMTS-Netzwerks und das Gebot ‘Wettbewerblicher Unabhängigkeit', 2001 Kommunikation & Recht 281 (288); B. Wegener in Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag 220 EC, para. 14 (2^nd ed., Calliess, C. & Ruffert, M. eds., 2002), Article. See also Röder-Messell, E., Alkohol-Freiheit – wesentlicher Aspekt der Warenverkehrsfreiheit auch im Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, inFestschrift für Christian Celsen 28 (Koch, A. & Neumann, A. eds., 2001).Google Scholar

⁸ See Koenig, C. et al., Funktionsfähiger Wettbewerb auf den Telekommunikationsmärkten 120 (2002); Vogelsang, I. et al., 'Workable Competition’ in Telecommunications Markets – The Example of Germany, 2003 C.T.L.R. 68 (71).Google Scholar

⁹ See also Capito, R. & Elspaß, M., Die Auswahl des Betreibers und der neue Rechtsrahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für die Märkte der elektronischen Kommunikation, [2003] Kommunikation & Recht 110 (114); C. Huppertz, supra note 6, at 219; C. Koenig, supra note 8, at 162; I. Vogelsang, supra note 8, at 73; R. Schütz et al., Elektronische Kommunikation 45 (2003);. R. Klotz, Die neuen EU-Richtlinien über elektronische Kommunikation: Annäherung der sektorspezifischen Regulierung an das allgemeine Kartellrecht, 2003 1 Supplement to Kommunikation & Recht 3 (7 note 48), incorrectly assumes that a different view was held by C. Koenig et al.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Capito, R. & Elspaß, M., supra note 9, at 114; S. Farr & V. Oakley, EU Communications Law 69 (2002); C. Huppertz, supra note 6, at 212. This does not necessarily comply with other uses of the term “effective competition” in the Community's body of law. Such uses are analysed, inter alia, by Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7, at 323.Google Scholar

¹¹ See also Bartosch, A., Europäisches Telekommunikationsrecht in den Jahren 2000 und 2001, 2002 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 389 (393), in practice, the market analysis would directly and only aim to identify SMP undertakings.Google Scholar

¹² Framework Directive, supra note 1, at Article 16 (4). See also Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002 O.J. (C 165/6) (“Guidelines”), at para. 114. Cf. Cave, M. & Prosperetti, L., European Telecommunications Infrastructures, 17 (3) Oxford Rev. of Econ. Policy 416,428 2001; R. Klotz, supra note 9, at 7; C. Koenig et al., Die Novellierung des Telekommunikationsgesetzes 13 (2003); C. Koenig et al.,supra note 8, at note 583; J. Scherer, Die Umgestaltung des europäischen und deutschen Telekommunikationsrechts durch das EU-Richtlinienpaket – Teil I, [2002] Kommunikation & Recht 273 (286). A different view is held by Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 239; Immenga, U. & Kirchner, C., Zur Neugestaltung des deutschen Telekommunikationsrechts, 2002 Telekommunikations- & Medienrecht 340 (355).Google Scholar

¹³ Recital 25 of the Framework Directive. See also Guidelines, supra note 12, at para. 70; A. Bartosch, supra note 11, at 391; Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7, at 313; S. Farr & V. Oakley,supra note 10, at 70; C. Huppertz, supra note 6, at 195; U. Immenga, Europäisierung des Telekommunikationsrechts: Eine neue Dimension, 2002 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 673 (673); Immenga, U. & Kirchner, C., supra note 12, at 343; R. Klotz, Wettbewerb in der Telekommunikation: Brauchen wir die ex-ante-Regulierung noch?, 2003 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht 283 (292); P. Oberndörfer, Die Zugangsverpflichtungen von nicht marktbeherrschenden Mobilfunknetzbetreibern nach dem Referentenentwurf zur Novelle des TKG, 2003 Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 654 (655).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 161.Google Scholar

¹⁵ control, Merger, in principle, aims to prevent the creation of a position of dominance, see Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7, at 332., with further references. See also C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at note 607.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See also Basedow, J., Dienstleistungsmonopole und Netzzugang in der europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung, 1997 16 Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 121 (126); Koenig, C. & Loetz, S., Bedeutung der Essential facilities-Doktrin für den Zugang zu Netzinfrastrukturen im europäischen Telekommunikationsrecht, 2000 Europäisches Wirtschafts- & Steuerrecht 377 (381); C. Koeniget al., supra note 8, at 161, with further references ibid, at note 604.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 16. See also Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7), at 332. Therefore, some statements in the Market Recommendation seem to be rather questionable, see, for example, its fifteenth recital which implicates that “restoring effective competition” is a goal of sector-specific regulation; the same holds true with regard to the reference to a tendency “towards effective competition” in the ninth recital of the recommendation. See also European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum (2003), at p. 15 (“A key aim of the … regulatory framework is to enhance user and consumer benefits … by promoting and ensuring effective competition.” emphasis added). The Explanatory Memorandum can be downloaded at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/maindocs/documents/explanmemoen.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Klotz, R., supra note 9, at 3; idem, supra note 13, at 291; P. Oberndörfer, supra note 13, at 654.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The more serious the market dominance is, the more difficult will this compensation be, see C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 204; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 69-70.Google Scholar

²⁰ C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 56 and 61; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 69; I. Vogelsang, Ökonomische Aspekte des Referentenentwurfs zum TKG, 2003 Multimedia und Recht 509 (509). See also Immenga, U. & Kirchner, C., supra note 12, at 355. A different view seems to be held by Schütz, R. et al., supra note 9, at 45.Google Scholar

²¹ See, e.g., I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at note 16, with regard to economies of scale.Google Scholar

²² Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 90; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 70.Google Scholar

²³ See also Kirchner, C., Europäische Regulierung der Telekommunikationsmärkte – Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Regulierung von elektronischen Kommunikationsnetzen und -diensten, in U. Immenga et al., Telekommunikation im Wettbewerb 129 (2001); R. Klotz, supra note 13, at 286, who rightly points out that sector-specific regulation should aim to achieve a durable self-sustaining competition.Google Scholar

²⁴ Klotz, R., Der Referentenentwurf zum TKG im Lichte der europarechtlichen Vorgaben, 2003 Multimedia und Recht 495 (497).Google Scholar

²⁵ Koenig, C. & Kühling, J., Reformansätze des deutschen Telekommunikationsrechts in rechtsvergleichender Perspektive, 2001 Multimedia und Recht 80 (85); C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 128, with further references ibid, at note 450.Google Scholar

²⁶ In similar vein Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 191 and 196.Google Scholar

²⁷ Directive, Framework, supra note 1, at Article 15 (2).Google Scholar

²⁸ Id. at Article 15 (4).Google Scholar

²⁹ Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services, 2003 O.J. (L 114/45), hereinafter referred to as “Market Recommendation”.Google Scholar

³⁰ See, e.g., Farr, S. & Oakley, V., supra note 10, at 13.Google Scholar

³¹ Directive, Framework, supra note 1, at Article 15 (4).Google Scholar

³² See Article 249 (5) of the EC Treaty. Cf. Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 193; Husch, G. et al., Die Umsetzung des EU-Rechtsrahmens für elektronische Kommunikation: Ein erster Überblick, 2003 Multimedia und Recht 139 (141); R. Klotz, supra note 13, at 290. See also Cosma, H. A. & Whish, R., Soft Law in the Field of EU Competition Policy, 2003 EBLR 25 (37 and 48), for a discussion of recommendations as form of “soft law”.Google Scholar

³³ Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7, at 346; Koenig, C. & Haratsch, A., Europarecht 102 (4^th ed., 2003). The binding force that constitutes the Member States’ duty to take recommendations into consideration therefore stems from Article 10 of the EC Treaty and not from the recommendation; the contents of the recommendation are in no way binding.Google Scholar

³⁴ Salvatore Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407 (4421), para. 18. See also Cosma, H. A. & Whish, R., supra note 32, at 48. Note quite accurate insofar A. Bartosch, supra note 11, at 392, according to whom the ECJ had ruled that national authorities were not only to take recommendations into account but also to “follow them”.Google Scholar

³⁵ See supra note 34.Google Scholar

³⁶ Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7, at 346.Google Scholar

³⁷ Koenig, C./Loetz, S./Neumann, A., supra note 12, at 26.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Koenig, C. et al., supra note 12), at note 68, with regard to a similar provision in the German constitution. A more far-reaching view seems to be held by Ladeur, K.-H., Europäisches Telekommunikationsrecht im Jahre 2001, [2002] Kommunikation & Recht 110 (113).Google Scholar

³⁹ Scherer, J., supra note 12, at 281 (with regard to Article 7 [5] of the Framework Directive).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 290 (with regard to Article 7 [5] of the Framework Directive).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Klotz, R., supra note 9, at 6 (an economically and legally sound substantiation is required).Google Scholar

⁴² Id. at 5 (NRAs may deviate from the Market Recommendation both by defining additional markets and by abstaining from defining certain markets). However, see also B. Holznagel, EU-Rahmenrichtlinien und Diskussion um das TKG in Deutschland – Das Anforderungsspektrum an die Novellierung im Überblick, in Novellierung des Telekommunikationsgesetzes 9 (A. Picot ed., 2003); R. Klotz,supra note 24, at 496, who concludes that the Market Recommendation is “factually binding” because NRAs have to take the utmost account of it.Google Scholar

⁴³ Knauth, P., Der Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Arbeit zur TKG-Novelle, in A. Picot, supra note 42, at 29 (36). A different view seems to be held in the Guidelines, at para. 4 (“the markets to be regulated“) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Farr, S. & Oakley, V., supra note 10, at 80.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Directive, Framework, supra note 1, at Article 15 (3) Sentence 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See above, B. I.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Koenig, C. et al., supra note 12, at 60, for an in-depth discussion of the principle of clarity and defi-niteness and related constitutional law requirements.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Article 14 read in conjunction with Annex II of the Framework Directive.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 196, who explicitly identifies the need for substantive criteria as well. See also R. Krüger, Marktabgrenzung im Telekommunikationssektor und die Definition von beträchtlicher Marktmacht (SMP), 2003 1 Supplement to Kommunikation & Recht 9 (17).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Franzius, C., Strukturmodelle des europäischen Telekommunikationsrechts, [2002] Europarecht 660 (684); C. Huppertz, supra note 6, at 200 and 203. This is the reason why immediately after the Framework Directive entered into force and before the Market Recommendation was drafted many legal writers, including the authors, assumed that the existence or lack of effective competition was to be the determinant for future sector-specific regulation, see, for example e.g., Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7, at 320 (“To regulate or not to regulate, that is the question.”); U. Immenga & C. Kirchner, supra note 12, at 343; C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 157.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 203; R. Krüger, supra note 49, at note 61, also refer to Recital 27 with regard to the identification of substantive criteria for the purpose of defining markets that may be subject to sector-specific regulation. A similar view seems to be held by Husch, G. et al., supra note 32, at 141.Google Scholar

⁵² This sentence cannot be assigned clearly to either Article 15 or Article 16 of the Framework Directive. Whereas the mention of “effective competition” obviously refers to Article 16, it is not clear to which provision the statement concerning the application of general competition law refers to. On the one hand, Article 16 of the Framework Directive deals in its third and fourth paragraph with the imposition of ex ante obligations. Therefore, the beginning of the sentence (“it is essential that ex ante obligations should only be imposed”) points to this provision, see, e.g., (implicitly) C. Kirchner, Stellungnahme zum TKG-Referentenentwurf (RefE) 4 (2003); Immenga, U. & Kirchner, C., supra note 12, at 355. On the other hand, there are also strong arguments for an assignment to Article 15. First, the beginning of the sentence does not stand in the way of such an interpretation because ex ante obligations are also not imposed where there is no definition of a relevant market according to Article 15. Second, Recital 26 of the Framework Directive refers to Article 14 of the directive. If Recital 27 would really refer only to Article 16, there would be no recital with regard to Article 15 – a rather questionable outcome in the light of the great importance of this provision. Furthermore, the second sentence of Recital 27 clearly refers to (the second paragraph of) Article 15 of the Framework Directive and not to Article 16 alone. Third, if the statement concerning the application of general competition law would refer to Article 16, there would be no way to take this statement into account because Article 16 does not allow to make the imposition of obligations dependent on the question whether general competition law remedies are or are not sufficient, see C. Koenig et al., supra note 12, at 14; C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 159. It therefore has to be concluded that the reference to general competition law either refers to Article 15 – like assumed within the article – or has no effect at all. C. Huppertz, supra note 6, at 237, also assigns the statement concerning the application of general competition law to the market definition procedure; however, she justifies her interpretation by means of the Market Recommendation alone, which seems rather questionable with regard to the hierarchy order amongst the directive and the recommendation, because it implies that the Commission could decide which outcome is in compliance with the Framework Directive.Google Scholar

⁵³ Recital 9 of the Market Recommendation.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ It is not quite clear whether this third criteria aims only at a removal of the entry barriers. However, with regard to the internal systematics of Recital 9 of the Market Recommendation, it seems safe to assume that, at least, all criteria deal with the problems for competition which arise because of the existence of entry barriers, see also R. Klotz, supra note 13, at 314. In similar vein C. Huppertz, supra note 6, at 205.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Recitals 9 and 16 of the Market Recommendation.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Recital 19 of the Market Recommendation; European Commission, supra note 17, at 12; R. Klotz,supra note 24, at 497. A different view seems to be held by Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 206; R. Schütz et al., supra note 9, at 49 (with regard to market definitions at the national level, NRAs should have recourse to the Guidelines, not to the criteria set out in the Market Recommendation).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See also Cosma, H. A. & Whish, R., supra note 32, at 37. According to some authors, this constitutes an explicit exception to the principle of attribution of powers, see M. Ruffert, in C. Calliess & M. Ruffert, supra note 7, Article 211 EC, para. 8.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ At the level of the Market Recommendation there really might be such a conflict with primary Community law, see supra note 17.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Article 3 (1) (g) of the EC Treaty.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See also supra note 16.Google Scholar

⁶¹ However, , see also the rather cautious comment by Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 162.Google Scholar

⁶² Klotz, R., supra note 13, at 295; idem, supra note 24, at 497.Google Scholar

⁶³ See above, B. II.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ The same view is held by Knauth, P., supra note 43, at 36.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Directive, Framework, supra note 1, at Article 15 (3) Sentence 1.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See, for example, from the perspective of an economist M. Hellwig, “Beitrag zum Panel über Marktanalyse und Marktbeherrschung nach dem novellierten TKG”, in A. Picot, supra note 42 at 83 (84).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See also Klotz, R., supra note 9, at 7, who calls the market definition the first part of the market analysis and the examination whether the market is effectively competitive the second part of the market analysis. In similar vein, P. Knauth, supra note 43, at 36, discusses aspects of the market definition procedure within the paragraph dealing with the “Marktanalyse” (market analysis). With regard to terminology, it might be an option to speak of the combination of the analysis of markets with the aim to determine whether they satisfy the criteria for sector-specific regulation and the market analysis procedure in the sense of Article 16 of the Framework Directive as “market review”.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Even the authors of the German version of the Market Recommendation obviously were rather confused by the complex framework – its 21^st recital speaks of the recommendation as “diese Richtlinie” (that is, “this Directive”). Furthermore, its 15^th and 20^th recitals refer to “echten/r Wettbewerb” although probably “wirksamen/r Wettbewerb” (“effective competition”) is meant. A similar problem arises, for example, with regard to the Spanish version of the Framework Directive. Although Recital 27 Sentence 1 of the directive mentions “competencia efectiva”, this term is not contained within Article 16 which only has recourse to the question whether the market is “realmente competitivo”.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See also the general proposal of U. Immenga & C. Kirchner, supra note 12, at 347.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Framework Directive, supra note 1, at Article 15 (1) Subparagraph 2. The Commission will review the need for any update of the Market Recommendation no later than June 30^th, 2004, see Recital 21 of the Market Recommendation.Google Scholar

⁷¹ This is explicitly confirmed by the European Commission, supra note 17, at 12.Google Scholar

⁷² 2003 Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich I-983.Google Scholar

⁷³ However, in order to actually impose sector-specific measures, the respective market must also lack effective competition as laid down in Article 16 of the Framework Directive. This has lead to the proposal that Section 8 (2) Sentence 1 of the Draft German Telecommunications Act should be amended in such a way that the market definition does not concern the markets that are subject to sector-specific regulation but rather the markets that may be subject to sector-specific regulation (that is, when there is also no effective competition on these markets), see Institut für Informations-, Telekommunikations- und Medienrecht (ITM) – Arbeitsgruppe ‘Telekommunikation', Stellungnahme der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Telekommunikation’ des ITM zum Referentenentwurf TKG-E 2003 (2003), at pp. 4 et seq. This proposal has been accepted within the Revised Draft German Telecommunications Act which was amended accordingly. Although there are no fundamental problems connected to such an amendment, it was probably superfluous, since Section 8 (2) Sentence 1 of the Draft German Telecommunications Act does not refer to “market regulation” – that is, sector-specific regulation in the narrower sense – as it is, for example, the case in Section 7 (1) but to regulation according to the second part of the act. Thus it could well be argued that carrying out a market analysis as provided for in Section 9 of the Draft German Telecommunications Act (which also belongs to the second part of the act), is, though not a measure of “market regulation”, a measure of “regulation” (according to the second part of the act) as well. In any case, the differences between these alternatives are of a terminological nature only.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ “Workable competition” hereinafter does not refer to the concept of workable competition as defined by Clark, J. M., Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. Econ. Rev. 241(1940), but to the concept of “funktionsfähiger Wettbewerb” which is based on Clark's concept of workable competition and goes back to E. Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs (2^nd ed., 1967). See also C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, and I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, for an in-depth discussion of this concept of competition with regard to telecommunications markets.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ All translations are those of the authors and in no way official translations of the respective documents.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ This sentence has been split into two sentences within Section 10 (2) of the Revised Draft German Telecommunications Act.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ The Austrian legislator obviously also distinguishes between sector-specific regulation in the broader sense (including the market analysis) and sector-specific regulation in the narrower sense (limited to the actual imposition of sector-specific obligations) which is called “market regulation” within the Draft German Telecommunications Act.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See above, B. II.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Ironically, R. Klotz, supra note 24, at 498, criticises the use of such a criterion within the Draft German Telecommunications Act for a lack of clarity.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Kantzenbach, E., supra note 74, at 16; C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 26, and I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at note 4., for an explanation of these functions.Google Scholar

⁸¹ This function is in fact a set of functions that are typically assigned to workable competition: the allocation of supply, income distribution, control of market power (in the narrower sense), and freedom. An aggregation of individual functions may take place for the purpose of finding a definition because goal conflicts only arise between the three aggregated functions, see C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 54; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 69.Google Scholar

⁸² The creation of an “efficient allocation of resources” as one of the main functions of competition is also stressed by the European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2000 O.J. (C 291/1), para. 7.Google Scholar

⁸³ This set of function includes the functions of flexibility of adaptation and technological progress, see C. Koenig/ et al., supra note 8, at 54; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 69. In the past, the European Commission has also identified functions of competition that correspond to what the Draft German Telecommunications Act calls “productive and dynamic efficieny”, see Cosma, H. A. & Whish, R., supra note 32, at 41 for further references.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ The importance of this aspect is also stressed by Klotz, R., supra note 13, at 314, with regard to EC telecommunications law.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See, with regard to the current German Telecommunications Act, C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 134; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 71. See also Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Judgement of 25 April 2001, 2001 Kommunikation & Recht 530 (537); Monopolkommission, Wettbewerbsentwicklung bei Telekommunikation und Post 2001: Unsicherheit und Stillstand (Special Report according to Section 81 [3] of the German Telecommunications Act), [2001] 14 Bundestagsdrucksache 211 (216), para. 9.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See, e.g., Doll, R. et al., Der Referentenentwurf für ein neues TKG – Einstieg in den Ausstieg aus der Regulierung?, 2003 Multimedia und Recht 522 (523); S.-E- Heun, Der Referentenentwurf zur TKG-Novelle, 2003 Computer und Recht 485 (488); R. Klotz, supra note 24, at 498 (who obviously – incorrectly – assigns the use of the term “workable competition” within Section 8 [2] of the Draft German Telecommunicaton Act to the level of the market analysis procedure). See also the comments of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Recht und Informatik (DGRI) e. V., 2003 Computer und Recht Supplement to Issue 7, at p. 1; C. Kirchner, at 3; the Verband der Anbieter von Telekommunikations- und Mehrwertdiensten (VATM) e. V., at 8; the Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di) – Fachbereich 9, at 9. The comments of C. Kirchner, the VATM, and ver.di may be accessed in the WWW available at http://www.tkrecht.de/index.php4?direktmodus=novelle-genese.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 214, rightly points out that (also) from the perspective of EC telecommunications law there is, at least in general, no (need for) sector-specific regulation in a workable market that is not a criteria market – regardless of whether there are or are not one or more SMP undertakings on that market.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 45.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Directive, Framework, suprra note 1, at Article 16 (3) Sentence 1.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Hellwig, M., supra note 66, at 85; C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 115; J. Neitzel, Regulierung in der Sackgasse?, 2002 Computer und Recht 256 (257).Google Scholar

⁹¹ Doll, R. et al., supra note 86, at 523; S.-E- Heun, supra note 86, at 488; C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 117.Google Scholar

⁹² Goal conflicts and trade-offs are central to the determination of workably competitive markets, see C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 28 and 52; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 69.Google Scholar

⁹³ Vogelsang, I. et al., supra note 8, at 71 (see also 69).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See also Krüger, R., supra note 49, at 18, according to whom the indicators with regard to the second criterion are similar to those used for the finding of positions of dominance.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Recital 16 of the Market Recommendation.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Minor differences are not per se incompatible with Community law. According to Article 15 (3) Sentence 1 of the Framework Directive, there is explicitly no full harmonisation with regard to market definitions. This might be different with regard to other aspects of the regulatory procedure, e. g. concerning SMP as the trigger criterion for measures of sector-specific regulation, see Capito, R. & Elspaß, M., supra note 9, at 115; R. Klotz, supra note 13, at 293; idem, supra note 24, at 497.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ In similar vein, Kirchner, C., supra note 23, at 152, recommends that it should be the legislator, and not the NRB, who ultimately decides which markets should (or, from the perspective of Kirchner, should not) be subject to sector-specific regulation. Although this would go far beyond the regulatory mico-control achieved by means of the term “workable competition”, using such a criterion would at least leave a rudimentary decision on the scope of sector-specific regulation with the legislator.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See supra note 73.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ The importance of the functions relating to the control of market power for workable competition is also stressed by Schütz, R. et al., supra note 9, at 45. (However, Schütz et al. at the same time seem to restrict the relevant competitive functions to the control of market power.)Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that by referring to the control of market power the statutory definition combined four individual functions, see supra note 81.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 30; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 69. Recital 10 of the Market Recommendation distinguishes between structural barriers on the one hand and legal or regulatory barriers on the other.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Additionally, the revised definition contains some examples for situations in which this is the case: where frequent intervention is indispensable, where timely intervention is necessary to create legal certainty, where there is a need for monitoring technical parameters or where there is a need for a detailed assessment of costs. These examples are similar, but not identical to examples given in the explanatory memorandum to the Market Recommendation for circumstances in which sector-specific regulation would be considered to constitute an appropriate complement to general competition law, see European Commission, supra note 17, at 11.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Recital 16 of the Market Recommendation.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgement of 16 January 1957, 6 BVerfGE 32 (38).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See also Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 174.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ In contrast, the English version uses the term “full competition”, which is not attached to a particular concept of competition.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ See Kantzenbach, E., supra note 74, at 136; Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 23; Whish, R., Competition Law 5 (4^th ed., 2001). This questionable terminological choice was already made under the former European framework, see Richtlinie 96/19/EG der Kommission vom 13. März 1996 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 90/388/EWG hinsichtlich der Einführung des vollständigen Wettbewerbs auf den Telekommunikationsmärkten, 1996 O.J. (L 74/13) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ In particular, “effective competition” is not the same as “workable competition” in the sense of the statutory definition according to Section 3 Number 9 of the Draft German Telecommunications Act, see P. Knauth, Regulierungsschwerpunkte und offene Fragen bei der Umsetzung der Telekommunikationsrichtlinien, 2003 1 Supplement to Kommunikation & Recht 24 (25); C. Koenig et al., supra note 8, at 163. A different view seems to be held by S.-E-Heun, supra note 86, at 488.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 364, also critisizes the use of “effective competition” and SMP as (only) supposedly different criteria within the market analysis procedures as a potential source for misunderstandings.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See Vogelsang, I., supra note 20, at 509. See also the general recommendation in favour of the concept of workable competition by Koenig, C. et al., supra note 8, at 173; I. Vogelsang et al., supra note 8, at 74.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Directive, Framework, supra note 1, at Article 7 (4).Google Scholar

¹¹² Doll, R. et al., supra note 86, at 523; Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 194; U. Immenga & Kirchner, C., supra note 12, at 353; R. Klotz, supra note 13, at 295.Google Scholar

¹¹³ See above, B. II.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ See also Klotz, R., supra note 9, at 7; idem, supra note 13, at 295; Knauth, P., supra note 108, at 25. Therefore, it seems not quite accurate to call the Market Recommendation “factually binding”; see, however, Huppertz, C., supra note 6, at 194 and 206; Immenga, U., supra note 13, at 673; Klotz, R., supra note 9, at 7.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ This is the very reason why it is not really helpful in this context to look at the (important) aim of harmonisation that is also pursued by the EC framework for telecommunications. See also supra note 96.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See also Schütz, R. et al., supra note 9, at 52. In the original proposal (by the Commission), the Commission should issue a decision on relevant product and service markets, Article (1) Subparagraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E/198). According to Article 249 (4) of the EC Treaty, decisions are binding upon those to whom they are addressed. The question whether the Commission should be granted the power to define the markets that are subject to sector-specific regulation by means of a binding regulatory instrument was one of the major contentious issues during the legislative process, see Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R., supra note 7, at 345; C. Koenig et al., Die Interdependenz von Märkten in der Telekommunikation (Teil II), 2001 Computer und Recht 825 (826).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ See also Cosma, H. A. & Whish, R., supra note 32, at 52, who point out that “quasi-legal instruments cannot modify the provisions of … the secondary law”, and at p. 53, stressing “that the time for regulation by hard law is not over. It is a fundamental (principle) in all national systems that the authorities need to be given competence by way of law before they can be able (to) regulate individual behaviour. The same equally applies in the Community legal order.”Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ A similar conclusion is drawn by Husch, G. et al., supra note 32, at 141; W. Möschel, Hat das Telekommunikationsgesetz seine Bewährungsprobe bestanden?, 2002 Kommunikation & Recht 161 (164).Google Scholar