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Recent Developments of Corporate Governance in the European Union and their Impact on the German Legal System
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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The collapses of several US-businesses like those of Enron and Worldcom and a number of scandals in the EU – in the recent past that of Parmalat – have strongly affected public confidence in the operation and governance of large entities trading their shares in organized capital markets. The European Commission reacted by issuing the Action Plan on Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU on 21 May 2003. The Action Plan contains measures which the Commission wants to implement over the short term (until 2005), medium term (until 2008) and long term (until 2010). The key issues set up in the Action Plan concern corporate governance, capital maintenance, recapitalization as well as decreasing capital, groups of companies, international corporate restructuring and the introduction of a new legal form of incorporation. The fact that the big rating agencies have begun to rate the corporate governance performances of major companies, can well be seen as a further indicator that good corporate governance has an important concern for managers, shareholders and for policy makers. As part of the Action Plan, the Commission has recently launched consultations on board responsibilities and improving financial and corporate governance information, on directors’ remuneration and on the role of (independent) non-executive or supervisory directors. In the light of these recent consultations and the results of the public consultation on the Action Plan, this Article offers an overview and assessment of the corporate governance measures planned at Community level.
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- Copyright © 2004 by German Law Journal GbR
References
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