¹ Subtitle and argument of this text are inspired by and build on Roberto Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (1996).Google Scholar

² For recent political economy analyses, see Streeck, Wolfgang, Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus (2013); Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 New Left Rev. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 2011); David Kennedy, International Legal Theory: Law and the Political Economy of the World, 26 Leiden J. of Int'l L. 7 (2013); Saskia Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (2014).Google Scholar

³ See Michael McLeay, Amar Radia & Ryland Thomas, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, Bank of Eng.Q. Bull., 2014 Q1; Michael Kumhof & Zoltán Jakab, The Truth about Banks, Finance & Development, 53 Fin. & Dev. 1 (Mar. 2016); Thomas Mayer, Die neue Ordnung des Geldes: Warum Wir eine Geldreform brauchen, 32 (2014). For references to various views in the literature on whether or not central banks can effectively control the money supply, see Degens, Philipp, Alternative Geldkonzepte – ein Literaturbericht, MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/1 (Feb. 2013), at 7.Google Scholar

⁴ Bank deposits by most accounts are considered money, as account transfers are today the preferred and widely accepted means of payment.Google Scholar

⁵ Mayer, supra note 3, at 36.Google Scholar

⁶ These indirect means include the setting of interest rates and purchase of sovereign and commercial bonds, see McLeay et al., supra note 3.Google Scholar

⁷ Josef Huber, Monetäre Modernisierung. Zur Zukunft der Geldordnung: Vollgeld und Monetative (3d ed. 2013); Mayer, supra note 3, 51 et seq.; Adair Turner, Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance (2015); Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation (2015); Kumhof & Jakab, supra note 3.Google Scholar

⁸ Huber, supra note 7; Frosti Sigurjonsson, Monetary Reform: A Better Monetary System for Iceland (2015) (report commissioned by the Prime Minister of Iceland).Google Scholar

⁹ Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof, The Chicago Plan Revisited (IMF WP/12/202); Mayer, supra note 3.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Josef Huber, who subsumes his reform proposal under the label ‘New Currency Theory,‘ focuses on public revenue generation from seigniorage, such as the income accruing from money creation, and sees herein a distinguishing factor from other reform proposals. See Huber, Joseph, Modern Money Theory and New Currency Theory: A Comparative Discussion, Including an Assessment of Their Relevance to Monetary Reform, Real-World Econ. Rev. 38, 50 (issue no. 66, 2014); the proposal for monetary reform in Iceland, which is mainly the work of Josef Huber, attributes the power to decide how much money to create to the central bank and the power to decide how this money is allocated to the political institutions of government, see Sigurjonsson, supra note 8, at 78.Google Scholar

¹¹ Streeck, supra note 2; see also Tabb, William K., Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization 121 (2004).Google Scholar

¹² Wolfgang Streeck & Daniel Mertens, Politik im Defizit: Austerität als fiskalpolitisches Regime, 3 Der moderne Staat 7 (2010).Google Scholar

¹³ See also Biebricher, Thomas, Neoliberalism and Law: The Case of the Constitutional Balanced-Budget Amendment, in this special issue.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Interview by Shiv Malik with Mario Draghi on Feb. 18, 2016 (published on Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/inter/date/2016/html/sp160311.en.html.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁶ The most prominent proponents of so-called modern money theory are Randall Wray, William Mitchell, and Warren Mosler. See L. Randall Wray, Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems (2d ed. 2015); William Mitchell, L. Randall Wray & Martin Watts, Modern Monetary Theory and Practice: An Introductory Text (2016); Warren Mosler, The Seven Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? - The Logics of ‘Hit the Bottom’, in The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional Differentiation 3 (Poul Kjaer & Gunther Teubner eds., 2011). Teubner refers to Joseph Huber's and Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof's proposals to reform monetary institutions, supra notes 7 & 9.Google Scholar

¹⁸ For legal scholarship that seeks to understand how different monetary designs shape political economy, see Desan, Christine, Making Money: Coins, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism (2014); for a brief summary and indication of the promise her research holds for reform oriented legal analysis, see Desan, Christine, Decoding the Design of Money, The Eur. Fin. Rev. 24 (Feb.–Mar. 2015); Streeck, supra note 2, also seeks to clarify the role of money and finance in political economy and to derive from this understanding proposals for monetary reform. Streeck concentrates on the external dimension of money, namely the potential of exchange rate policy to address economic imbalances.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Unger, supra note 1; Roberto Unger, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (1998).Google Scholar

²⁰ Unger, supra note 1, at 34.Google Scholar

²¹ I concentrate on the German legal scholarship and jurisprudence because the separation was already very pronounced in Germany prior to the establishment of European Monetary Union and now is even more pronounced in the European Monetary Union in response to German demands for this particular institutional design.Google Scholar

²² Unger, supra note 1, at 36.Google Scholar

²³ It should be noted that while the treaties postulate that “[t]he Union shall establish an economic and monetary union” (today, Article 3:4 TEU), it would be more correct to speak just of monetary union as member states have not fully transferred their economic policy powers to the EU.Google Scholar

²⁴ On the objectives of the Bundesbank's monetary policy before monetary integration, which encompassed not only monetary stability, but arguably also full employment and economic growth, see Roth, Markus, Beschäftigung als gelpolitisches Ziel der Europäischen Zentralbank, Soziales Recht 141 (2015).Google Scholar

²⁵ Public law scholarship and the Federal Constitutional Court speak of the principle of the tax state (Prinzip des Steuerstaats), Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitution Court], 78 Entscheidungen des BverfGE 249, 266 et seq.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Article 109:3 Basic Law, §4 Stabilitätsgesetz.Google Scholar

²⁷ Article 282:1 TFEU.Google Scholar

²⁸ Article 127:2 TFEU.Google Scholar

²⁹ Article 127:1 TFEU.Google Scholar

³⁰ According to Article 130 TFEU, neither ECB nor national central banks shall seek or take instructions from EU institutions or member state governments; Article 282:3 obliges the ECB to independently exercise its powers and manage its finances.Google Scholar

³¹ Article 121:1 TFEU.Google Scholar

³² Article 126 TFEU. The reference values are 3% of GDP for government budget deficits and 60% of GDP for government debt.Google Scholar

³³ In the course of the eurocrisis, the Stability and Growth Pact was reformed inter alia through the so-called 6-pack legislation.Google Scholar

³⁴ Article 125 TFEU.Google Scholar

³⁵ Article 123:1 TFEU.Google Scholar

³⁶ My observations are mainly based on contributions to a prominent nine volume treatise on German constitutional law, Josef Isenssee & Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, as well as on Christoph Herrmann, Währungshoheit, Währungsverfassung und subjektive Rechte (2010) and Christoph Ohler, Bankenaufsicht und Geldpolitik in der Währungsunion (2015).Google Scholar

³⁷ See, e.g., Herrmann, supra note 36, at 149. It should be noted that the function of money to serve as means of payment frequently appears to be subsumed under the function as medium of exchange. This lack of distinction indicates that money is taken to have an existence independent of the legal order that makes it into a means of payment by declaring it legal tender.Google Scholar

³⁸ Christian Waldhoff, Grundzüge des Finanzrechts des Grundgesetzes, in 5 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 813, § 116, para. 9 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3d ed. 2007).Google Scholar

³⁹ Herrmann, supra note 36, at 145.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from a Dead House (1862).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Klaus Vogel, Der Finanz - und Steuerstaat, in 2 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 843, §30 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3d ed. 2004); Michael Kloepfer, Finanzverfassungsrecht mit Haushaltsverfassungsrecht 1 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴² Quoted in Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 39 (2002) and from there requoted in numerous legal treatises on money.Google Scholar

⁴³ Waldhoff supra note 38, at para. 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Vogel, supra note 41, at paras. 2, 3; Waldhoff, supra note 38, at para. 2.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Vogel, supra note 41, at para. 19.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Vogel, supra note 41, at para. 2. Waldhoff, supra note 38, at para. 9; Herrmann, supra note 36, at 146.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Herrmann, supra note 36, at 149 (author's translation); the original reads:Google Scholar

Aus der Sicht des Staates tritt hinzu [zur Funktion des Geldes als Tauschmittel, Maβeinheit und Wertübertragungs- und Wertaufbewahrungsmittel], dass erst die Existenz von Geld ihm die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter sowie die weitläufigen Möglichkeiten wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Lenkung nach Maβgabe eigener, demokratisch gesetzter Ziel- und Zweckvorstellungen ermöglicht; hängen diese doch davon ab, dass der Staat den von ihm beanspruchten Teil des wirtschaftlichen Erfolgs seiner Bürger nicht in Naturalien sondern als Finanz- und Steuerstaat in Geld abschöpfen und dann für seine Zwecke verwenden kann. Google Scholar

Not only can money be used to discharge governments' fiscal obligations, the existence of money also makes possible the taxation of income, expenditures, and production of services. See Goodhart, Charles, The Two Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency Areas, 14 Eur. J. of Pol. Econ. 407, 416 (1998).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Vogel, supra note 41, at para. 3; Waldhoff, supra note 38, at para. 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Cf. also Streeck's observation of the adherence by German sociology to the economic concept of money as a politically neutral medium of exchange: Wolfgang Streeck, Why the Euro Divides Europe, New Left Review 95, 5, 9–10 (2015). On the account of the evolution of money in mainstream economics and an alternative, cartalist, account, which stresses the central role of the state, see Goodhart, supra note 47. Regarding the success of economic accounts of money that explain its evolution independent of the state, Goodhart hypothesizes that it “may also reflect economists' normative preference for systems determined by private sector cost minimization rather than messier political factors.” Goodhart, supra note 47, at 409.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Cf. Charles Blankart's critique of Abba Lerner: Blankart, Charles B., Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie: Eine Einführung in die Finanzwissenschaft 395 (8th ed. 2011). On Abba Lerner's theory of functional finance, see Section D.III below.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Vogel, supra note 41, at para. 52.Google Scholar

⁵² Vogel, supra note 41, at para. 58; Paul Kirchhof, Die Steuern, in 5 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 959, § 118 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3d ed. 2007).Google Scholar

⁵³ Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, volume 5: Rechtsquellen, Organisation, Finanzen (3rd ed. 2007) contains separate chapters written by different authors on the constitution of finance and the constitution of money, including: Christian Waldhoff, Grundzüge des Finanzrechts des Grundgesetzes § 116, and Reiner Schmidt, Geld und Währung § 117; on the constitution of money, see Herrmann, supra note 36; Hahn, Hugo J. & Ulrich Häde, Währungsrecht (2d ed. 2010); on the constitution of finance, see Kloepfer, supra note 41.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See also Goodhart, supra note 47, at 416 (making a similar point with reference to economics and the lack of analysis of the linkages between money and taxation). The linkages between money and finance are manifold, including, but not limited to, the role of sovereign bonds in the money creation process, the impact of monetary policy on the interest yields of sovereign bonds and money creation by commercial banks. To close the research gap on these linkages collaboration also with private lawyers is needed. The work of Christine Desan fills the lacuna as concerns money and finance in early modern England: Desan, supra note 18; on the links between sovereign bonds and money creation by central banks, see also Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money, ch. 7 (2004).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Waldhoff, supra note 38, at para. 9; Reiner Schmidt, Geld und Währung, in 5 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 935, § 117, para. 6 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3rd ed. 2007).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Additional support for the state's responsibility to protect the value of money is derived from the private law principle of nominalism, according to which the value of money depends on its nominal value; put differently nominalism means that the extent of a payment obligation is generally determined nominally and not by the purchasing power of money, Hahn & Häde, supra note 53, 32 et seq.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ As was already indicated, the view that money “can do without the state” finds ample support in economics; Friedrich Hayek, for example, advocated a denationalization of money. See Hayek, Friedrich A., Entnationalisierung des Geldes (1977).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Schmidt, supra note 55, at paras. 21, 22, 23; Herrmann, supra note 36, at 185.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Mar. 31, 1998, Entscheidungen Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Case No. 2 BvR 1877/97, 97, 350.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Schmidt, supra note 55, at para. 23.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [bverfge] 155, 174 (Oct. 12, 1993).Google Scholar

⁶² Herrmann, supra note 36, at 149; for such accounts of the constitution of money, apart from Christoph Herrmann's, see in particular Ohler, supra note 36, and Schmidt, supra note 55; on the prohibition of monetary financing, see Jörn A. Kämmerer, Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion: EWU 150, para. 5 (Helmut Siekmann ed., 2013).Google Scholar

⁶³ Ohler, supra note 36, at 2 (citing Milton Friedman & Anna Schwartz).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ In public choice terms, this situation is referred to as the time inconsistency problem. See Towfigh, Emanuel, Rational Choice and its Limits, in this special issue.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The link between the value of money and price stability is provided by purchasing power as a generally accepted expression of the value of money. See Ohler, supra note 36, at 8.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Schmidt, supra note 55, at para. 5.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Kämmerer, supra note 62, at para. 5.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Article 48 TEU.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank 32–35 (2001). In preparation of monetary integration, the German constitution was amended and Article 88, clause 2 Basic Law now expressly provides for a European Central Bank “committed to the overriding goal of assuring price stability.”Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Mundell, Robert A., A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, 51 Am. Econ. Rev. 657 (1961).Google Scholar

⁷¹ See Eichengreen, Barry & Frieden, Jeffry, The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction, 5 Econ. & Pol. 85 (1993).Google Scholar

⁷² Goodhart, supra note 47.Google Scholar

⁷³ Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 61; the English translation is available at: http://www.judicialstudies.unr.edu/JS_Summer09/JSP_Week_1/German%20ConstCourt%20Maastricht.pdf (quote at 30).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Id. at 31 (emphasis added). The Court reiterated this finding in its ruling of 14 January 2014 on OMT: Nevetheless, this restriction [of democratic legitimation] is still compatible with democratic principles because it takes the tested and scientifically documented special character of monetary policy into account that an independent central bank is more likely to safeguard monetary stability, and thus the economic basis, for budgetary policies, than state bodies whose actions depend on money supply and value and which need to rely on short-term approval by political forces.Google Scholar

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⁷⁵ Supra note 61, at 29.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Id. at 30.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Id. Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10; 2 BvR 1485/10; 2 BvR 1099/10, 129 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 124 (Sept. 7, 2011).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08; 2 BvE 5/08; 2 BvR 1010/08; 2 BvR 1022/08; 2 BvR 1259/08; 2 BvR 182/09, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267 (Jun. 30, 2009) para. 252.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Cf. Christoph Herrmann, Die Bewältigung der Euro-Staatsschulden-Krise an den Grenzen des deutschen und europäischen Währungsverfassungsrechts, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 805, 807 (2012).Google Scholar

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⁸² See supra note 74.Google Scholar

⁸³ Cf. Roberto Unger's critique of rationalizing legal analysis in Unger, supra note 1, at 8.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Barry Eichengreen, European Monetary Integration with Benefit of Hindsight, 50 J. of Common Mkt. Stud. 123, 131 (2012). Ironically, the current expansive policy of the ECB, the governmental institution furthest removed from the electorate, appears motivated not only to stimulate the economy, but increasingly also to address a situation of social instability in Europe.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Roubini speaks of unconventional unconventional monetary policy. See Roubini, Nouriel, Unconventional Monetary Policy on Stilts, Social Europe (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/04/unconventional-monetary-policy-stilts/. The ECB's newest addition to its unconventional monetary policy arsenal is the program commenced in June 2016 under which the ECB purchases company bonds: Decision (EU) 2016/948 of the European Central Bank of 1 June 2016 on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase programme (ECB/2016/16), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Philip Plickert, Deutsche Ökonomen werfen der EZB Staatsfinanzierung vor, FAZ (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/eurokrise/neuer-appell-deutsche-oekonomen-werfen-der-ezb-staatsfinanzierung-vor-12569316.html.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Jean-Claude Trichet, Reflections on the Nature of Monetary Policy Non-Standard Measures and Finance Theory, ECB (Nov. 18, 2010), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp101118.en.html.Google Scholar

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⁸⁹ See, e.g., Draghi, Mario, Introductory Statement, Hearing at the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, June 15, 2015, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150615_1.en.html.Google Scholar

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⁹³ Yves Mersch, On European Unity: Economic and Institutional Challenges Facing Europe, ECB (June 25, 2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150625.en.html.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Bank of England, The Distributional Effects of Asset Purchases, Bank of Eng. Q. Bull. 186, 254 (2012 Q3).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Bank of International Settlements, 86^th Annual Report. 1 April 2015–31 March 2016, 63 (June 26, 2016).Google Scholar

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⁹⁹ Goldmann, supra note 90; Herrmann, supra note 80.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ This shadow may explain why in Germany high tax income currently does not lead to increased public investments. While expansive monetary policy results in low interest rates on sovereign bonds and thus a good budgetary situation this may change at the hand of the ECB and the budget may again be strained due to increased debt service.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Cf. also the critique by Christian Joerges of a missing theoretical paradigm to inform the European Economic Constitution: Christian Joerges, Brother, Can You Paradigm?, 12 ICON 769 (2014); Christian Joerges, Pereat Iustitia, Fiat Mundus: What is Left of the European Economic Constitution After the OMT Litigation?, 23 MJ 99 (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁰² A. Mitchell-Innes, What is Money?, The Banking L. J. 377 (1913), reprinted in Credit and State Theories of Money. The Contributions of A. Mitchell-Innes 14 (L. Randall Wray ed., 2004); Goodhart, supra note 47; Ingham, supra note 54; Graeber, supra note 81; Desan, supra note 18; Wray, supra note 16; Mitchell, supra note 16; Mosler supra note 16.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776); see also Carl Menger, On the Origin of Money, 2 Econ. J. 238 (Foley, Caroline A. trans., 1892).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Karl Marx, Das Kapital vol. 1, ch. 1 (1867).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Graeber, supra note 81, at ch. 2.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁹ Id. at 16.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Id. at 31; with this theory Mitchell-Innes also dispels the standard economic account that credit succeeds the emergence of money, id. at 27.Google Scholar

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¹¹² See Goodhart, Charles, Currency School versus Banking School: an ongoing confrontation, 4 Econ. Thought 20 (2015).Google Scholar

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¹²⁰ Graeber, supra note 81, ch. 2.Google Scholar

¹²¹ For examples see Mitchell-Innes, supra note 102, at 19, 26.Google Scholar

¹²² Georg Friedrich Knapp, Staatliche Theorie des Geldes (1905).Google Scholar

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¹²⁴ See Vogl, Josef, Der Souveränitätseffekt 75 (2015).Google Scholar

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¹²⁶ Id. at 80.Google Scholar

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¹²⁸ Desan, supra note 18, ch. 8.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ The Bank of England was created when a group of private investors extended a loan to the government of England to be dispensed in the form of bank notes. These notes became acceptable as means of payment as they could be exchanged for species and could be used to redeem tax obligations to the government.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Desan, supra note 18, at 27.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Lerner, Abba P., Functional Finance and the Federal Debt, 10 Soc. Res. 38, 38 (1943); Lerner, Abba P., Money as a Creature of the State, 37 Am. Econ. Rev. 312 (1947).Google Scholar

¹³² See L. Randall Wray, From the State Theory of Money to Modern Money Theory: An Alternative to Economic Orthodoxy, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No 792 (Mar. 2014); Wray supra note 16; Mitchell supra note 16; Mosler supra note 16.Google Scholar

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¹³⁴ See Mosler, supra note 16. To be sure, the legal architecture of money in the European Union currently does not allow an implementation of Lerner's theory of functional finance. Implementation would require a different institutional design.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Knapp, supra note 122.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Lerner, Functional Finance and the Federal Debt, supra note 131, at 39.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Spending can be financed either by borrowing or issuing money. According to Lerner, governments should only borrow if they hold it desirable that the public has less money and more government bonds (Lerner's 2^nd law of functional finance). Id. at 40.Google Scholar

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¹³⁹ Lerner, Money as a Creature of the State, supra note 131.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ See William Mitchell and Joan Muysken, Full Employment Abandoned: Shifting Sands and Policy Failures (2008); Fadhel Kaboub, Employment Guarantee Programs: A Survey of Theories and Policy Experiences, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 498 (May 2007); see also Wray, supra note 16, at 221.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Graeber, supra note 81, at 384.Google Scholar

¹⁴² Cf. Leopold Specht, Review of Christine Desan, Making Money. Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism, 13 ICON 774 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Graeber, supra note 81, at 25.Google Scholar

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¹⁴⁷ Id. at 189.Google Scholar