¹ See Musil, Robert, The Man without Qualities 27 (Volume I, Sophie Wilkins trans., 1996).Google Scholar

² See Ulrich's metaphorical analysis of social and political fragmentation on the eve of the First World War, when he concludes that, nevertheless, “(…), zoology teaches that a number of flawed individuals can often add up to a brilliant whole.” See Musil (note 1), 27; likewise, see the introduction of Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World, 14 (2009) [hereinafter Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism] refers to the same notion of ordering legal and societal fragmentation by stating: “(…) the answer to the challenge of the Great Legal Complexity of the world seems to constitute a sort of bricolage that attempts, through multiple interactions (judicial and normative, spontaneous and imposed, direct and indirect) to link together legal ensembles (national and international) that history has separated and that will not accept hegemonic fusion.”.Google Scholar

³ See, for an overview providing different constitutional conceptions within the EU, Four Visions Of Constitutional Pluralism, EUI Law Department Working Paper 2008/2 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2008); furthermore Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty, 11 European Law Journal (Eur. L.J.) 262, (2005); see also Neil Walker, EU Constitutionalism and New Governance, in Law And New Governance In The EU And The US, 15 (Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).Google Scholar

⁴ See Edward C. Luck, A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today, in The United Nations Security Council And War: The Evolution Of Thought And Practice Since 1945, 61 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2008); Julie A. Mertus, The United Nations And Human Rights: A Guide For A New Era (2005); see also Detlev Wolter, A United Nations For The 21^st Century: From Reaction To Prevention. Towards An Effective And Efficient International Regime For Conflict Prevention And Peacebuilding (2007).Google Scholar

⁵ See Harro Van Asselt et al., Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law, 30 Law & Policy (Law & Pol'Y) 423, (2008); for an overview on the implementation of the Kyoto-Protcol, see Legal Aspects Of Implementing The Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work (David Freestone and Charlotte Streck eds., 2005).Google Scholar

⁶ See Broomhall, Bruce, International Justice And The International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty And The Rule Of Law (2003); also Marlies Glasius, The International Criminal Court: A Global Society Achievement (2006); for a cosmopolitan perspective on the ICC's evolution, see Franceschet, Antonio, Four Cosmopolitan Projects: The International Criminal Court in Context, in Governance, Order, And The International Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik And A Cosmopolitan Court, 179 (Steven C. Roach ed., 2009).Google Scholar

⁷ See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Constitutional Pluralism And International Economic Law In The 21^st Century (2010), forthcoming.Google Scholar

⁸ For a recent theoretical approximation, see Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus And Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (2010); see also Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP) 627, (2006); Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 Connecticut Law Review (Conn. L. Rev.) 1739, (2007).Google Scholar

⁹ For structural implications resulting from the formation of new economic systems, see Sassen, Saskia, Losing Control? Sovereignty In An Age Of Globalization, 2–3 and 28 (1996); see also the categorization of a new world order triggered by “the extent and nature of existing government networks, both horizontal and vertical”, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, 15 (2004); for the development of cooperation and international regimes after hegemony, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation And Discord In The World Political Economy, 49–51 (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁰ By using the term “ensemble” instead of “system”, Delmas-Marty emphasizes its neutrality taking “into account currently forming ensembles that are too changing and unstable to constitute true legal systems”. See Delmas-Marty (note 2), 17.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Mahlmann, Matthias, Theorizing Transnational Law – Varieties of Transnational Law and the Universalistic Stance, 10 German Law Journal (GLJ), 1325, 1326 (2009); see, more generally, Regina Kreide and Andreas Niederberger, Transnationale Verrechtlichung und Entrechtlichung – Eine Einleitung, in Transnationale Verrechtlichung. Nationale Demokratien Im Kontext Globaler Politik, 14, 24–25 (Regina Kreide and Andreas Niederberger eds., 2008).Google Scholar

¹² According to Delmas-Marty, “(…) differing speeds at which legal systems evolve, which destabilize normative time (…) [can] lead to perverse effects when the differences are too great (between global trade law and human rights, for example), (…)”, Delmas-Marty (note 2), 16.Google Scholar

¹³ Delmas-Marty (note 2), 14; with regard to the problem of uncertainty in international law, see also Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harvard Law Review (Harv. L. Rev.) 1791, 1801 (2009).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Sassen, Saskia, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval To Global Assemblages, 229 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Delmas-Marty uses the term pluralism in a highly descriptive manner. Referring to the book's aim, she states that her goal is “not to produce a never-ending description of the legal landscapes encountered, but to put them in order”, and, therefore, summarizes the observations of a differentiated legal landscape by the term “pluralism”: see Delmas-Marty (note 2), 1; for Delmas-Marty's distinction of “various pluralisms”, see Delmas-Marty (note 2), 2; for a very early account on the transnationalization of public and private international law, see Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (Storrs Lectures in Jurisprudence at Yale Law School) (1956); for a recent overview on the status quo of the international debate on transnational legal pluralism, see Zumbansen, Peer, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 Transnational Legal Theory 141, (2010); for another recent historical delineation of legal pluralism see Derek McKee, Review Essay – Emmanuel Melissaris's Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism, 11 German Law Journal (GLJ) 574, 575–578 (2010); for an early theoretical account, see Teubner, Gunther, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in Global Law Without A State, 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997), referring to specific problems challenging traditional legal structures with the complexity of emerging socio-economic processes and new (political) institutions, e.g. the lex mercatoria. Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Musil (note 1), 28.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Delmas-Marty (note 2), 17.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id.; see also Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism (Max Weber Lecture, European University Institute, MWP LS 2009/6), 5 (2009).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See, for the “Utopian unity” and the “illusory autonomy”, Delmas-Marty, (note 2), 2; for the legal dispute regarding the EU's compliance with UN Security Council Standards, see Joined cases C-402/05P & C-415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 2008 ECR I-6351.Google Scholar

²⁰ Delmas-Marty (note 2), 19.Google Scholar

²¹ See, again, for the development of this argument, Delmas-Marty (note 2), 17, referring mainly to the regulatory impact of the US-American government being hegemonic. Google Scholar

²² For the jurisdictional cross-references in the context of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the circular citation of decisions of European Constitutional Courts concerning the compatibility with national constitutional identities, see e.g. the translated decision of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (Ústavní soud eské republiky), November 3rd, 2009, at Nr. 137, available at the Constitutional Court's website: http://www.usoud.cz/file/2506.Google Scholar

²³ Delmas-Marty (note 2), 21.Google Scholar

²⁴ See, in this context, the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Breyer in the Medellin Case, stating that “in a world where commerce, trade and travel have become ever more international”, the non-application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations would be “a step in the wrong direction”, see Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), para. 4; see also Delmas-Marty (note 2), 19.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Richard J. Goldstone & Adam M. Smith, International Judicial Institutions: The Architecture Of International Justice At Home And Abroad (2009); also, Delmas-Marty (note 18), 3.Google Scholar

²⁶ Delmas-Marty (note 2), 37.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Delmas-Marty (note 18), 4.Google Scholar

²⁸ Parallel to this, hybridization implies the linking of new regulatory instruments, originating from national, regional and global organizations in order to synchronize the different rhythms of regulation described above; see, also, Delmas-Marty (note 2), 59.Google Scholar

²⁹ See Delmas-Marty (note 18), 4–5.Google Scholar

³⁰ For this purpose, Delmas-Marty highlights that “justice without hierarchy is built by trial and error, a sort of porosity between various ensembles, a co-penetration by capillarity”, Delmas-Marty (note 2), 27.Google Scholar

³¹ Id., 152–153.Google Scholar

³² Id., 91.Google Scholar

³³ See Tanja A. Börzel et al., Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply with European Law, in Comparative Political Studies (2011), forthcoming, on file with the author.Google Scholar

³⁴ See Zumbansen, Peer, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 Transnational Legal Theory 141, (2010).Google Scholar

³⁵ See, supra, note 12, 1793; see also Stefan Oeter, Theorising the Global Legal Order – An Institutionalist Perspective, in Theorizing The Global Legal Order, 61, 68 (Andrew Halpin & Volker Roeben eds., 2009); see, more generally, Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), finalized by Martti Koskenniemi.Google Scholar

³⁶ Delmas-Marty (note 2), 11–13.Google Scholar

³⁷ See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining and Connecting the two Fields, in Human Rights and International Trade, 29 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005); in addition, human rights conventions often leave states a large national margin of appreciation with regard to domestic implementation, but provide only minimum standards while WTO regulations may have higher standards of protection.Google Scholar

³⁸ See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A [XX1] of 16 December 1966.Google Scholar

³⁹ Mireille Delmas-Marty, Towards A Truly Common Law: Europe As A Laboratory For Legal Pluralism (2002), 95–97.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Delmas-Marty (note 2), 27.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism (note 2), 20; she refers to the concept of internormativity mentioned by Jean Carbonnier, Sociologie Du Droit, 317 (1978).Google Scholar

⁴² For an overview, see the collected essays edited by Gunther Teubner, Global Law Without A State (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); see also Transnational Governance And Constitutionalism (Christian Joerges & Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004); more recently, Jiri Pribán, Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe's Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference, 23 Ratio Juris 41, 42 (2010).Google Scholar

⁴³ Gerhard Hafner, Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, in Official Records Of The General Assembly, 55^th Session, 326, 341 (2000); for further arguments see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics (Nyu J Int'l L & Pol) 791, (1999); also Benedict Kingsbury, Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 Nyu J Int'l L & Pol 679, (1999).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Delmas-Marty (note 2), 157–158.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Delmas-Marty (note 2), 159.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The metaphorical reference of clouds is related to the diversity of legal elements shaping the legal ensembles. See Delmas-Marty (note 2), 150.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Kolusionen: Zur Fragmentierung Des Globalen Rechts (2006); see, also, Conflict Of Laws In A Globalized World (Eckhart Gottschal et. al eds., 2007); regarding the role of courts in European legal pluralism, see Maduro, Miguel Poiares, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in Ruling The World? Constitutionalism, International Law And Global Governance, 356, 357–358 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds., 2009); see, furthermore, Maria Rosaria Ferrarese, When National Actors Become Transnational: Transjudicial Dialogue between Democracy and Constitutionalism, 9 Global Jurist (Frontiers) 1, 5–6 (2009).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See, for the evolutionary understanding of international law, Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, 179 (2002).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Musil (note 1), 28.Google Scholar