1 BGHSt 49, 112.Google Scholar

2 Christoph Safferling, Terror and Law – Is the German Legal System able to deal with Terrorism? - The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decision in the case against El Motassadeq, 5 German Law Journal (GLJ) 515 (2004), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=428; Loammi Blaauw-Wolf, The Hamburg Terror Trials – American Political Poker and German Legal Procedure: An Unlikely Combination to Fight International Terrorism, 5 GLJ 791 (2004), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=473.Google Scholar

3 BGHSt 50, 16. Gartenschläger was convicted to life imprisonment in the former GDR at the age of 17. He was redeemed as prisoner by West-Germany after almost ten years in severe detention. In the following years he managed to reveal that the GDR had installed anti-personnel-mines and spring guns to prevent boarder trespassing. This caused a major political uproar as the GDR was thus exposed to have lied barefacedly claiming no such instruments existed. Gartenschläger was killed by special unit of GDR secret service while attempting to dismantle another mine at the boarder fence as proof for his allegations.Google Scholar

4 Grunewald, Ralph & Safferling, Christoph J.M., Report – Bundesgerichtshof Strafsachen (Federal Court of Justice, Criminal Law) – 2002/2003, 2/3 Annual of German & European Law (AGEL) 378–398 (Russell Miller and Peer Zumbansen eds., 2004/2005).Google Scholar

5 See Kreutzer, Arthur, Einverständliches Töten als Mord? Kriminologische, strafrechtliche und justizkritische Bemerkungen zum Revisionsurteil im Kannibalenfall, 88 Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform (MschrKrim) 412 (2005).Google Scholar

6 BGHSt 50, 80. Commented on by Hans Kudlich, Juristische Rundschau (JR) 228 (2005).Google Scholar

7 BGHSt 50, 80, 84.Google Scholar

8 §211 Murder. (1) The murderer shall be punished with imprisonment for life. (2) A murderer is, whoever kills a human being out of murderous lust, to satisfy his sexual desires, from greed or otherwise base motives, treacherously or cruelly or with means dangerous to the public or in order to make another crime possible or cover it up.Google Scholar

§213 Manslaughter. (1) Whoever kills a human being without being a murderer, shall be punished for manslaughter with imprisonment for not less than five years. (2) In especially serious cases imprisonment for life shall be imposed.Google Scholar

9 Since long the BGH favours the view according to which § 211 StGB is to be read as an independent norm (cf. BGHSt 50, 1), whereas the prevailing view in literature reads § 211 StGB as a norm that merely qualifies manslaughter according to § 212 StGB. This discrepancy is not only academic in nature, but influences the punishability of the aider and abetter to a killing by virtue of § 28 StGB; see § 211 MN 45–55: Albin Eser, Strafgesetzbuch – Kommentar (Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder, eds., 27th ed. 2006).Google Scholar

10 For a more detailed description of German law concerning murder and manslaughter see Philipp Hoffmann, The “La Belle” Trial: The Sentencing of a Terrorist Bomber under German Criminal Law, 6 GLJ 667, 670–675 (2005), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol06No03/PDF_Vol_06_No_03_667-687_Developments_Hoffmann.pdf.Google Scholar

11 This has been stated in previous decisions, see BGH 2 NStZ 464 (1982).Google Scholar

12 § 168 Disturbing the Peace of the Dead. (1) Whoever, without authorization, takes away the body or parts of the body of a deceased person, a dead fetus or parts thereof or the ashes of a deceased person from the custody of the person entitled thereto, or whoever commits insulting mischief thereon, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine. (2) Whoever destroys or damages a place for laying-in-state, burial site or public place for remembering the dead, or whoever commits insulting mischief there, shall be similarly punished. (3) An attempt shall be punishable.Google Scholar

13 BGHSt 50, 80, 88–90.Google Scholar

14 § 216 Homicide upon Request. (1) If someone is induced to homicide by the express and earnest request of the person killed, then imprisonment from six months to five years shall be imposed. (2) An attempt shall be punishable.Google Scholar

15 See Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 May 2006, p. 8; see also Der Tagesspiegel (The Daily Looking Glass) at: http://archiv.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/10.05.2006/2521273.asp (last visited 28 November 2006).Google Scholar

16 BGHSt 49, 166.Google Scholar

17 § 223 Bodily Injury. (1) Whoever physically maltreats or harms the health of another person, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine. (2) An attempt shall be punishable.Google Scholar

§ 228 Consent. Whoever commits bodily injury with the consent of the injured person only acts unlawfully if the act is, despite the consent, contrary to good morals.Google Scholar

18 RG Juristische Wochenschrift (JW) 2229 (1928).Google Scholar

19 BGHSt 49, 166, 172.Google Scholar

20 BGHSt 49, 166, 173.Google Scholar

21 Rebecca Wittmann, The Normalization of Nazi Crime in Postwar West German Trials, in: The Nuremberg Trials: International Criminal Law Since 1945, 196–202 (Herbert Reginbogin & Christoph Safferling eds., 2006).Google Scholar

22 BGHSt 49, 189–201.Google Scholar

23 This decision has been criticized. On one hand Italian activists demanded the completion of the trial (http://www.cultura.toscana.it/eccidi/rassegna_stampa/doc/engel.shtml, last visited October 10, 2006), on the other hand, in Germany, some critics asked for an acquittal (Günter Bertram, Zweierlei Maß? – Der 5. Strafsenat des BGH erledigt den Hamburger Fall Engel, Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift (NJW) 2278, 2280 (2004).Google Scholar

24 See the website of the Italian ministry of defence for the decision: http://www.difesa.it/GiustiziaMilitare/RassegnaGM/Processi/CriminiGuerra/Siegfried.htm (last visited October 10, 2006) and for the English translation of the decision: http://www.associazioni.milano.it:4080/isec/ita/memoria/engsent.htm (last visited October 10, 2006). It may be noted that the Italian judgement calls the accused, Siegfried Engel, using the fourth name of Friedrich Wilhelm Konrad Siegfried Engel, whereas in the German judgement he is called Friedrich Engel, using his first name.Google Scholar

25 The limitation period of manslaughter in Germany is 30 years, § 78 (3) No 1 StGB. Murder has been excluded from limitation in Germany since 1969 due to the 9th Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz. (StrÄndG – Criminal law amendment statute), 4 August 1969 (BGBl. I 1065[1969] and the 16th StrÄndG, 16 July 1979 (BGBl. I 1046 [1979]).Google Scholar

26 See Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, et subs.; Stefan Oeter, Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, MN 476–479 (Fleck ed., 1995).Google Scholar

27 BGHSt 49, 193 ff.Google Scholar

28 Since the soldiers who shot the prisoners were from the Kriegsmarine (navy), the accused was not the commander in charge and, therefore, not responsible as commander.Google Scholar

29 BGHSt 49, 193 ff.Google Scholar

30 See for criticism in relation to this aspect Günter Bertram, Zweierlei Maß? – Der 5. Strafsenat des BGH erledigt den Hamburger Fall Engel, Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift (NJW) 2278, 2279 (2004).Google Scholar

31 See for a famous precedence the decision regarding the former GDR Head of State Erich Honecker, Berliner Verfassungsgerichtshof (BerlVerfGH) Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift (NJW) 515 (1993); an English translation of this judgement is available at 100 ILR 393.Google Scholar

32 Indeed Friedrich Engel passed away in February 2006, only two years after the BGH decision.Google Scholar

33 See, for an English translation of the German copyright law, the website of the Oxford University Comparative Law Forum: http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/UrhG.htm (last visited October 10, 2006).Google Scholar

34 BGHSt 49, 93–112.Google Scholar

35 BGHSt 49, 102.Google Scholar

36 BGHSt 49, 105, 106.Google Scholar

37 See, for the full text of the convention the website of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/phonograms/trtdocs_wo023.html (last visited October 10, 2006).Google Scholar

38 BGHSt 49, 100, 101.Google Scholar

39 According to § 17 StGB the accused is held responsible, on principle, if he could have avoided his mistake in law. However, the sentence may be mitigated.Google Scholar

40 It is quite common in German Criminal Law to construe a more serious form of an offence by including the element “on commercial basis.” Accordingly, the element can be found in numerous penal provisions.Google Scholar

41 BGHSt 49, 347 ff.Google Scholar

42 None of the special elements/circumstances required by German law for the offence of murder could be proven.Google Scholar

43 § 20 StGB: “Whoever upon commission of the act is incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of the act or acting in accordance with such appreciation due to a pathological emotional disorder, profound consciousness disorder, mental defect or any other serious emotional abnormality, acts without guilt.” Available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm, (last visited October 10, 2006).Google Scholar

44 § 63 StGB: “If someone committed an unlawful act and at the time lacked capacity to be adjudged guilty (§ 20) or was in a state of diminished capacity § 21), the court shall order placement in a psychiatric hospital if a comprehensive evaluation of the perpetrator and his act reveals that, as a result of his condition serious unlawful acts can be expected of him and he therefore presents a danger to the general public.” Available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm, (last visited October 10, 2006).Google Scholar

45 According to this provision of German procedural law a motion for new evidence may be dismissed when the facts in question have been proven sufficiently by a prior, sound, expert opinion given by a qualified individual.Google Scholar

46 BGHSt 49, 352.Google Scholar

47 Acknowledged systems of forensic psychiatry are, for instance, the “International Classification of Diseases, Injuries, and Causes of Death” (ICD-10) or the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM – IV).Google Scholar

48 BGHSt 49, 353, 357.Google Scholar

49 It should be noted that although § 20 primarily contains aspects which resemble the English concept of insanity it does not create a defence as such. Rather, it provides the general condition applicable to every criminal offence under German law that the accused is mentally capable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his/her actions and act accordingly. The burden of proof regarding these circumstances lies on the prosecution.Google Scholar

50 BGHSt 49, 352.Google Scholar

51 BGHSt 49, 356.Google Scholar

52 BGHSt 49, 351 et subs.Google Scholar

53 BGHSt 49, 357.Google Scholar

54 BGHSt 49, 353.Google Scholar

55 Nedopil, Norbert, M.D., 10 Juristische Rundschau (JR), 216, 217 (2005) (Nedopil points out that the American system differs from the WHO-system. Prof. med. Nedopil is head of the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic of the University of Munich).Google Scholar

56 BGHSt 49, 1–7.Google Scholar

57 The establishment of the particular gravity of the guilt hinders the prisoner from obtaining a future reduction of the sentence, § 57a (1) StGB.Google Scholar

58 Brandenburgisches Gesetz über die Hilfen und Schutzmaßnahmen sowie den Vollzug gerichtlich angeordneter Unterbringung für psychisch Kranke.Google Scholar

59 One of the first academic publications on plea-bargaining stems from Karl F. Schumann, Handel mit der Gerechtigkeit (1977), a comparison between US American procedural law and the StPO under the provocative title “bargaining justice.” For general treaties on the conflict of German Criminal Procedure and plea-bargaining, see Bernd Schünemann, Absprachen im Strafverfahren? Grundlagen, Gegenstände und Grenzen. Gutachten B zum 58. Deutschen Juristentag, (1990) and Stefan Braun, Die Absprache im deutschen Strafprozess (1998). It is almost common sense among legal scholars, that plea bargaining conflicts with the following principles of German criminal procedure: (1) the fair trial, (2) legality-principle, (3) the principle of an inquisitorial trial, (4) the principle of a public, oral and immediate trial, (5) the presumption of innocence, and (6) the freedom from self-incrimination. Compare the list given by Werner Beulke/Helmut Satzger, Der fehlgeschlagene Deal und seine prozessualen Folgen, BGHSt 42, 191, in: 37 Juristische Schulung (JuS) 1072 (1997).Google Scholar

60 Many academics have outspokenly declared plea-bargaining as illegal, compare Bernd Schünemann, Wetterzeichen einer untergehenden Strafprozesskultur?, 13 Strafverteidiger (StV) 657 (1993) with further references. In BGHSt 50, 40, 51 the BGH accepts that the StPO is, in principle, hostile towards bargaining.Google Scholar

61 See, for the point of view of two of the most prominent German defense counsels, Hans Dahs, Absprachen im Strafprozess – Chancen und Risiken, 8 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ) 153 (1988), Gunter Widmaier, Der strafprozessuale Vergleich, 6 StV 357 (1986).Google Scholar

62 Dieter Meurer, Dogmatik und Pragmatismus - Marksteine der Rechtsprechung des BGH in Strafsachen, 53 NJW 2936, 2944 (2000); Thomas Weigend, Eine Prozeßordnung für abgesprochene Urteile? 19 NStZ 57 (1999); see also BGH 57 NJW 2536, 2539 (2004).Google Scholar

63 For a general introduction into the guilty plea procedure and why it is not commonly adopted in Continental Europe, see Christoph Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure 268–76 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).Google Scholar

64 The judge may make use of the confessed facts as he wishes, see BGHSt 38, 102 and BGHSt 42, 191; see for a critical review Beulke/Satzger (note 59) and Ralph Kölbel, Geständnisverwertung bei missglückter Absprache, 23 NStZ 232 (2003). This is due to the fact that the German procedural system is not by any means consensual as is the Anglo-American criminal procedure, see Weigend (note 62), 63.Google Scholar

65 BGH 20 StV 556, 557 (2000): in this case the accused hit his wife for no reason once with such impact that she died of cerebral hemorrhaging. Such an act would not lead to a murder charge as in English law (implied malice), but to a charge according to § 227 StGB: Bodily Injury Resulting in Death, which is to be punished with no less than three years imprisonment in ordinary cases and from one to ten years in less serious cases. The Landgericht of Darmstadt offered two years on probation contrasted with seven years imprisonment if the accused did not confess. Since the accused declined the offer he was convicted to seven years imprisonment. To justify this rather harsh punishment, the Landgericht pointed at the missing remorse on the side of the accused. The BGH quashed the conviction but for different reasons, and ordered a re-trial at a different Landgericht as it considered the judges in Darmstadt biased.Google Scholar

66 Literally translated this means “a pair of sanction-scissors,” metaphorically describing the drifting apart of the lowest possible adequate and the harshest yet adequate punishment as a pair of scissors. The law pertaining to the implementation of the exact amount of punishment is laid down in §§ 46 to 51 StGB. It is commonly agreed that there does not exist one, and only one, just amount of punishment. The court, rather, has a certain margin within the frame of a lowest possible and a hardest possible amount of punishment (so called Spielraumtheorie); in detail: Franz Streng, Strafrechtliche Sanktionen, MN 480–85 (2^nd ed., 2002).Google Scholar

67 Such behaviour on the side of the judges could, in extreme cases, amount to unlawful coercion, which would be punishable according to § 240 StGB; see explicitly Volker Erb, Absprachen im Strafverfahren als Quelle unbeherrschbarer Risiken für den Rechtsstaat, in: Recht der Wirtschaft und der Arbeit in Europa: Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Blomeyer, 743 (Rüdiger Krause, Winfried Veelken, Klaus Vieweg, eds., 2004).Google Scholar

68 At first the BGH (BGHSt 37, 99) stated that plea-bargaining is “basically not unlawful” implicitly following an earlier decision of the BVerfG (40 NJW 2662 [1987]).Google Scholar

69 Lutz Meyer-Goßner, Strafprozessordnung, Einl, MN 119 d (49^th ed. 2006).Google Scholar

70 A violation of this publicity requirement, however, does not equal a violation of the principle of a public trial, which would lead to a so called absoluter Revisionsgrund (absolute ground for appeal) by virtue of § 338 No. 6 StPO; see BGHSt 49, 255.Google Scholar

71 These criteria have been approved by several decisions, cf. BGHSt 49, 84, 88; 50, 40, 49–50.Google Scholar

72 Weigend (note 62), 57 et subs.; Bernd Schünemann, Die Absprachen im Strafverfahren, in: Festschrift für Rieß, 525, 536 (Ernst-Walter Hanack, Hand Hilger, Volkmar Mehle, Gunter Widmaier, eds., 2002).Google Scholar

73 BGH 57 NJW 2536, 2539 (2004).Google Scholar

74 The organization of the Court in Germany is laid down in the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG – Judicial Organization Act), 27 January 1877 (RGBl. 41 [1877]) in the version of 1 January 1975 in: BGBl. I 1077 [1975] as amended 5 May 2004, in BGBl. I 718 [2004].Google Scholar

75 The information is also available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/.Google Scholar

76 Thus, the cases at hand originating from Duisburg and Lüneburg fall within the competence of the Third Senate, which is concerned with appeals stemming from the regions of Celle, Düsseldorf, Oldenburg and Schleswig, according to the allocation of duties of the BGH 2005, available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de.Google Scholar

77 43 BGHSt 195; in prior cases a waiver of the right to appeal was not void in general, but only in the case of undue pressure. If the waiver was merely encouraged by the Landgericht, it was held to be valid.Google Scholar

78 This procedure is laid down in § 132 (3) GVG.Google Scholar

79 Decision of the 1st Senate of 26 November 2003 - 1 ARs 27/03 = 24 StV 115 (2004).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

80 Decision of the 2nd Senate of 28 January 2004 - 2 ARs 330/03 = 24 StV 196 (2004).Google Scholar

81 The other two 4th (decision of 25 November 2003 - 4 ARs 32/03 = 24 StV 4 [2004]) and 5^th Senate (decision of 29 October 2003 - 5 ARs 61/03 = 24 StV 4 [2004]) agree with the 3^rd Senate.Google Scholar

82 Decision of the 3rd Senate of 15 June 2004 - 3 StR 368/02 and 3 StR 415/02 = 24 StV 473 (2004) = 57 NJW 2536 (2004).Google Scholar

83 See BGHSt 50, 40, 56–63.Google Scholar

84 Interestingly, the BGH does not mention the right to a speedy trial according to Art. 6 § 1 ECHR; see Safferling (note 63) 250–256 (2003).Google Scholar

85 BGHSt 50, 40, 53–55.Google Scholar

86 BGHSt 50, 40, 55 refers to a Chamber-decision of the BVerfG 2 BvL 4/98 (February 27, 2000), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/lk20000227_2bvl000498.html. In this decision, however, quite the opposite has been laid down, as the Chamber points to the possibility for a victim to act as a private accessory prosecutor. Only in this position would the victim have had unique procedural rights according to §§ 397, 397a, 400 StPO).Google Scholar

87 BGHSt 50, 40, 55–56.Google Scholar

88 Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren, 18 May 2006.Google Scholar

89 See e.g., the statement of the Deutsche Anwaltsverein (German Lawyers’ Association) at http://www.anwaltverein.de/03/05/2006/46-06.pdf (last visited 28 November 2006) and of the Strafverteidigertag (Defence Lawyers’ Association) at http://www.strafverteidigervereinigungen.org/STVT_Frankfurt1.htm (last visited 28 November 2006). See also, Matthias Jahn, Die Konsensmaxime in der Hauptverhandlung, 118 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 427 (2006).Google Scholar

90 A short historical sketch can be found at Herbert Tröndle & Thomas Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, § 66b MN 2–6 (53rd ed. 2006).Google Scholar

91 For a thorough description and discussion of the issue in English, see Frieder Dünkel & Dirk van Zyl Smit, Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Re-examined: A Comment on two decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG – 2 BvR 2029/01 of 5 February 2004 and BVerfG – 2 BvR 834/02 – 2 BvR 1588/02 of 10 February 2004) and the Federal Draft Bill on Preventive Detention of 9 March 2004, in 5 GLJ 619 (2004), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=453.Google Scholar

92 BVerfG of 5 Feburary 2004, 2 BvR 2029/01, in: 57 NJW 2004, 739 and BVerfG of 10 Feburary 2004, 2 BvR 834/02, 1588/02, in: 57 NJW 2004, 750 = BVerfGE 109, 190; see Dünkel & van Zyl Smit (note 91), 619.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

93 Gesetz (Act) of 23 July 2004 (BGBl. I S. 1838); see also BT-Drucks. 15/2887; critically reviewed by e.g. Jörg Kinzig, Umfassender Schutz vor dem gefährlichen Straftäter?: Das Gesetz zur Einführung der nachträglichen Sicherungsverwahrung, 24 NStZ 655 (2004); Klaus Laubenthal, Die Renaissance der Sicherungsverwahrung, 116 ZStW 703 (2004); and with a view to the ECHR: Joachim Renzikowski, Die nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung und die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Juristische Rundschau (JR) 271 (2004).Google Scholar

94 As to the relationship between § 66 and § 66a StGB see BGHSt 50, 188, 192–194.Google Scholar

95 See § 275a StPO and §§ 74, 24 II GVG and § 74f GVG.Google Scholar

96 See the materials: BT-Drucks. 15/2887; and BVerfG 57 NJW 750, 757 (2004).Google Scholar

97 BGHSt 50, 121; 180; 275.Google Scholar

98 An evaluation of § 66b StGB from a practitioners viewpoint can be found at: Susanne Folkers, Die nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung in der Rechtsanwendung, 26 NStZ 426 (2006).Google Scholar

99 BGHSt 50, 180, 182–185.Google Scholar

100 BGHSt 50, 275.Google Scholar

101 BGHSt 50, 121, 125; 50, 180, 187 and OLG Frankfurt 10 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht-Rechtsprechungsreport (NStZ-RR) 106, 107 (2005); see also BT-Drucks. 15/2887, p. 12.Google Scholar

102 BGHSt 50, 180, 188; 275; OLG Koblenz 25 NStZ 97, 99 (2005); Folkers, supra at note 98, 426, 428.Google Scholar

103 BGHSt 50, 121, 129–30.Google Scholar

104 Under the auspices of natural positivism, see Franz von Liszt, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts 158, 162 (14th&15th ed. 1905).Google Scholar

105 The question has become relevant in one of the most spectacular white-collar crimes in Germany, the so-called “Flow-Tex-Trial;” BGHSt 48, 4.Google Scholar

106 See Matthias Jahn & Martin Müller, Der Widerspenstigen Zähmung, Aktuelle Gesetzgebungsvorschläge zu den Urteilsabsprachen im Strafprozess, Juristische Arbeitsblätter 681 (2006).Google Scholar

107 As to this development, see Jesus Maria Silva-Sanchez, Die Expansion des Strafrechts (2003) and very critical Peter-Alexis Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit (2003), and the English version: Forgotten Freedom (2004).Google Scholar