1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2728/13, (Jan. 14, 2014). Before the OMT decision, the German Constitutional Court dealt with aspects of the Euro crisis in the Greece/EFSF decision, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 987/10, (Sept. 7, 2011); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 8/11, (Feb. 28, 2012) (“Committee of Nine” decision); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 4/11, (June 19, 2012); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1390/12, (Sept. 12, 2012). Older cases related to the Euro are Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 89, 155, (Oct. 12, 1993) (Maastricht decision); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 97, 350 (Mar. 31, 1998); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 123, 267 (June 30, 2009).Google Scholar

2 Gauweiler and Others, ECJ Case C-62/14 (pending). Peter Gauweiler is a Member of German Parliament and a vice-chairman of one of the governing parties (CSU); he was also a plaintiff in the Lisbon case at the German Constitutional Court and is considered an EU-skeptic. Other parties in the case are an NGO promoting direct democracy and the Left Party Parliamentary Group in Federal Parliament.Google Scholar

3 The decision to separate the OMT issue from the ESM/Fiscal Compact part was made as early as December 2013, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1390/12, (Dec. 17, 2013). The Constitutional Court issued an interim decision on the case on 12 September 2012. See BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12. See Wendel, Mattias, Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012, 14 German L.J. 21 (2013). The final judgment on the ESM/Fiscal Compact part of the case was issued on 18 March 2014 and basically confirmed the interim decision, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1390/12, (Mar. 18, 2014).Google Scholar

4 See http://www.esm.europa.eu/ for details. The ESM replaced the temporary EFSF.Google Scholar

5 There is also a capital stock funded by the Euro states, though.Google Scholar

6 See for the details the Act for Financial Participation in the European Stability Mechanism (Gesetz zur finanziellen Beteiligung am Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus), in short ESM Financing Act, ESMFinG. In the words of the Court:Google Scholar

7 Available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/. Details on the ECB action are also explained in the General Court's Order of 10 December 2013 on OMT, Von Storch and Others v. ECB, Case T-492/12 (appeal pending before the ECJ as Case C-64/14 P). The OMT program was a follow-up to the Securities Market Programme (SMP) that already aimed at buying struggling Euro Member States’ bonds on the secondary market.Google Scholar

8 The Court majority clearly spells out that it compares ESM and OMT. See BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 40, 78.Google Scholar

9 Observers found the selection of economists heard by the Court to have been quite one-sided anti-ECB. See Wiedemann, Andreas, Overview of the Karlsruhe Hearing on OMT, Bruegel (June 13, 2013), http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1109-overview-of-the-karlsruhe-hearing-on-omt-summary/.Google Scholar

10 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 55–98.Google Scholar

11 Id. at paras. 63, 69. The Court argues that the delimitation depends on the aim of an act, which is to be determined objectively, and they point to the ECJ's arguments in drawing the line between Member State powers and EU powers in the Pringle case. Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370/12, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 (Nov. 27, 2012). The majority also displays its bias by referring to “the convincing expertise of the Bundesbank.“ BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 71.Google Scholar

12 The provisions are Articles 119, 127(1), (2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], and Articles 17–24 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; Articles 123, 130 TFEU also play a role.Google Scholar

13 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 100. See infra FAQ VI for the details of the limits suggested.Google Scholar

14 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at para. 2).Google Scholar

15 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].Google Scholar

16 Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, Case 314/85, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, 4231 (Oct. 22, 1987).Google Scholar

17 TFEU art. 344.Google Scholar

18 See Kaiser, Karen & Schübel-Pfister, Isabel, Der ungeschriebene Verfassungsgrundsatz der Europarechtsfreundlichkeit: Trick or Treat?, in 2 Linien der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 545–71 (Sigrid Emmenegger & Ariane Wiedmann eds., 2011).Google Scholar

19 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 37, 271, 282 (May 29, 1974) (Solange I decision) (English translation in: Decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht Vol. 1, Part II, 270 (Federal Constitutional Court ed.,1992), The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law 440 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed., 1994), [1974] 2 CMLR 540); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 73, 339 (Oct. 22, 1986) (Solange II decision) (English translation in: Decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht Vol. 1, Part II, 613 (Federal Constitutional Court ed.,1992), The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law 461 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed., 1994), [1987] 3 CMLR 225); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 102, 147 at para. 39.Google Scholar

20 BVerfGE 89, 155 (Oct. 12, 1993) (Maastricht decision). The decision and the proceedings are well documented in Winkelmann, Ingo, Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Oktober 1993 (1994). See also Mayer, Franz C., Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung 98–116 (2000); Mayer, Franz C., Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction, in Principles of European Constitutional Law 399–439 (Armin v. Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2010).Google Scholar

21 BVerfGE 89, 155, 188 (Oct. 12, 1993) (Maastricht decision).Google Scholar

22 For the terminology, see the Kloppenburg decision of the German Constitutional Court Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 75, 223 (Apr. 8, 1987). On the distinction between ultra vires acts in a narrow sense (i.e., overstepping competences defined according to area) and in a broad sense (i.e., the general illegality of an act), see Mayer, Franz C., Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung 24–30 (2000).Google Scholar

23 Strangely enough, the German Constitutional Court also used the idea of an underlying “integration program” in the context of the NATO Treaty. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 104, 151 (Nov. 22, 2001); see also Markus, Rau, NATO's New Strategic Concept, 44 German Yearbook of International Law 545, 570 (2001).Google Scholar

24 In that sense the former German Constitutional Court Judge, Bryde, Brun-Otto, Transnationale Rechtsstaatlichkeit, in Festschrift für Renate Jäger 65, 70 (Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt et al. eds., 2011).Google Scholar

25 Lisa Nienhaus und Christian Siedenbiedel, Richter Hasenherz, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Feb. 9, 2014, at 19.Google Scholar

26 BVerfGE 123, 267, 353–355 at para. 240–241.Google Scholar

27 The legislator did not take any action so far.Google Scholar

28 See for example the contributions by Schönberger, Möllers & Halberstam, and Tomuschat in the special section of the special issue on the Lisbon Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court in 10 German L.J. 1209, 1241, 1260 (2009).Google Scholar

29 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 126, 286, 303–307, paras. 58–66 (July 6, 2010). See also Franz C. Mayer and Maja Walter, Die Europarechtsfreundlichkeit des BVerfG nach dem Honeywell-Beschluss, Jura 532 (2011).Google Scholar

30 BVerfGE 126, 286, 303 at para. 58.Google Scholar

31 See Von Storch and Others v. ECB, Case T-492/12 (Dec. 10, 2013) (Order of the General Court refusing to grant standing for individuals in that context).Google Scholar

32 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 101.Google Scholar

33 The ECJ will not answer questions that are submitted to it within the framework of procedural devices arranged by the parties in order to induce the Court to give its views on certain problems of EU law that do not correspond to an objective requirement inherent in the resolution of a dispute. Foglia v. Novello, Case 244/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3045, para. 18.Google Scholar

34 Cf. Judge Lübbe-Wolff in her dissenting opinion to the OMT reference, BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at para. 11).Google Scholar

35 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 100.Google Scholar

36 Fratzscher, Marcel, Ein Richterspruch mit Risiko, Die Zeit (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-02/gastbeitrag-fratzscher-bundesverfassungsgericht-ezb.Google Scholar

37 See TFEU art. 130, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. The independence of the ECB is even mentioned in Article 88 of the German Constitution (Basic Law).Google Scholar

38 The average duration of preliminary reference procedures was 16.4 months from 2008 to 2012. See Annual Report 2012, Court of Justice of the European Union (2013), 104, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7000/.Google Scholar

39 Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370/12, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000.Google Scholar

40 See, e.g., Oakley, David, Bond markets weigh risks of eurozone QE, Financial Times (Feb 18, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7bbb007a-97e5–11e3-ab60–00144feab7de.html#axzz2uxn3VsxO.Google Scholar

41 Emphasis added.Google Scholar

42 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 5.Google Scholar

43 See BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (dissenting opinions), for the arguments against the reasoning of the majority.Google Scholar

44 See FAQ no. 4, supra. Google Scholar

45 Wünsche, CJEU Case 69/85, 1986 E.C.R. 948, para. 13 (Mar. 5, 1986).Google Scholar

46 Article 344 TFEU, Article 19 (1) TEU and Article 4 (3) TEU. See on this also Bryde, Brun-Otto, Transnationale Rechtsstaatlichkeit, in Festschrift für Renate Jäger 65, 70 (Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt et al. eds., 2011).Google Scholar

47 European law adopts a public international law approach towards the Member States in that context. See Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24. For a precedent of judicial actions leading to treaty infringement proceedings the Case, see Hendrix ('Pingo-Hähnchen'), preliminary procedure under Article 169 EC Treaty (now Article 258 TFEU), A/90/0406, Reasoned opinion of the Commission SG (90)/D/25672 of 3 August 1990, part V (dealing with the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), the German Supreme Court). For preliminary proceedings against Sweden, see also Lenski, Edgar & Mayer, Franz C., Vertragsverletzung wegen Nichtvorlage durch oberste Gerichte?, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 225 (2005).Google Scholar

48 See FAQ 13, infra. Google Scholar

49 The German original:Google Scholar

50 This translation is adapted from the translation suggested by Winkelmann, supra note 18 at 779–780 (see also 751–799 for a French translation and 800–802 for a Spanish translation of the head notes). There, “Rechtsakte“ is translated with “legislation,” which is too narrow. “Rechtsakte“ means acts having legal effects. There are other translations in 33 I.L.M. 388, 422 et seq (1994) and in Common Market Law Reports 57 (1994), reprinted in The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law 526 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed., 1994). See also the English translation of the relevant part of the Honeywell decision, BVerfGE 126, 286, 302, at paras. 54–55, published by the German Constitutional Court:Google Scholar

51 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at para. 23).Google Scholar

52 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 53.Google Scholar

53 See Mayer, Franz C., Mit Europarecht gegen Abhöraktionen?, Verfassungsblog (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/mit-europarecht-gegen-die-amerikanischen-und-britischen-abhoeraktionen-teil-1-nsa.Google Scholar

54 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Gerhardt, dissenting at para. 7).Google Scholar

55 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 1.Google Scholar

56 Id. at para. 5.Google Scholar

57 BVerfGE 89, 155, 188 (Maastricht decision), following the translation suggested by Winkelmann, supra note 18 at 779–780.Google Scholar

58 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 45.Google Scholar

59 Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, para. 594.Google Scholar

60 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, para. 1134.Google Scholar

61 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 102.Google Scholar

62 BVerfGE 123, 267, 253–255, para. 240.Google Scholar

63 Rossa, Diarmuid, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community 416 (1997). In order to avoid a revolt or a (legal) revolution and to maintain the legitimacy of the national legal orders, Phelan suggests an amendment to the Treaties which would give primacy (over European law) to basic principles of the Member States’ constitutions relating to life, liberty, religion, and the family, which are predicated on visions of personhood and morality (not of the market or the proper distribution of goods) peculiar to each Member State. The rights through which these principles find expression would be regarded as superior to European law within their sphere of application. The exact range of this reservation would be established by the respective national courts or other institutions of last resort, ibid, 416, 417 et seq. Critical of Phelan Maduro, Miguel, The Heteronyms of European Law, 5 E.L.J. 160 (1999), and MacCormick, Neil, Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?,18 O.J.L.S. 517 (1998); see also DR Phelan, The Right to Life of the Unborn v the Promotion of Trade in Services, 55 M.L.R. 670 (1992).Google Scholar

64 Protocol 17 to the Treaty of Maastricht.Google Scholar

65 See on this idea prior to the Lisbon decision, Mayer, Franz C., Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung 341 (2000); Mayer, Franz C., Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction, in Principles of European Constitutional Law 424, 425 (Armin v. Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2010); see also Bogdandy, Armin von & Schill, Stephan, Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1417 (2011); Wendel, Mattias, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht 572–574 (2011); Claes, Monica, Negotiating Constitutional Identity or Whose Identity is it Anyway?, in Constitutional Conversations in Europe 205 (Monica Claes et al. eds., 2012); Franzius, Claudio, Art. 4 EUV, in EUV/AEUV para. 31, 42 (Nowak et al. eds., forthcoming).Google Scholar

66 Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1; Loi 2006–961 du 3 août 2006 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information (1) [Law 2006–961 of August 3, 2006 on copyright and related rights in the information society], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 3, 2006, p. 11529‥Google Scholar

67 Tribunal Constitucional, DTC 1/2004 (Dec. 13, 2004).Google Scholar

68 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, CJEU Case 208/09, 2010 E.C.R. I-13693 (Dec. 22, 2010).Google Scholar

69 See Mayer, Franz C. & Wendel, Mattias, Die verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen des Europarechts, in 1 Enzyklopädie des Europarechts Vol 1 (Armin Hatje & Peter-Christian Müller-Graff eds., 2014); Mayer, Franz C. & Wendel, Mattias, Multilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism – querelle allemande or querelle d'Allemand?, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 127 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek eds., 2012); Wendel, Mattias, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht 573–575 (2011).Google Scholar

70 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 27.Google Scholar

71 Id. at para. 29.Google Scholar

72 Id. at para. 102.Google Scholar

73 This is the article that defines German constitutional identity, according to the Court. Id. at para. 103.Google Scholar

74 Id. Google Scholar

75 The next thing that may happen is that some German court declares Volkswagen or Opel to be part of German national identity, thus removing subsidies to core German industries from EU state aid control.Google Scholar

76 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 30.Google Scholar

77 See Komarek, Jan, Playing With Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court's Ultra Vires Revolution, VerfassungsBlog (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/playing-with-matches-the-czech-constitutional-courts-ultra-vires-revolution.Google Scholar

78 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at paras. 3–9).Google Scholar

79 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 4, 7, 9.Google Scholar

80 Id. at para. 96.Google Scholar

81 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at paras. 18, 22).Google Scholar

82 “José Manuel Barroso, President of the EC, and Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the EC in charge of Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration, received Andreas Voßkuhle, Chairman of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. Discussions focused on how to best ensure the respect of democracy and the rule of law in the EU and its Member States.” Visit of Andreas Voßkuhle, Chairman of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, to the European Commission, European Commission Audiovisual Services, http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/photo/photoByReportage.cfm?ref=023108&sitelang=en.Google Scholar

83 Hugo Müller Vogg, Voßkuhle spricht nicht nur durch seine Urteile, Bayernkurier (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.bayernkurier.de/zeitung/artikel/ansicht/8522-voskuhle-spricht-nicht-nur-durch-seine-urteile.html; Wefing, Heinrich, Gefährlicher Flirt - Warum Verfassungsrichter Sicherheitsabstand zur Politik halten sollten, Die Zeit (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.zeit.de/2013/11/Verfassungsrichter-Politik-Abstand.Google Scholar

84 Consider in this context the outburst of the then Interior Minister Friedrich in early 2013: “If constitutional court judges want to make policy, then they should run as a candidate for parliament.” Susanne Höll, Innenminister Friedrich rügt obersten Verfassungsrichter, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sicherheitsdebatte-innenminister-friedrich-ruegt-obersten-verfassungsrichter-1.1657163.Google Scholar

85 Franz C. Mayer and Daniel Kollmeyer, Sinnlose Gesetzgebung? Die Europäische Bankenunion im Bundestag, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 1158 (2013).Google Scholar

86 BVerfGE 123, 267, 353–55 at para. 241.Google Scholar

87 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff dissenting at para. 15). The remedy takes Article 38 German Constitution as a starting point and creates a fundamental right to a German Parliament that still has something meaningful to decide, which can be invoked by means of a constitutional complaint.Google Scholar

88 Cf. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff dissenting at para. 16).Google Scholar

89 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Gerhardt dissenting at paras. 6–7).Google Scholar

90 See TFEU art. 263, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47‥Google Scholar

91 Id. See in that context the General Court's Order of 10 December 2013 on OMT, Von Storch and Others v. ECB, Case T-492/12 (appeal pending before the ECJ as Case C-64/14 P).Google Scholar

92 See Karlsruhe klagt über gestiegene Arbeitsbelastung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 14, 2014, at 4. Of course the 40,000 plaintiffs here are not equivalent to 40,000 cases. But there is still the question of a sensible allocation of court resources. For statistical details see http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/organisation/statistik_2013.html Google Scholar

93 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff dissenting at para. 14).Google Scholar

94 Cf. FAQs supra. Google Scholar

95 BVerfG, BVerfGE 126, 286 at Headnote 1. In German: “Das setzt voraus, dass das kompetenzwidrige Handeln der Unionsgewalt offensichtlich ist und der angegriffene Akt im Kompetenzgef ge zu einer strukturell bedeutsamen Verschiebung zulasten der Mitgliedstaaten führt” (emphasis added).Google Scholar

96 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 37.Google Scholar

97 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Gerhardt dissenting at paras. 16–17).Google Scholar

98 BVerfGE 126, 286, 303–307 at para. 95 (Landau, dissenting).Google Scholar

99 Id. at para. 104 (Landau, dissenting), Judge Landau considers the ultra vires control to exist only “on paper.”Google Scholar

100 Id. Google Scholar

101 Christian Hillgruber, Nicht nur Zähne zeigen – beißen!, 8 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3 (2014).Google Scholar

102 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Gerhardt dissenting at para. 5).Google Scholar

103 Alfred Verdross coined the term Grenzorgane (borderline institutions) in that context; that is, institutions bound by law, but not subject to any legal control, so that the resolution of a conflict is merely a political or sociological matter. Alfred Verdross, Völkerrecht 24 (1950) (referring to Hans Kelsen).Google Scholar

104 There is an interesting parallel in US constitutional history with the 19^th century conflicts between state supreme courts and the US Supreme Court which concerned the same issue, i.e. who is to be the final arbiter on the competences of the overarching polity. See Mayer, Franz C., Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung 290–315 (2000). For an example, see Hunter v. Martin, 14 Munf. 1 (1815), rev'd sub nom. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).Google Scholar

105 Andreas Voßkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts, 6 European Constitutional L. Rev. 175, 195 (2010).Google Scholar

106 Arguably that is not the intention of the Court, as judges keep repeating extra-judicially, but the perception is still there. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/13 (Feb. 26, 2014) (the latest ruling on the three-percent electoral threshold and its media echo).Google Scholar

107 See, e.g., Bryde, Brun-Otto, Die bundesrepublikanische Volksdemokratie als Irrweg der Demokratietheorie, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 305 (1994); Weiler, J.H.H., The State “über alles”. Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, in 2 Festschrift Ulrich Everling 1651 (1995). See for a more recent analysis Claudio Franzius, Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union, Europarecht 655 (2013).Google Scholar

108 BVerfG, 2 BvE 8/11 (“Committee of 9” decision).Google Scholar

109 Some rather technical matters play a role here, e.g., the fact that the Court repeatedly scheduled oral hearings where the attendance of parliamentarians was more or less expected right on the days of important plenary debates. Some extrajudicial incidents are seen as paradigmatic by some observers and parliamentarians, such as a public debate between the President of the Constitutional Court and the Speaker of Parliament in early 2013 where the judge described the relationship between Court and legislator in EU matters as Fördern und fordern (Support and challenge), a slogan associated with the rather controversial Hartz 4-welfare program. At the same event, the President of the Court, trying to say something nice about the Speaker of Parliament said that he would actually ‘adopt him, if he wasn't a sociologist by training'. See Robert Roßmann, Spitzen der Präsidenten, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Mar. 1, 2013). Let me stress that there are unfair Court-bashing twists and elements in these reports, too. See Gelinsky, Katja, Voßkuhle und die Presse: Stimmungsumschwung oder Manipulation?, Verfassungs Blog (Mar. 24, 2014) http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/voskuhle-und-die-presse-stimmungsumschwung-oder-manipulation (analyzing the media coverage).Google Scholar

110 Note that judges of the German Constitutional Court often emphasize that they have the privilege that they can take all the time that is necessary to discuss an issue and to find a decision.Google Scholar

111 That was part of the issue when Parliament tried to delegate oversight powers to an opaque committee, BVerfG, 2 BvE 8/11 (“Committee of 9” decision).Google Scholar

112 There is one indirect link between German Parliament and the ECB in the OMT case, though. The ECB created it by limiting access to the OMT program to Member States who subscribe to an ESM program. There, nothing happens without the consent of the Bundestag. Thus, the German Constitutional Court could order German Parliament to approve ESM programs only if the ECB has committed to respect certain OMT limits for the state in question.Google Scholar

113 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfGE 89, 155, 208 (Oct. 12, 1993) (Maastricht decision).Google Scholar

114 Normally, the concept is used in the context of federalism and federal-state relations. See e.g., Halberstam, Daniel, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in The Federal Vision 213 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).Google Scholar

115 Judge rapporteur Huber in a public appearance at the University of Jena, 20 June 2013.Google Scholar

116 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Gerhardt, dissenting at para. 23).Google Scholar

117 Judge Lübbe-Wolff raises this point. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at para. 28).Google Scholar

118 To give another example of the Constitution's openness, in Article 24 it subscribes to a general, comprehensive and compulsory international arbitration—without any ultra vires or constitutional identity reservation.Google Scholar

119 BVerfGE 123, 267 at Headnote 4.Google Scholar

120 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at para. 28).Google Scholar

121 See, e.g., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

122 BVerfG, 2 BvR 987/10 7 at para. 116.Google Scholar

123 Schmitt, Carl, Der Hüter der Verfassung 48 (1931).Google Scholar

124 Kelsen, Hans, Wer soll Hüter der Verfassung sein?, 6 Die Justiz 5 (1931).Google Scholar

125 See Judge Lübbe-Wolff's dissent on this. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting at para. 8).Google Scholar

126 Judge Voßkuhle and Judge Huber both used similar wording in public appearances in Berlin in March 2014 stating that the German Constitutional Court would “accept” (“akzeptieren”) a (sound) ECJ decision. This wording still leaves everything open and of course, two judges cannot speak for the other judges on that matter. The events took place Mar. 6 at the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften and Mar. 10 at the German Foreign Office, see on that Steinbeis, M., OMT-Vorlage: Richter Huber signalisiert Demut gegenüber dem EuGH, Verfassungsblog (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/omt-vorlage-richter-huber-signalisiert-demut-gegenueber-dem-eugh.Google Scholar

127 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1390/12, (Mar. 18, 2014).Google Scholar

128 On ‘court-packing’ as the most dramatic measure and its limits, see Mayer, Franz C., Kompetenzverschiebungen als Krisenfolge? Die US-Verfassungsentwicklung seit dem New Deal und Lehren für die Euro-Krise, Juristenzeitung (2014, forthcoming).Google Scholar

129 The full quote is, “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.” Luke 23:34.Google Scholar