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126 Kopp & Schenke, supra note 9, § 42 margin number 125; Thomas von Danwitz, Was ist eigentlich Regulierung?, 2004 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 977, 983. See Art. 87f(1)of the Basic Law, explicitly requiring a federal law: “In accordance with a federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat, the Federation shall ensure the availability of adequate and appropriate postal and telecommunications services throughout the federal territory.”Google Scholar

127 See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).Google Scholar

128 Masing, supra note 3, 559; Martin Bulinger, Regulierung als modernes Instrument zur Ordnung liberalisierter Wirtschaftszweige, 2003 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1355 (1356); Hans-Heinrich Trute, Regulierung – am Beispiel des Telekommunikationsrechts, in: Der Wandel des Staates vor den Herausforderungen der Gegenwart – Festschrift für Winfried Brohm zum 70. Geburtstag 169 (170) (Carl-Eugen Eberle, Martin Ibler & Dieter Lorenz eds., 2002); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Regulierung nach dem TKG, 1998 Kommunikation und Recht 479.Google Scholar

129 Section 1 of the Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen [Act on the Federal Network Agency] of 7 July 2005, BGBl. I at 1970.Google Scholar

130 See Section 1 of the Telecommunications Act, Section 1(2) of the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz [EnWG, Energy Industry Act] of 7 July 2005, BGBl. I at 1970, Section 1 of the Postgesetz [PostG, Postal Act] of 22 December 1997, BGBl. I at 3294, and Section 1(1) of the Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz [AEG, Railroad Act] of 27 December 1993, BGBl. I at 2378.Google Scholar

131 See, supra, B.III.2.b).Google Scholar

132 See Section 135 of the Telecommunications Act:Google Scholar

“Hearings, Oral Proceedings

1. (1)

   (1) The Chamber is to give parties concerned the opportunity to state their views.Google Scholar

2. (2)

   (2) Where appropriate, the Chamber may give persons representing business circles affected by the proceedings the opportunity to state their views.Google Scholar

3. (3)

   (3) The Chamber shall decide on the matter in question on the basis of public oral proceedings; subject to the agreement of the parties concerned, it can take its decision without oral proceedings. At the request of any of the parties concerned or on the Chamber's own initiative the public is to be excluded from part or all of the proceedings if it poses a threat to public order, specifically to national security, or to an important trade or operating secret.”Google Scholar

133 See Section 137(3) of the Telecommunications Act:Google Scholar

“(3) [A]ppeals (on issues of fact and law) against judgments and appeals (on procedural issues) against other decisions of the administrative court shall be ruled out.”

134 Responsible lower court for actions against decisions of the FNA is the Trial Court of Cologne (Verwaltungsgericht Köln).Google Scholar

135 Bernd Holznagel, Christoph Enaux & Christian Nienhaus, Telekommunikationsrecht 67 (2nd ed. 2006).Google Scholar

136 The situation in the field of energy regulation is similar. Here, the Higher Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) is the first instance. An appeal against the decisions of the Higher Court of Appeals is only possible at the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof).Google Scholar

137 Section 1 of the Act establishing the Federal Network Agency.Google Scholar

138 See Section 42(1) of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB, Act against Restraints on Competition] of 15 July 2005, BGBl. I at 2114:Google Scholar

“Ministerial Authorization

1. (1)

   (1) The Federal Minister of Economics and Technology shall, upon application, authorize a concentration prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt if, in a specific case, the restraint of competition is outweighed by advantages to the economy as a whole following from the concentration, or if the concentration is justified by an overriding public interest. In this context the competitiveness of the participating undertakings in markets outside the scope of application of this Act shall also be taken into account. Authorization may be granted only if the scope of the restraint of competition does not jeopardize the market economy system.”Google Scholar

139 Christian Koenig, Jürgen Kühling & Winfried Rasbach, Energierecht 196 (2006); Christian Koenig, Sascha Loetz & Andreas Neumann, Telekommunikationsrecht 218 (2004).Google Scholar

140 Section 5 of the Act on the Federal Network Agency.Google Scholar

141 See, supra, B.III.2.b).Google Scholar

142 Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review of Economic Analyses, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 43, 44 (1983).Google Scholar

143 See, supra, C.I.3.Google Scholar

144 Scalia, , supra note 63, 518.Google Scholar

145 Redeker, , supra note 29, 762; Scalia, supra note 63, 517.Google Scholar

146 Merill, , supra note 34, 970.Google Scholar