¹ Interestingly, the late 1990s actually saw a decrease in the number of international organizations after the growth in the absolute numbers of international organizations which followed the Second World War. See Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom & Kevin Warnke, International Governmental Organizations, in The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World 9, 11 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 3rd ed. 2005).Google Scholar

² Vaubel, Roland, Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu, Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis, 133 Pub. Choice 275, 276–77 (2007).Google Scholar

³ Dep‘t. Int‘l. Dev., Multilateral Aid Review: Ensuring Maximum Value for Money for UK Aid Through Multilateral Organizations (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67583/multilateral_aid_review.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴ See, e.g., Vaubel, Roland, Principal-agent Problems in International Organizations, 1 Rev. Int'l. Orgs. 125, 132 (2006).Google Scholar

⁵ Vaubel, , supra note 2, at 279 (noting the article does exclude international organizations which did not expand, which would have provided a more complete data set).Google Scholar

⁶ Vaubel, , supra note 2, at 277.Google Scholar

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⁸ Mathiason, John, Who Controls the Machine, III: Accountability in the Results-Based Resolution, 24 Pub. Admin. & Dev. 61, 65 (2004).Google Scholar

⁹ U.N. General Assembly, Review of results-based management at the United Nations: Rep. of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, paras. 33–34 U.N. Doc. A/63/268 (Sep. 22, 2008) (stating that results-based management requires clarity in the use of information in the a priori formulation and ex post facto assessment of programs); see also Trevor Findlay, Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA 94 (2012) (analyzing reform efforts at the International Atomic Energy Agency and finding that “governments have not used performance data to evaluate proposed plans and budgets”).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See U.N. General Assembly, supra note 9, para. 46.Google Scholar

¹¹ See U.N. General Assembly, supra note 9, at 2.Google Scholar

¹² Dep‘t. Int‘l. Dev., supra note 3.Google Scholar

¹³ See Dep‘t. Int‘l. Dev., supra note 3, at app. 1 at 112–29. (noting that criteria were taken from the actual surveys provided to multilateral organizations as part of the 2011 Multilateral Aid Review).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Dep‘t. Int‘l. Dev., supra note 3.Google Scholar

¹⁵ U.N. General Assembly, supra note 9, at 2.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, The Department for International Development: The multilateral aid review Ev 2 (2013), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/660/660.pdf (noting that Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden have all conducted their own review, and “[t]hey are all pursuing exactly the same idea, which is that we should be much more systematic about looking at multilaterals and deciding which are the most effective, and how we should channel it”).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See id. at 5 (explaining how “[t]he Department's Review has encouraged other donor countries, such as Australia and Denmark, to conduct similar assessments”).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. at Ev 5; see also id. at Ev 9 (“We think it would be a good idea if more of these organisations were sunsetted …. [but] that works only if lots of the members are willing to leave, so we are a bit constrained in how far we can get that psychology into things.”).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for International Development, The Multilateral Aid Review 8, para. 16 (2012), http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/1213594.pdf; see also House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, supra note 16, at 5 (“Before its next full Review in 2015, the Department should refine its framework to better reflect all types of multilateral organisation and it should map the roles of multilateral organisations, highlighting gaps, overlaps and linkages, to enable informed decisions on who can best deliver the Department's objectives.”).Google Scholar

²⁰ Corporate Scorecards, World Bank Group 12–13 (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/10/20275677/world-bank-group-world-bank-corporate-scorecard-october-2014.Google Scholar

²¹ For example, at the time the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia rejected as unnecessary a suggestion by the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations for the Tribunal to develop effective management information that systematically collates critical performance measures. See Internal Audit Div., Office of Internal Oversight Services, ICTY Completion Strategy paras. 17–18 (2008) (stating that the registry did not have efficient data to make such management decisions at the time).Google Scholar

²² See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly, supra note 9, at para. 45 (“Results-based management at the United Nations has been an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making. …”).Google Scholar

²³ See id. (describing the measurements of achievement utilized by the United Nations Secretariat).Google Scholar

²⁴ See Luck, Edward C., Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History of Progress, in The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations In An Interdependent World 445, 449–50 (Paul F. Diehl ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 3d ed. 2005) (“To put it crudely, much of the reform debate, at its basest level, is a struggle over political turf, over who is perceived to gain or lose influence within the Organization if the proposed changes are enacted or implemented.”).Google Scholar

²⁵ The processes involved in abolishing the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda provide examples in this regard. See generally Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy: Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals 3 J. Int'l Crim. L. 82 (2005); Laura Bingham, Strategy or Process-Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 24 Berkley J. Int'l L. 687 (2012). The collapse of the International Tin Council also demonstrates this. See generally Llona Cheyne, Current Developments: International Law, International Tin Council 39 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 945 (1990); Carsten Thomas Ebenroth, Shareholders’ Liability in International Organizations—the Settlement of the International Tin Council Case 4 Leiden J. Int‘l L. 171 (1991); Romana Sadurska & Christine Chinkin, The Collapse of the International Tin Council: A Case of State Responsibility? 30 Va. J. Int‘l L. 841 (1990).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 63d Sess., April 26–June 3, July 4–Aug. 12, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 52, 73 (2011) (defining an international organization as “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality”).Google Scholar

²⁷ See President Theodor Meron, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/President/120607_pdt_meron_un_sc_en.pdf (“Highly experienced and valued staff continue to leave the Tribunal in increasing numbers, and the Tribunal has made little progress in securing support for the different staff retention measures that it has presented to the United Nations over more than half a decade.”); see also Ruth Frolich, Introductory Note to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1966: International Residual Mechanism for ICTY and ICTR, 50 Int'l Legal Materials 323, 325 n.5 (2011) (“Both tribunals … are losing their staff rapidly. In fact, staff retention has turned out to be one of the biggest problems associated with the Completion Strategy, making it all the more difficult to meet its goals.”).Google Scholar

²⁸ See C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 466 (2d ed. 2005) (“The constitution of most organizations, including the UN and the majority of the specialized agencies of the UN, do not have provisions on dissolution, probably because they were intended to continue in existence indefinitely.”); Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law 1049, § 1629 (5th ed. 2011).Google Scholar

²⁹ See also Amerasinghe, , supra note 28, at 467 (explaining that this second alternative means of dissolution is possible because “treaties, including multilateral treaties, can be terminated or changed by agreement of all the parties”); Schermers & Blokker, supra note 28, at 1057, § 1641.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Amerasinghe, , supra note 28, at 468 (“[T]here is good evidence that there is a general principle of international institutional law that an organization may be dissolved by the decision of its highest representative body (the general congress), when there are no provisions governing dissolution.”); see also Schermers & Blokker, supra note 28, at 1053–54, § 1637.Google Scholar

³¹ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) In conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or (b) At any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.”); see also Schermers & Blokker, supra note 28, at 1051, § 1633.Google Scholar

³² See Amerasinghe, , supra note 28, at 468–69 (noting that the decision to dissolve was unanimous, but only thirty-five of the total forty-five members were present at the meeting, and the absent members did not protest to this decision later); Schermers & Blokker, supra note 28, at 1051, § 1633.Google Scholar

³³ See Vienna Convention art 30(2) (“When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.”); see also Schermers & Blokker, supra note 28, at 1050, §1632.Google Scholar

³⁴ See id. art. 59(1)(b) (“the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time”).Google Scholar

³⁵ See also Schermers & Blokker, supra note 28, at 1057, §1641.Google Scholar

³⁶ T.C. Res. 2200 (LXI), U.N. Doc. T/RES/2200 (LXI) (May 24, 1994).Google Scholar

³⁷ Dep‘t. Int‘l. Dev., supra note 3.Google Scholar

³⁸ This observation is based on the ratings for organizations such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization and the International Committee of the Red Cross contrasted with those organizations with broader mandates such as the Commonwealth Secretariat or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.Google Scholar

³⁹ For example, the United Nations maintains the United Nations Dispute Tribunal and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal, the World Bank maintains the World Bank Administrative Tribunal, and the International Monetary Fund maintains the Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Administrative Tribunal Membership, Int'l Labour Org. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/membership/index.htm (listing the organizations that have recognized the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Mathiason, John, Invisible Governance: International Secretariats in Global Politics 96–97 (2007); see also Gabrielle Marceau, IGOs in Crisis? Or New Opportunities to Demonstrate Responsibility? 8 Int'l Org. L. Rev. 1, 1–13 (2011).Google Scholar

⁴² See id. at 96–97.Google Scholar

⁴³ See, e.g., Alnoor Ebrahim & Steve Herz, Accountability in Complex Organizations: World Bank Responses to Civil Society (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08–027, 2007), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-027.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/16 (Jan. 9, 2007).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See also Vaubel, , supra note 4, at 130–31.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ This can also manifest in the decision of States to appoint a weak or ineffective leader to an international organization. See, e.g., John Holmes, The Politics of Humanity: The Reality of Relief Aid 15 (2013); Kishore Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, The West, and the Logic of One World 223–24 (2013); Mark Malloch Brown, The Unfinished Global Revolution: The Limits of Nations and the Pursuit of a New Politics 53 (2011).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Dep‘t. Int‘l. Dev., supra note 3.Google Scholar